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I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, numerous courts,' commentators, 2 and legislators3

1. E.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990); Coffman v. Wilson
Police Dep't, 739 F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 665 F. Supp. 381 (E.D.
Pa.), reconsideration denied sub nom. Dudosh v. Warg, 668 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1987), vacated,
853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 367 (1988); Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F.
Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984); Bruno v. Codd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979).
2. E.g., D. RHODE, JUSTCE AND GEmm 237-44 (1989); Finesmith, Police Response to Battered

Women: A Critique and Proposalsfor Reform, 14 SEroN HALL L. Rnv. 74 (1983); Waits, The Criminal
Justice System's Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WAsH.
L. Rnv. 267 (1985); Woods, Litigation on Behalf of Battered Women, 5 WomEN's RTS. L. REP. 7 (1978);
Comment, Ending the ContinuousReign of Terror: Sleeping Husbands, Battered Wives, and the Right
of Self-Defense, 24 WAKE Foansr L. Rv. 959, 959 (1989); Case Comment, Gender BasedDiscrimination
in Police Reluctance to Respond to Domestic Assault Complaints,75 GEo. L.J. 667 (1986); Note, Section
1983 and Domestic Violence: A Solution to the Problem of Police Officers' Inaction, 30 B.C.L. Rv.
1357, 1357 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Section 1983]; Note, Battered Women and the Legal System: Past,
Present andFuture, 13 LAw & PSYCHOLOGY REv. 145 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Battered Women]; Note,
Duties and Enforcement Mechanisms for the Rights of Battered Women, 16 SuFroLc U.L. Rnv. 937
(1982) [hereinafter Note, Duties]; Note, Battered Women and the Equal Protection Clause: Will the
Constitution Help Them When the Police Won't?, 95 YAE L.J. 788 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Equal
Protection].
3. On the federal level, Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware has introduced a statute, the Violence
Against Women Act of 1990, that recognizes the gravity of crimes against women and encompasses
abused spouses. S. 2754, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. S8,263-69 (daily ed. June 19, 1990).
Title II of the proposed bill "provides new laws, encourages new policies, and adds new funds to help
in the fight against domestic violence." Id. at S8,263 (statement of Sen. Biden). It includes a federal
statute authorizing interstate enforcement of state orders of protection against spouse abuse, id. § 211,
136 CONG. REc. at 58,267, and funding through grants to encourage local law enforcement officials to
arrest abusive spouses. Id. § 222, 136 CoNG. REc. at S8,268.
The vast majority of states have order of protection statutes which generally require the police to
protect battered spouses against their abusers notwithstanding the police's general aversion to getting
involved in domestic violence disputes. See infra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. For a generally
current compilation of citations to these provisions, see Case Note, 40 U. ML a L. Rzv. 333, 350 n.102
(1985) (citing Lerman, A Model State Act: Remedies for Domestic Abuse, 21 HARV. J. ON LE-ns. 61,

62 n.1 (1984)). Some state courts allow those holders of protective orders the police fail to protect, with
injury or death resulting, to bring common law tort damage suits against the nonresponsive police on
a "special relationship" theory. E.g., Sorichetti v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 461, 482 N.E.2d 70,
492 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1985); Baker v. City of New York, 25 A.D.2d 770, 269 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1966); see
Turner v. Distriqt of Columbia, 532 A.2d 662 (D.C. 1987) (child protection statute created tort duty);
Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Yamuni, 529 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1988) (child protection
statute created tort duty). See also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S.
189, 201-03 (1989). See infra note 22. In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) may authorize denial of
procedural due process constitutional tort damage recoveries against the police for their deprivation,
through inaction, of some battered spouses' entitlements to protection, created under such protection
orders, without first providing them procedural due process. See infra notes 57-89, 254-374 and accompanying text.
Disseminated
by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991
3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

have agreed that spouse abuse 4 of either sex5 is a major American,
if not international, 6 problem involving large numbers of victims 7
who belong to all socioeconomic groups.8 Police reluctance to be-

come involved in domestic disputes is a major aspect of this problem. Much harm results from law enforcement's failure to protect
battered victims from their tormenters. 9 Scholars have identified a
number of reasons for this hesitation, including the police's desire
for safety and their traditional aversion against getting involved in

4. As in Finesmith, when terms such as "battered spouse," "spouse abuse," and "domestic
violence" are used in this article they refer to both the legally married and unmarried. Finesmith, supra
note 2, at 76 n.10. See Woods, supra note 2, at 8; Comment, Does the Legal System Batter Women?
Vindicating Battered Women's ConstitutionalRights to Adequate Police Protection, 21 ARiz. ST. L.J.
705, 705 n.2 (1989); Note, Battered Women, supra note 2, at 145.
5. While the victims of spouse abuse can be either men or women, women are victimized far
more often than men. See, e.g., D. RHODE, supra note 2, at 237; Taub, Ex ParteProceedingsin Domestic
Violence Situations: Alternative Frameworksfor ConstitutionalScrutiny, 9 HoFSTRA L. Ray. 95, 95 &
n.5 (1980); Waits, supra note 2, at 267 n.1; Comment, supra note 4, at 705 n.2; Note, The Universe
and the Library: A Critique of James Boyd White as Writer and Reader, 41 STAN. L. REv. 959, 1004
n.234 (1989). And while many of the remedies for battered spouses discussed in this article are equally
available to both male and female victims, special problems exist when the victim is male and the theory
of relief is gender-based denial of equal protection or even when the victim is female but the theory
of relief is discriminatory treatment of victims of domestic violence, regardless of sex, in violation of
equal protection.
6. For an overview of the international spouse abuse problem, see Torgbor, Police Intervention
in Domestic Violence-A Comparative View, [1989] FAN. L. 195; accord Comment, supra note 4, at
705 n.3.
7. While the sources disagree over exactly how many people are battered, all agree that the
number of victims is both large and increasing. See, e.g., 136 CoNo. REc. 58,263 (daily ed. Tune 19,
1990) (statement of Sen. Biden); D. RHODE, supra note 2, at 237; Finesmith, supra note 2, at 77-79;
Waits, supra note 2, at 273; Comment, supra note 4, at 707; Comment, supra note 2, at 959; Note,
Section 1983, supra note 2, at 1357; Note, Domestic Violence and Custody Litigation: The Need for
Statutory Reform, 13 HorsRnA L. Ray. 407, 407-08 (1985).
8. See, e.g., Finesmith, supra note 2, at 79; Kennedy & Homant, Battered Women's Evaluation
of the Police Response, 9 VlcrmowcY 174, 175 (1984); Comment, supra note 2, at 959-60.
9. See, e.g., D. RHODE, supra note 2, at 239; Brown, Police Responses to Wife Beating: Neglect
of a Crime of Violence, 12 J. CUM. JusT. 277, 278 (1984); Gondolf & McFerron, Handling Battering
Men, Police Action in Wife Abuse Cases, 16 CRim. JusT. & BmHAv. 429, 429-30 (1989); Note, supra
note 7, at 408; Note, Equal Protection, supra note 2, at 788-89. A number of cases have vividly demonstrated the terrible injuries that spouse abusers can inflict when the police or other authorities refuse
to get involved. E.g., Hynson v. City of Chester Legal Dep't, 864 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1988); Watson
v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988); Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 665 F. Supp. 381
(E.D. Pa.), reconsiderationdenied sub nom. Dudosh v. Warg, 668 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1987), vacated,
853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988); Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp.
1521 (D. Conn. 1984); cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 19193 (1989) (child abuse case); Sorichetti v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 461, 482 N.E.2d 70, 492 N.Y.S.2d
591 (1985) (child abuse case). See infra note 22.
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domestic disputes.' 0 Whatever the cause, many believe that the best
way to encourage police intervention, and thus to protect the bat-

tered, is to hold police departments and their individual officers
civilly liable to those injured by abusive spouses when police inaction
contributed to the harm."
Traditionally, battered spouses could sue the police on any of
several theories. Courts allowed some actions based on state common law 2 or violations of state constitutional law.' 3 In addition,
they permitted due process' 4 and equal protection' 5-based damage
liability claims,' 6 as well as derivative actions based on the failure

10. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 9, at 278-80; Gondolf & McFerron, supra note 9, at 430-31,
438; Waits, supra note 2, at 299-302, 313-14; Note, The InadequatePolice Protectionof Battered Wives:
Can a City and Its Police Be Held Liable Under the Equal Protection Clause?, 14 FOaRDTA URB. L.J.
417, 434-38 (1986); Note, Battered Women, supra note 2, at 152-53. Police safety is a major issue, as
the police suffer numerous deaths and injuries while on domestic disturbance calls. E.g., Brown, supra
note 9, at 279-80; Waits, supra note 2, at 314; Comment, supra note 4, at 711 & n.60; Note, Battered
Women, supra, at 152-53. Many authorities, however, convincingly deny that concerns over police safety
justify police inaction in domestic violence cases. E.g., Marcus, Conjugal Violence: The Law of Force
and the Force of Law, 69 CAns. L. Ray. 1657, 1672-73 (1981); Waits, supra note 2, at 314; Woods,
supra note 2, at 19-20; Comment, supra, at 711 n.60; Note, supra note 10, at 436; Note, Battered
Women, supra, at 152-53.
For a comprehensive, but not exhaustive, listing of police excuses for nonfeasance in battered spouse
cases, see infra note 130.
11. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 & n.7 (1980) ("It is almost axiomatic that the
threat of damages has a deterrent effect.. . ."); Hynson v. City of Chester Legal Dep't, 864 F.2d 1026,
1030 (3d Cir. 1988) ("It is obvious that lawsuits requesting ... monetary awards for damages resulting
from such [police] policies [dictating inaction in battered spouse situations] will cause municipal and
metropolitan police agencies to reconsider their policies toward domestic violence."); D. RHODE, supra
note 2, at 242; Woods, UPDATE: Litigation on Behalf of Battered Women, 15 CLA iNHousE Rav.
261, 263 (1981); Comment, supra note 4, at 706, 727-28; Note, Section 1983, supra note 2, at 1382;
see also Jeffries, Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the Significance of Fault, 88
MICH. L. Rv.82, 82 (1989) (notes unconstitutional conduct may be deterrable); Note, DeShaney v.
Winnebago County: The Narrowing Scope of ConstitutionalTorts, 49 MD.L. R-v. 484, 507 & n.142
(1990) (argues holding social service agencies liable for their nonfeasance in child abuse situations will
cause them to act to protect abused children more readily). Proposed S.2754, see supranote 3, encourages
police action in domestic violence cases by withdrawing otherwise available federal grant funds from
state and local law enforcement agencies which fail readily to arrest spouse abusers. S. 2754, § 221,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. S8,263, S8,267-68 (daily ed. June 19, 1990).
12. See supra note 3.
13. See, e.g., Coffman v. Wilson Police Dep't, 739 F. Supp. 257, 266 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (applying
Pennsylvania Constitution to battered spouse's claim against nonresponsive police).
14. See infra notes 39-89 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 90-137 and accompanying text.
16. Damages are the normal Section 1983 remedy. See, e.g., Memphis Community School Dist.
U.S. 247 (1978). It can be extremely difficult
Carey v. Piphus,
U.S.
299 (1986);
477
v. Stachura,by
Disseminated
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to train the police municipal liability theory,1 7 under Section 1983
of Title 42 of United States Code18 if the abused spouses preferred

a federal law remedy.1 9 At least one jurisdiction permitted suit for
commission of a common law statutory tort.20 In the last decade
suits against the police proved increasingly successful. 2'

The United States Supreme Court significantly altered the balance in suits against the police when it decided DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services.22 That holding

to obtain equitable relief through a Section 1983 suit. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.
95, 111-12 (1983); Robinson v. City of Chicago, 868 F.2d 959 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
756-57 (1990). This article deals only with Section 1983 damage remedies.
17. See supra notes 138-66 and accompanying text.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Various other miscellaneous Section 1983 claims were possible. See, e.g., Note, Duties, supra note
2, at 974-75.
Proposed S. 2754, see supra note 3, would create a new federal civil rights statute, modelled on
Section 1983, that outlaws gender-motivated crimes of violence and provides a cause of action for
compensatory and punitive damages against anyone, including one who acts under color of state law,
who deprives persons of their right not to be subjected to such attacks. S. 2754, § 301, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. S8,263, S8,268 (daily ed. June 19, 1990).
19. While litigants can file Section 1983 suits in state as well as federal courts, e.g., Howlett v.
Rose, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 2433 (1990), the vast majority choose a federal forum. See, e.g., Herman, Beyond
Parity: Section 1983 and the State Courts, 54 BRooxLYN L. Rv. 1057 (1989). As is discussed more
fully infra note 36, after Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2307-08 (1989),
a State or its officials acting in their official capacities cannot be sued for damages under Section 1983
in either state or federal court because the State and those officials are not "persons" under Section
1983. See also Howlett, 110 S. Ct. at 2442-44 (state law "sovereign immunity" defense not available
to governmental body in state court Section 1983 suit because of Constitution's Supremacy Clause if
defense would not be available in federal forum).
20. See Nearing v. Weaver, 295 Or. 702, 670 P.2d 137 (1983); Gundle, Civil Liability for Police
Failure to Arrest: Nearing v. Weaver, 9 WomeN's Rrs. L. RaP. 259 (1986).
21. For example, in a trial conducted after the decision in Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595
F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984), the battered spouse recovered $2.3 million for herself from the nonresponsive police and $300,000 for her three-year-old son who witnessed the attack on her. Battered
Wife Who Sued Police Wins $2.3 Million, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1985 at 109. She ultimately settled her claim
for $1.9 million in exchange for the police dropping their appeal. See Case Comment, supra note 2,
at 668 n.14; Note, Equal Protection, supra note 2, at 795 n.31. See also Sorichetti v. City of New
York, 65 N.Y.2d 461, 464, 482 N.E.2d 70, 72, 492 N.Y.S.2d 591, 593 (1985) (battered child recovered
$2 million from non-responsive police).
22. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
DeShaney itself featured egregious acts of child abuse rather than spouse abuse. See id. at 191-

6

Jones: Battered Spouses' Section 1983 Damage Actions against the Unrepon

1991]

BATTERED SPOUSE ACTIONS AFTER DESHANEY

effectively eliminated most of the due process theory-based Section

1983 actions that were then brought,2 and possibly adversely affected equal protection-grounded ones as well. 24 The Court thus may

have left battered spouses with a possible common law negligence
action as their only effective remedy.
This article will discuss the impact of DeShaney on Section 1983
damage suits by abused spouses against the police. It will first sum-

marize the pre-DeShaney civil rights litigation, addressing possible
substantive and procedural due process, denial of equal protection,

and derivative municipal failure to train liability actions.2 After an
overview of DeShaney itself, 26 the article will evaluate the impact
of DeShaney on the field. 27 Finally, the article will discuss the future

and the policy considerations which will dictate whether, even after
DeShaney, Section 1983 tort actions will be readily available for

abused spouses to bring against the police who fail to protect them. 28

II.

BATTERED SPOUSES' SECTION

1983

DAMAGE SUITS BEFORE

DESHANEY

Although it could be difficult to distinguish between common
law and constitutional torts,29 before DeShaney some courts found

93. Throughout this article precedents or authorities involving child abuse will be cited because the police's
nonfeasance is accorded essentially the same legal treatment whether the failure was to prevent child or
spouse abuse. See, e.g., id. at 1004 n.4; Doe v. Milwaukee County, 903 F.2d 499 (7th Cir.); Meador
v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 182 (1990); Taylor
v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989); Oren, The
State's Failureto Protect Children and Substantive Due Process: DeShaney In Context, 68 N.C.L. Ray.
659, 709-12 & n.372, 714 (1990).
23. See infra notes 42-56, 214-53 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 375-402 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 29-166 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 167-210 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 211-415 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 416-73 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Abernathy, Section 1983 and ConstitutionalTorts, 77 GEo. L.J. 1441 (1989); Brown,
De-Federalizing Common Law Torts: Empathy for Parratt, Hudson & Daniels, 28 B.C.L. Ray. 813
(1987); Burnham, SeparatingConstitutionaland Common-Law Torts: A Critique and a Proposed Constitutional Theory of Duty, 73 Mn;N. L. Ray. 515 (1989); Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse" The Move
From Constitution to Tort, 77 GEo. L.J. 1719 (1989). "The term constitutionaltort describes any action
for damages for violation of constitutional rights, either against federal defendants ....or against state
and local defendants, usually under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Burnham, supra,at 515 n.2 (emphasis in original).
Accord, e.g.,byEisenberg
& Schwab,
The Reality
Constitutional
Tort Litigation, 72 CoRsax L. Ray. 7
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breaches of federal constitutional law in the state or local police
failures to assist battered spouses. 30 The state or local police violated

abused spouses' federal constitutional rights under color of state law,
and thus breached Section 1983,31 when they failed to protect the
spouses against attack. 32 Battered spouses usually asserted denial of

their constitutional rights to due process or equal protection or both
as the basis for suit. 33 Sometimes, they derivatively sued the relevant

municipality or municipal officials acting in their official capacities
for failure to adequately train the local police.3 4 Under any of these

641, 643-44 (1987); Note, supra note 11, at 487 & n.32; Case Comment, Anderson v. Creighton and
Qualified Immunity, 50 Omo ST. L.J. 447, 447 n.2 (1989).
For an interesting discussion of the scope of Section 1983 actions and the possible use of implied
constitutional suits as an alternative to those under Section 1983, see Collins, "Economic Rights," Implied
ConstitutionalActions, and the Scope of Section 1983, 77 GEo. L.J. 1493 (1989).
30. E.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 855 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1988), amended and withdrawn, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990); Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn.
1984).
31. For an overview of Section 1983 in the battered spouse setting, see Note, Section 1983, supra
note 2; Note, Duties, supra note 2, at 969-79. See also Note, Police Liability for Negligent Failure to
Prevent Crime, 94 HtAv. L. REv. 821, 829-31 (1981). For general descriptions of the use of Section
1983, see, e.g., 1 C. ANrmAu, FEmERA Cvxi RIGHTS AcTs §§ 51-259 (2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1989); S.
NAMOD, Civm RiGHTs AND Civm LimERTrss LmrAmoN (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1989); M. ScrwARTz &
J. KnmiN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATIoN: CLAI,
DEasass, AND FEas (1986 & Supp. 1990).
Of course, Section 1983 proscribes only state-sanctioned deprivations of rights. See, e.g., S. NAHMOD, supra, at § 8.12; M. ScHwARTz & J. Knuli, supra, at §§ 1.3, 5.6; Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky,
and ConstitutionalDamages Claims, 75 VA. L. REv. 1117, 1118 (1989); Rosen, The Bivens Constitutional
Tort: An Unfulfilled Promise, 67 N.C.L. Ray. 337, 337-39 (1989). Analogous federal actions for abused
spouses against federal law enforcement officials should be available pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971), and its progeny. See, e.g.,
Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1248 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (court allowed Section 1983-type action
in Bivens claim); Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 833
(1982); Masel v. Barrett, 707 F. Supp. 4, 7 n.1 (D.D.C. 1989). For more on Bivens, see, e.g., Nichol,
supra; Rosen, supra; Note, United States v. Stanley: MilitaryPersonneland the Bivens Action, 67 N.C.L.
REv. 233 (1988).
32. For the elements of a Section 1983 suit, see, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981),
rev'd on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S.
635, 640 (1980); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990); Note, Section
1983, supra note 2, at 1358.
33. See, e.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 855 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1988), amended and
withdrawn, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990); Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 629 F. Supp. 849 (E.D. Pa.
1985).
34. See, e.g., Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 665 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa.), reconsiderationdenied
suli nom. Dudosh v. Warg, 668 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1987), vacated, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 656 F. Supp. 423 (N.D.
Cal. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990); Bartalone v. County of Berrien,
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
643 F. Supp. 574 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
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theories of action, battered spouses had to establish that their injury
was proximately caused by the alleged Section 1983 violation.35 Section 1983 issues like general municipal liability 6 or potential im-

35. In Martinez v. California the Supreme Court held that a showing of proximate causation is
a prerequisite to any Section 1983 suit. 444 U.S. 277 (1980). Accord, e.g., Brower v. County of Inyo,
109 S. Ct. 1378, 1382-83 (1989); DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197 n.4. See infra note 46 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of Martinez and the proximate cause necessity in Section 1983 litigation, see, e.g.,
Comment, Actionable Inaction: Section 1983 Liability for Failure to Act, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 1048,
1052-53 (1986) [hereinafter Comment, Actionable Inaction]; Comment, Abused Children and State-Created ProtectionAgencies: A ProposedSection 1983 Standard, 57 U. CN. L. REv. 1419, 1434-37 (1989)
[hereinafter Comment, Abused Children]; Note, Defining the Scope of the Due Process Right to Protection: The Fourth Circuit Considers Child Abuse and Good Faith Immunity, 70 CoRNmL L. REv.
940, 952-54 (1985).
The proximate cause requirement would prove important in domestic violence police inaction litigation. For example, the Seventh Circuit's decision in DeShaney was grounded in part in Martinezs
proximate causation mandate. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 812 F.2d 298,
302-03 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'd on other grounds, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). As the court there observed:
mhe fact that state inaction might be deemed a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury
under evolving common law notions is not enough to establish a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The states are free in the administration of their own tort law to attenuate the
requirement of causation as far as they want ... but deprivation in the constitutional sense
requires more than a minimal or fictitious causal connection between the action of the state
and the injury of the plaintiff.
Id. See Garcia v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 728, 740 n.10, 789 P.2d 960, 967 n.10, 268 Cal. Rptr.
779, 786 n.10 (1990) (Section 1983 claim). Other governmental nonfeasance cases also addressed the
proximate causation issue. E.g., Commonwealth Bank & Trust Co. v. Russell, 825 F.2d 12, 14-15 (3d
Cir. 1987); Ketchum v. Alameda County, 811 F.2d 1243, 1245-47 (9th Cir. 1987); Hayes v. Vessey, 777
F.2d 1149, 1153-54 (6th Cir. 1985); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1205 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984); Dimas v. County of Quay, 730 F. Supp. 373, 375 (D.N.M. 1990); see
Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 586 n.2 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 341 (1990). After
Martinez, any battered spouse or other person contemplating a Section 1983 suit against the inactive
police clearly first had to establish proximate causation.
36. Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, a municipality is not subject to Section 1983
liability for the unconstitutional acts of its agents or employees solely on a respondeat superior or
vicarious basis. 436 U.S. 658, 694-5, 690 n.55 (1978). See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 385 (1989); Howell v. City of Catoosa, 729 F. Supp. 1308, 1310 (N.D. Okla. 1990). Instead, in
order to recover from a municipality the plaintiff in a constitutional tort action must show, under Monell,
that "the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by [the municipality's] officers."
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Thus, the municipality itself must have caused the unconstitutional act. See
City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 385. As Pembaur v. Cincinnati established, a single illegal act committed
pursuant to municipal policy might justify imposing Section 1983 liability against a municipality. 475
U.S. 469 (1986). See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985). For more on municipal
liabllity under Section 1983, see, e.g., Brown, CorrelatingMunicipal Liability and Official Immunity
Under Section 1983, 1989 U. ILL. L. Rev. 625; Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: Balancing Federalism
Concerns and Municipal Accountability Under Section 1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 539 (1989); Oliver,
Municipal Liabilityfor Police Misconduct under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,
64 WAsm. U.L.Q. 151 (1986); Schuck, MunicipalLiability UnderSection 1983: Some Lessons from Tort
Law and Organization
Theory, 77Repository
GEo. L.J. 1753
(1989).1991
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3 7 arose in many
munity of individual government officials/defendants
38

domestic violence police inaction cases.

context of a Section 1983 failure to train the police derivative constitutional tort action, see infra notes
138-66, 403-15 and accompanying text.
The Section 1983 municipal liability rules established by Monell and its progeny apply to both
municipalities and public officials acting in their official capacity. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55; see,
e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985); Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-73 (1985).
References to municipal liability in this article should accordingly be deemed also to refer to liability
of those public officials.
This article concerns municipal, or local, government liability rather than that of state government.
State government is protected from federal court damage actions by the eleventh amendment. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). And a few months after the Supreme Court issued DeShaney, it
held in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police that neither states nor state officials acting in their
official capacities are "persons" subject to liability under Section 1983. 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2307-08 (1989).
See, e.g., Garcia v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 728, 739, 789 P.2d 960, 966, 268 Cal. Rptr. 779, 785
(1990) (Section 1983 claim). Thus, a state and its officials acting in their official capacities cannot be
sued under Section 1983 for damages in either state or federal court. For more on state government,
the eleventh amendment, and Section 1983, see, e.g., Brown, supra, at 627 n.16; Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. Cm. L. Ray. 61 (1989); Nahmod, Government
Liability Under Section 1983: The Present Is Prologue, 21 URa. LAw 1 (1989); Shreve, Letting Go of
the Eleventh Amendment, 64 IND. L.J. 601 (1989).
37. Both absolute and qualified immunity are available to individual state or local officials who
are sued in Section 1983 actions. Only a few classes of persons whose activities are integral to the
governmental process, such as legislators, judges, and prosecutors, are accorded absolute immunity. See,
e.g., Case Comment, supra note 29, at 447-48; QualifiedImmunity, 56 GEo. WAsH. L. Ray. 1047, 1048
& n.3 (1988). Qualified immunity is more generally accessible, specifically to police officers and officials.
Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), and Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987),
police may carry out their discretionary law enforcement duties free from suit unless they act illegally
and violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (emphasis added). This Supreme Court-mandated protection
for the police "represents a compromise between the conflicting concerns of permitting the recovery of
damages for vindication of constitutional rights caused by the abuse of public office and permitting
government officers to perform discretionary functions without fear of harassing litigation." Hynson v.
City of Chester Legal Dep't, 864 F.2d 1026, 1031-32 (3d Cir. 1988). An officer's qualified immunity
is only overcome if at the time the officer acted it was clearly established that the officer's behavior
was contrary to law. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819. Qualified immunity was important in several Section
1983 domestic violence actions by battered spouses against the police. E.g., Hynson; Watson v. City
of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988); Turner v. City of North Charleston, 675 F. Supp. 314
(D.S.C. 1987). For more on qualified immunity, see, e.g., Gildin, Immunizing Intentional Violations of
ConstitutionalRights Through JudicialLegislation: The Extension of Harlow v. Fitzgerald to Section
1983 Actions, 38 EMORY L.J. 369 (1989); Urbonya, ProblematicStandards of Reasonableness: Qualified
Immunity in Section 1983 Actions for a Police Officer's Use of Excessive Force, 62 TEM. L. Ra,. 61
(1989).
38. E.g., Hynson v. City of Chester Legal Dep't, 864 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1988); Watson v. City
of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988); Turner v. City of North Charleston, 675 F. Supp. 314
(D.S.C. 1987); Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 665 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa.), reconsideration denied sub
nom. Dudosh v. Warg, 668 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1987), vacated, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 942 (1988); Bartalone v. County of Berrien, 643 F. Supp. 574 (W.D. Mich. 1986);
Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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A.

Denial of Due Process

The federal due process issue posed in the abused spouse predicament is whether state or local police nonfeasance through failure
to protect the spouse from abuse - possibly in derogation of statute
denies the spouse due process.3 9 Spouses injured in such situations
have claimed violations of both substantive and procedural due process tenets. 4° The police misbehavior must be more than simple neg41
ligence to be actionable.
1.

"Special Relationship" Substantive Due Process Cases

Many pre-DeShaney authorities, including a number of decisions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, doubted that police inaction constituted a federal substantive due process violation and held there was no federal duty
to protect the citizenry. 42 Others perceived this inaction as uncon-

39. "[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law ...." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1. See generally Urbonya, Establishing a Deprivation of a
ConstitutionalRight to PersonalSecurity Under Section 1983: The Use of Unjustified Force by State
Officials in Violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 51 ALa. L. Ray. 173, 174
n.9 (1987); Comment, Actionable Inaction, supra note 35.
40. See, e.g., Note, Duties, supra note 2, at 975. As courts and scholars agree, a number of
kinds of due process, both procedural and substantive, currently exist. E.g., Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818
F.2d 791, 794 (l1th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989); Burnham, supra note
29, at 517-19; see also Urbonya, supra note 39, at 175-76.
41. In Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), and Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986),
the Supreme Court established that the due process clause is not abridged by negligent acts. See, e.g.,
Burnham, supra note 29, at 522-23. Acts constituting gross negligence or other non-intentional behavior
more culpable than negligence probably can be the subject of due process constitutional tort litigation.
See, e.g., Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1390-91 & n.8 (10th Cir. 1990); Wood v. Ostrander,
879 F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 341 (1990); Archie v. City of Racine,
847 F.2d 1211, 1218-20 & n.8 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989); Taylor
v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 793 (l1th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989); L.
TRm, AmmucAN CoNSTToNAL LAw § 10-7, at 665 n.10 (2d ed. 1988); Oren, infra note 22, at 72128; Comment, Abused Children, supra note 35, at 1438.
For more on the proof of discriminatory intent requirement that can apply in some denial of equal
protection cases, see infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text. For a discussion of levels of culpability
in municipal failure to train the police litigation, see infra notes 151, 408, 414 and accompanying text.
42. E.g., Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1220-24 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) ("Section
1983 is not ... a source of authority for federal courts to revise the structural choices any government
must make. Political society exists to choose among the many good things we all wish to have, but
which cannot be attained simultaneously.... The Constitution does not require the state to hew to the
best balance between effective care and expensive care-even if we knew what the best balance is.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991

11

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 2
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 93

stitutional. 4 Those courts which determined that a police failure to

Dissatisfaction with the outcome of such a political choice is not a sufficient ground for declaring the
structure unconstitutional." Id. at 1224), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989); Wideman v. Shallowford
Community Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1034-37 (11th Cir. 1987); Harpole v. Arkansas Dep't of Human
Services, 820 F.2d 923, 926 (8th Cir. 1987); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services,
812 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1987) ("The men who framed the original Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment were worried about government's oppressing the citizenry rather than about its failing to
provide adequate social services. For such failures, political remedies (along with such legal remedies as
states might see fit to provide in their own courts) were assumed to be adequate." Id. at 301), af'd,
489 U.S. 189 (1989); Washington v. District of Columbia, 802 F.2d 1478, 1480-82 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507, 510 (7th Cir.) ("mhe police have no constitutional duty to save people
in danger. The bill of rights is designed to protect people from the state, not to ensure that the state
supplies minimum levels of safety or comfort.... The level of safety to be provided by the police to
the people ... is determined by political and economic forces, not by juries implementing the due
process clause." Id. at 510 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986);
Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714, 720-23 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986); Ellsworth
v. City of Racine, 774 F.2d 182, 185 (7th Cir. 1985) ("iThere is nothing in the Constitution which
requires governmental units to act when members of the general public are in danger." Id. at 185),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047 (1986); Hinman v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 771 F.2d 189, 194 (7th Cir.
1985) ("The Constitution was designed as a charter of negative liberties; it generally does not impose
any affirmative duty on federal or state governments to provide services .... ." Id. at 194); Jackson v.
Byrne, 738 F.2d 1443, 1446 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[N]othing in the Constitution requires governmental units
to act when members of the general public are imperiled.. ." Id. at 1446); Beard v. O'Neal, 728 F.2d
894, 899-900 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 825 (1984); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200,
1203-4 (7th Cir. 1983) ("iThe Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties. The
men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that government might do too little for the people
but that it might do too much to them. The Fourteenth Amendment ... sought to protect Americans
from oppression by state government, not to secure them basic governmental services .... [N]o one
thought federal constitutional guarantees or federal tort remedies necessary to prod the states to provide
the services that everyone wanted provided. ... It is enough to note that, as currently understood, the
concept of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include a right to basic services, whether
competently provided or otherwise." Id. at 12034 (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984);
Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) ("iThere is no constitutional right to be protected
by the state against being murdered by criminals or madmen. It is monstrous if the state fails to protect
its residents against such predators but it does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment or, we suppose, any other provision of the Constitution. The Constitution is a charter of
negative liberties; it tells the state to let people alone; it does not require the federal government or the
state to provide services, even so elementary a service as maintaining law and order." Id. at 618); see,
e.g., Currie, Positive and Negative ConstitutionalRights, 53 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 864 (1986); Comment,
Actionable Inaction, supra note 35, at 1055-57; Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Snake Pits, Lion's Dens and
Section 1983: When Does Inaction Equal Action?-DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services, 24 VAKE FoazsTr L. Rzv. 781, 788-94, 801-04, 812-21 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Snake
Pits]; cf. Note, An Abused Child's Right to Life, Liberty, and Property in the Home: Constitutional
Approval of State Inaction, 92 W. VA. L. Ray. 175, 180-84 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Constitutional
Approval]. See generally Brown, supra note 29, at 880 (noting United States Supreme Court's recent
tendency to preclude most constitutionally-based Section 1983 claims); Nahmod, supra note 29, at 173844, 1746-48, 1750-51 (Supreme Court's increasing use of tort language in Section 1983 cases undercuts
constitutional status of these suits, notably in DeShaney).
43. See, e.g., Note, Snake Pits, supra note 42, at 804-11; Case Note, 12 HAMLiNE L. REv. 421
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
(1989); cf. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Casefor ConstitutionalProtection of Foster Children from12
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avert spouse abuse unconstitutionally violated substantive due proc-

ess did so by holding the state had a duty to protect disadvantaged
persons" who had a "special relationship"

45

with the state. They

reached this point by relying on language in the Supreme Court's
decision in Martinez v. California," which the lower courts construed as authorizing a due process action when a "special rela-

tionship" existed. 47 The courts considered various factors in order

Abuse and Neglect, 23 HiARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 199, 217-27 (1988) (argues that a due process-based
right to safety protects those beyond institutional walls such as abused spouses from harm governmental
inaction permitted to occur); Comment, Actionable Inaction, supra note 35, at 1063-72; Note, supra
note 35.
44. Such persons might include children, e.g., Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503
(3d Cir. 1985); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979); Sherrell v. City of Longview, 683 F.
Supp. 1108 (E.D. Tex. 1987), or battered spouses. E.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 855 F.2d
1421 (9th Cir. 1988), amended and withdrawn, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990); Turner v. City of North
Charleston, 675 F. Supp. 314 (D.S.C. 1987); Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 629 F. Supp. 849 (E.D.
Pa. 1985); cf. Lowers v. City of Streator, 627 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (rape victim).
45. The requisite "special relationship" is a constitutional concept which is similar to, yet very
different from, the common law tort negligence idea discussed supra note 3. See Coffman v. Wilson
Police Dep't, 739 F. Supp. 257, 265 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 665 F. Supp.
381, 388 n.1 (E.D. Pa.), reconsideration denied sub nom. Dudosh v. Warg, 668 F. Supp. 944 (E.D.
Pa. 1987), vacated, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988); Comment,
Actionable Inaction, supra note 35, at 1051.
46. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
Martinez involved a Section 1983 substantive due process claim against the State of California for
the murder of a girl by a parolee who was recklessly paroled five months before the crime. As the
Court in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services later explained, the Martinez
Court wished to avoid "squarely confronting the question presented [in DeShaney] whether the Due
Process Clause imposed upon the State an affirmative duty to protect [the public against criminals]."
489 U.S. 189, 197 n.4 (1989). Instead, "we affirmed the dismissal of the claim on the narrower ground
that the causal connection between the state officials' decision to release the parolee from prison and
the murder was too attenuated to establish a 'deprivation' of constitutional rights within the meaning
of § 1983." Id. The Martinez Court did not stop there, however. Instead, it went on to observe:
mhe parole board was not aware that appellants' decedent, as distinguished from the public
at large, faced any special danger. We need not and do not decide that a parole officer could
never be deemed to "deprive" someone of life by action taken in connection with the release
of a prisoner on parole. But we do hold that at least under the particular circumstances of
this parole decision, appellants' decedent's death is too remote a consequence of the parole
officers' action to hold them responsible under the federal civil rights law.
Martinez, 444 U.S. at 285 (footnote omitted). This final language helped spawn the "special relationship"
cases which would follow in the lower courts. See infra note 47 and accompanying text. See generally
Comment, Actionable Inaction, supra note 35, at 1052-53.
For more on Martinez and its requirement of proximate causation in Section 1983 litigation, see
supra note 35 and accompanying text.
47. A number of lower courts construed Martinez as authorizing the "special relationship" federal
due process tort case. E.g., Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 510-1l (3d Cir. 1985);
Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 191-94 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985); Sherrell v.
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to decide whether the requisite "special relationship" was present
in a particular case. 4 The courts disagreed over whether a "special
relationship" could ever exist in a non-custodial setting (where a
plaintiff was not a prison inmate, an involuntary patient in a state
mental institution, or otherwise in the custody of the state). 49
The Ninth Circuit gave the due process clause and the supposedly

Martinez-based "special relationship" rule what was probably their
broadest interpretation in the original version of Balistreriv. Pacifica
PoliceDepartment,50 a battered spouse case. 51 The plaintiff's Section
1983 due process and equal protection claims were dismissed by the
trial court, 52 but the Ninth Circuit initially granted her relief. On

City of Longview, 683 F. Supp. 1108, 1113-14 (E.D. Tex. 1987); Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 665 F.
Supp. 381, 389-90 (E.D. Pa.), reconsideration denied sub nom. Dudosh v. 'Warg, 668 F. Supp. 944
(E.D. Pa. 1987), vacated, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988); Buenavista v. City & County of San Francisco, 207 Cal. App. 3d 1168, 1176-77, 255 Cal. Rptr. 329, 33435 (1989) (Section 1983 claim).
For a brief overview of the "special danger" case sub-category of pre-DeShaney special relationship
right to protection law, see infra notes 233-36 and accompanying text.
48. E.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 855 F.2d 1421, 1425 (9th Cir. 1988), amended and
withdrawn, 901 F.2d 696, 700 (9th Cir. 1990). See Comment, Abused Children, supra note 35, at 1435;
Note, supra note 35, at 948-59.
49. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 855 F.2d 1421, 1425 n.4 (9th Cir. 1988), amended and
withdrawn, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990); Comment, Abused Children, supra note 35, at 1423-24, 143637.
50. 855 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1988). See Note, Battered Women, supra note 2, at 145. Following
the Supreme Court's DeShaney denunciation of the original panel decision in Balistreri, 489 U.S. at
197-98 & n.4, see infra note 189 and accompanying text, the panel granted a rehearing in the case and
ultimately amended and withdrew the initial holding on February 27, 1990. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police
Dep't, 897 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1990). In the new version of Balistreri,the court held no valid due process
claim was present, a complete reversal from its original determination. Id. at 371-72. Then on May 11,
1990, the court issued a second amended opinion. Balistred v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696 (9th
Cir. 1990). The latter decision was essentially identical to that of February 27 except that United States
District Judge Laughlin Waters' opinion, in which he concurred in part and dissented in part with the
majority, 897 F.2d at 374-77, was withdrawn by him, and he concurred with the majority only in the
result. 901 F.2d at 702. Thus, the decision continued in its complete reversal from its original due process
holding. Id. at 699-700.
For more on Judge Waters' original dissent to the majority's finding of an equal protection claim
for Jena Balistreri, 897 F.2d at 374-77, see infra note 402.
51. Jena Balistreri repeatedly was severely beaten, harassed, and threatened by her husband, whom
she ultimately divorced. She continually called the police for assistance, but they failed to act even after
she obtained a restraining order against her former husband's behavior. 855 F.2d at 1423. She finally
sued the police for the physical and emotional injuries she suffered because of their alleged failure to
control her former husband. Id.
52. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 656 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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the due process claim, the court held that a "special relationship"

can exist in a non-custodial situation and that it creates a federal
constitutional duty for public officials to protect a particular person,
such as a battered spouse, from crime:

3

The panel concluded that

a judicial restraining order, coupled with the police's repeated notice
of the spouse's plight, were enough to create a due process-based
54
constitutional duty to protect her.
Thus, before the Supreme Court decided DeShaney, certain courts
held that the federal due process clause required the state to protect

some persons in a custodial or non-custodial setting from harm by
a third party if a "special relationship" was present.5 5 In the appropriate case, this could mean that battered spouses had a con-

stitutional tort action against the police officials who failed to protect
them.5 6 This result has not survived DeShaney in non-custodial situations.
2.

Board of Regents v. Roth Procedural Due Process Cases

Another due process theory apparently was viable before DeShaney. Battered spouses5 7 arguably had a procedural due process
entitlement to governmental protection, pursuant to Board of Regents v. Roth 58 in jurisdictions having statutory provisions similar
to order of protection statutes.5 9 The government would be liable
53. 855 F.2d at 1425-26.
54. Id. at 1426. As the court provided, "[w]e conclude that the restraining order together with
the defendants' repeated notice of Balistreri's plight, as alleged in the complaint, are sufficient to state
a claim that the defendants owed Balistreri a duty to take reasonable measures to protect Balistreri from
her estranged husband." Id.
55. Of course, not all courts adopted this approach. E.g., Harpole v. Arkansas Dep't of Human
Services, 820 F.2d 923 (8th Cir. 1987); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 812
F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714 (Ist
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986). See Comment, Abused Children, supra note 35, at 1425-26.
56. E.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 855 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1988), amended and withdrawn, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990) (battered spouse); Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d
503 (3d Cir. 1985) (abused child).
57. See supra note 22.
58. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
59. Suckv order of protection statutes were discussed supra note 3. See, e.g., Hynson v. City of
Chester, 731 F. Supp. 1236, 1239-40 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (battered spouse case); cf. Taylor v. Ledbetter,
818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (foster child abuse case), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989);
Doe v. Milwaukee County, 712 F. Supp. 1370, 1376-78 (E.D. Wis. 1989) (child abuse case), aff'd, 903
F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1990). At least one later court expanded Roth entitlements in battered spouse cases
even beyond statutory limits. Coffman v. Wilson Police Dep't, 739 F. Supp. 257, 264-65 (E.D. Pa.
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if it or its agents deprived battered spouses of their protection right
without due process of lawA0
Roth held that people have a constitutionally protected procedural due process property right to a benefit when they have "a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it. "61 One also could have a liberty
right in a case of entitlement. 62 A person could not lawfully be deprived of such an entitlement without being provided whatever notice, hearing, and other remedies that were mandated by procedural
due process law. 63 A court usually ascertained whether a benefit

60. As the Supreme Court recently reiterated: "In procedural due process claims, the deprivation
by state action of a constitutionally protected interest in 'life, liberty, or property' is not in itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due process of
law." Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975, 983 (1990) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Accord,
e.g., Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 753 (1st Cir. 1990); Doe v. Milwaukee County, 903 F.2d 499,
502 (7th Cir. 1990). The Court has further held that: "We examine procedural due process questions
in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered
with by the State, the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were
constitutionally sufficient." Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 109 S. Ct. 1904, 1908 (1989)
(citations omitted). Accord, e.g., Colon v. Schneider, 899 F.2d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 1990).
61. 408 U.S. at 577.
62. See, e.g., Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474, 476 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 182 (1990); Taylor, 818 F.2d at 798; id. at 819 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1399 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
63. See, e.g., Roth, 408 U.S. at 569-70. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), defined what
process was due in a procedural due process case through its balancing test where the following factors
are weighed:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335; accord, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1041 (1990) ('Under Mathews v.
Eldridge, we consider the private interests at stake in a governmental decision, the governmental interests
involved, and the value of procedural requirements in determining what process is due under the Fourteenth Amendment."' (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 473 (1983) (emphasis in original) (citation
omitted))); Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975, 984 (1990); Colon v. Schneider, 899 F.2d 660, 670 (7th
Cir. 1990); Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1255-56 (7th Cir. 1990).
In Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986), and Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), the Supreme Court went a step
further and held that:
a deprivation of a constitutionally protected property interest caused by a state employee's
random, unauthorized conduct does not give rise to a § 1983 procedural due process claim,
unless the State fails to provide an adequatepostdeprivationremedy. The Court in those two
cases reasoned that in a situation where the State cannot predict and guard in advance against
a deprivation, a postdeprivation tort remedy is all the process the State can be expected to

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2

16

Jones: Battered Spouses' Section 1983 Damage Actions against the Unrepon

1991]

BATTERED SPOUSE ACTIONS AFTER DESHANEY

created an entitlement by looking at state law. 64 A Roth claim of
entitlement could be, and in the abused spouse context almost invariably was, 65 conferred by certain sufficiently definite 66 and
restrictive 67 state statutes. The courts in the Seventh Circuit adopted

provide, and is constitutionally sufficient.
Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. at 978 (emphasis added). This rule clearly could have presented a remedial obstacle
to a Roth procedural due process domestic violence claim. Most such violations would have arisen out
of random, and unauthorized, governmental behavior, and state court tort actions would have been
available as postdeprivation remedies. See Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1217 (7th Cir. 1988)
(en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989); Taylor, 818 F.2d at 827 (Anderson, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Case Comment, Taylor v. Ledbetter: Vindicating the ConstitutionalRights
of Foster Children to Adequate Care and Protection, 22 GA. L. Ray. 1187, 1202-03, 1214-15 (1988).
The Parrattrule applied to state deprivations of both property and liberty interests, Zinermon, 110 S.
Ct. at 986-87, although before Zinermon the lower courts were divided over its exact parameters. Id.
at 978 n.2 (citing cases). For an extensive overview of the pre-Zinermon law under Parrattand Hudson,
see Easter House v. Felder, 879 F.2d 1458, 1466-76 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), vacated and remanded,
110 S. Ct. 1314 (1990). See infra notes 318-52 and accompanying text.
64. As Roth recited:
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created
and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and
that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.
408 U.S. at 577 (emphasis added). Accord, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430
(1982); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978); Thornton v. Barnes, 890
F.2d 1380, 1386-87 (7th Cir. 1989); Chilingirian v. Boris, 882 F.2d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 1989).
65. But see Coffman v. Wilson Police Dep't, 739 F. Supp. 257, 264-65 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (held
judicially issued order of protection in battered spouse case created entitlement), see infra notes 264-66,
315-17 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Doe v. Hennepin County, 858 F.2d 1325, 1328-29 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 3161 (1989).
67. Roth itself stated that: "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have
more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He
must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." 408 U.S. at 577 (emphasis added). As one
jurist has observed:
The principle of Roth and subsequent Supreme Court cases is that the due process clause
protects property and liberty interests that have been recognized and protected by state law.
The state laws or regulations must, however, create a legitimate claim of entitlement; in other
words, they must be more than mere procedural guidelines or grants of discretionary authority
to state officials.
Taylor, 818 F.2d at 819 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original)
(citations omitted). Accord, e.g., Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 109 S. Ct. 1904, 1908,
1909-10 (1989); Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 382 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("mo
give rise to a protected liberty interest, the statute must act to limit meaningfully the discretion of the
decisionmakers."); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1985); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983) ("[A] State creates a protected liberty interest by placing substantive
limitations on official discretion."); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983) ("mhe repeated use
of explicitly mandatory language in connection with requiring specific substantive predicates demands
a conclusion that the State has created a protected liberty interest."); Woods v. Thieret, 903 F.2d 1080,
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a particularly narrow view of what constituted an entitlement.68
In Taylor v. Ledbetter,69 the Eleventh Circuit, en banc, held that
the State of Georgia's child foster care laws bestowed an entitlement,
pursuant to Roth, upon an abused foster child" such that when the
1082-83 (7th Cir. 1990); Colon v. Schneider, 899 F.2d 660, 666-67 (7th Cir. 1990); Thornton v. Barnes,
890 F.2d 1380, 1386 (7th Cir. 1989). Various pre-DeShaney decisions construed statutes and regulations,
many strictly, to determine whether they were sufficiently restrictive to create entitlements. E.g., Jean
v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985); Hewitt; Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981); Greenholtz
v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Richardson v.
City of Albuquerque, 857 F.2d 727 (10th Cir. 1988).
68. The Seventh Circuit held that under Roth, "a legitimate claim of entitlement is created only
when the statutes or regulations in question establish a framework of factual conditions delimiting entitlements which are capable of being explored at a due process hearing." Eidson v. Pierce, 745 F.2d
453, 459-60 (7th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Scott v. Village of Kewaskum, 786 F.2d 338,
339-40 (7th Cir. 1986); K.H. v. Morgan, No. 87-C-9833 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 1989) (1989 WEsTLAW 105279,
at 11), aff'd in part, remanded in part on othergrounds, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990); B.H. v. Johnson,
715 F. Supp. 1387, 1399-1400 (N.D. II1. 1989). This obviously was a very narrow view of Roth entitlements, and was derived from former Ninth Circuit Judge Shirley Hufstedler's dissenting opinion in
Geneva Towers Tenants Org. v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d 483, 495-96 (9th Cir. 1974)
(Hufstedler, J., dissenting), see infra note 281 and accompanying text. For an extended discussion about
Doe v. Milwaukee County, 903 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1990), and its application of the Eidson restrictive
analysis to battered spouse protective statutes when entitlements under them are asserted, see infra notes
376-82 and accompanying text. See also Woods v. Thieret, 903 F.2d 1080, 1082-83 (7th Cir. 1990)
(demonstrates very restrictive view of entitlements).
For more about Roth, "entitlements," and the sometimes controversial procedural due process
area, see, e.g., Brown, supra note 29; Elrod, The Effect of ProceduralDue Process On State and Local
Government DecisionMaking: Beyond Roth and Eastlake, 31 DE PAUL L. REv. 679 (1982); First, "Poor
Joshua!": The State's Responsibility to Protect Childrenfrom Abuse, 23 CLmuNoHousE Ray. 525, 53334 (1989); Kubitschek, A Re-Evaluation of Mathews v. Eldridge in Light of Administrative Shortcomings
and Social Security Nonacquiescence, 31 Auz. L. Rav. 53 (1989); Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAns. L. REv. 1044 (1984); Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court:
A Defense of Roth ahd Perry, 71 CAuw. L. Ray. 146 (1983); Smolla, The Displacement of FederalDue
Process Claims By State Tort Remedies: Parratt v. Taylor and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company,
1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 831 [hereinafter Displacement]; Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. Ra,. 69 (1982);
Terrell, Liberty and Responsibility in the Land of "New Property':Exploring the Limits of Procedural
Due Process, 39 U. FIA. L. REv. 351 (1987); Comment, Entitlement Enjoyment and Due Process of
Law, 1974 DuKe L.J. 89; Comment, Actionable Inaction, supra note 35, at 1064-72; Note, Unauthorized
Conduct of State Officials Under the Fourteenth Amendment: Hudson v. Palmer and the Resurrection
of DeadDoctrines, 85 CoLum. L. Ray. 837 (1985); Note, supra note 35, at 965-66 n.179; Note, supra
note 11, at 499-501; Case Comment, supra note 63. Both Comment, Actionable Inaction, supra, at
1064-72, and Note, supra note 35, at 965-66 n.179, featured early, pre-Taylor v. Ledbetter, see infra
notes 69-74 and accompanying text, commentaries on the viability of a Roth procedural due process
claim in a governmental inaction right of protection context such as that presented by cases featuring
public officers' nonfeasance in spouse abuse situations.
69. 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1337 (1989).
70. The child's situation was very similar to, but arguably distinguishable from, that of a battered
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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child was deprived of that entitlement without due process of law
she had a Section 1983 cause of action. 71 In the process the court

concluded that the Georgia laws were not mere procedural guidelines; instead, they comprised a comprehensive regulatory scheme

which brought a Roth entitlement into existence. 72 After determining
that the state statutes created an entitlement, the Taylor majority
essentially ended its analysis. 73 In so doing, the court apparently

ignored several vexing issues, including what process the child was
due in the first instance, and to what ultimate remedy was she entitled. Several dissenters vigorously disputed the majority's holding
and its failure to discuss the worrisome analytical/remedial problems .74

see DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 & n.9, while the battered spouse or non-foster abused child (like Joshua
DeShaney, see infra notes 192-94 and accompanying text) may have been ignored by the State but was
not normally placed in a position of peril by its agents. Later cases extended Taylor's Roth analysis to
the battered spouse or the abused child scenarios. E.g., Coffman v. Wilson Police Dep't, 739 F. Supp.
257, 263-66 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (battered spouse); Hynson v. City of Chester, 731 F. Supp. 1236, 123940 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (battered spouse); Doe v. Milwaukee County, 712 F. Supp. 1370, 1376-78 (E.D.
Wis. 1989) (abused child), aff'd, 903 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1990).
71. Taylor, 818 F.2d at 798-800; accord Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474,
476-77 (6th Cir.) (applied Taylor rationale to Kentucky law in similar abused foster child case), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 182 (1990). See infra notes 268-72 and accompanying text.
Taylor also featured a substantial substantive due process component. 818 F.2d at 793-98; id. at
812-18 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For more on this holding, and DeShaney's
reference to it, see infra note 192, infra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
72. Taylor, 818 F.2d at 799. Some of the dissenters strongly contested the majority's finding of
a statutory entitlement because they did not think the Georgia foster care laws restricted government
activity enough to constitute one. Id. at 819-22 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Accord Case Comment, supra note 63, at 1212-13. Judge Anderson concurred in the majority's entitlement finding. Taylor, 818 F.2d at 827 (Anderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
73. Taylor, 818 F.2d at 800. The court delegated to the district court on remand "all determinations regarding the scope of authority and the extent of duties of the appellees." Id. at n.10. The
court did observe that: "Since the child's claim under Roth is a procedural due process claim, the state
of Georgia may alter its statutes and ordinances in such a way as to change or eliminate the expectation
on which this child had the right to rely." Id. at 800. Thus, the child could easily be divested of her
entitlement.
74. The dissenters in Taylor emphasized what they referred to as an "analytical problem" with
the majority's application of Roth analysis to the foster care statutes in question which in their view
resulted in an inappropriate use of Roth. As Judge Tjoflat observed:
If a court finds that state law creates a "legitimate claim of entitlement," the next step in
the Roth analysis is to determine what process is due and whether the state provided that
process. The focus of this type of analysis is on the requirements of predeprivation notice
and a hearing. This case, however, is about investigation and supervision of foster homes,
not about predeprivation notice and a hearing.
(Tioflat,Repository
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In Archie v. City of Racine 5 the Seventh Circuit, en banc, adopted

a markedly different approach to constitutional law claims founded
upon state officials' breach of state law, including a Roth governmental nonfeasance assertion. It held that although a fire department
dispatcher's failure to send an ambulance to a hyperventilating
woman who ultimately died of respiratory failure may have given
her survivors a state tort law remedy, it did not bestow a federal
procedural or substantive due process right upon them. 76 The Archie
majority stated that the plaintiffs were attempting to transform a
common law tort (a negligent failure to act when under a statutory
duty to do So77) into a constitutional one. 78 The court then observed
that a state does not violate due process merely by failing to obey
the state's own law.79 Thus, the Archie court held that a breach of
state law - such as a police officer's failure to protect the holder

of a state order of protection

-

does not translate into a denial of

due process or any other federal right enforceable in a Section 1983

action.80 The court discussed how state law sometimes can create a
Roth entitlement whose disposition is controlled by federal procedural

omitted). Accord id. at 827 (Anderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[A] predeprivation
denial of procedural due process makes no sense in the context of this case."). See K.H. v. Morgan,
No. 87-C-9833 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 1989) (1989 WsrLAw 105279, at 11), aff'd in part, remanded in part,
914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990). The dissenters contended that this sort of case (a failure to protect a
battered spouse or an abused child or abused foster child which violated the tenor of state law) ought
not to be brought under the Roth rubric-an argument which appears similar to that, based upon Eidson
v. Pierce, 745 F.2d 453, 459-60 (7th Cir. 1984), which was discussed supra note 68 and applied, at least
in part, in K.H, B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1399-1400 (N.D. Ill. 1989), and Doe v. Milwaukee
County, 903 F.2d 499, 503-04 (7th Cir. 1990). See infra note 374.
75. 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989).
76. Id. at 1213-14.
77. Id. at 1216.
78. Id. See Colon v. Schneider, 899 F.2d 660, 672 (7th Cir. 1990).
79. "Mere violation of a state statute does not infringe the federal Constitution." Archie, 847
F.2d at 1216 (quoting Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11 (1944)). See also id. at 1216 & n.5 (collecting
other cases).
80. Id. at 1216-17. The court acknowledged that "[a] state ought to follow its law," id. at 1217,
but held that:
to treat a violation of state law as a violation of the Constitution is to make the federal
government the enforcer of state law. State rather than federal courts are the appropriate
institutions to enforce state rules. Indeed, "it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on
state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their
conduct to state law."
Id. (quoting Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984)). Accord, e.g.,
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
Colon v. Schneider, 899 F.2d 660, 672 (7th Cir. 1990). But see infra note 84.
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due process law. 8' The court stated, however, that even if such a
claim existed, the Archie plaintiffs would only be entitled to a state

common law tort action as their remedy. 82 In any event, the majority
concluded that no Roth claim ever came into being for the plaintiffs
because of the longstanding, salutary judicial rule that the dispatcher's
arguable breach of state law in no sense violated any federal right.83
Hence, the Archie court determined that when state officials violate

state law by failing to perform their state law duties Roth procedural
due process entitlement law never comes into play84 - a dangerous
precedent for potential Roth claimants, and especially for battered

spouses who wanted to enforce Roth claims for a police failure to
guard them despite their state orders of protection. 85 The Archie result

81. Archie, 847 F.2d at 1217.
82. This ruling was based upon the holdings in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled
on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), and Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1986),
see supra note 63 and accompanying text, eliminating procedural due process claims based upon a state
employee's random, unauthorized conduct. As the en banc Archie court interpreted those precedents:
If a state erratically deprives a person of property, the remedy is not a subsequent hearing
but a suit to recover damages-in other words, the opportunity to obtain redress in state
court is due process when a prior hearing is either infeasible or negligently withheld. So it is
here. It is hardly possible to hold hearings in advance to decide whether fire dispatchers will
turn deaf ears to cries of distress. If, as the plaintiffs believe, [the dispatcher] violated his
duties under state law, the opportunity to press that claim in state court is due process of
law.
847 F.2d at 1217 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). This language, of course, mirrors that of
the Taylor dissenters discussed supra note 74. The effect of Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990),
on the result in Parratt, Hudson, and Archie, as well as on the dissenters' words in Taylor, will be
assessed infra notes 335-52 and accompanying text, infra note 374.
83. Archie, 847 F.2d at 1217-18. As the court argued:
A rule equating a violation of a statute with a violation of the Constitution might make
states less willing to help their residents, because they could not limit the resources devoted
to that task. The body with the power to create a rule also has the right incentives to police
it. Cities and states are not hostile to their own laws; they do not need federal courts to prod
them to enforce rules voluntarily adopted ... The political branches have little reason to
afford inadequate remedies for torts. The residents as a whole gain from both the compensatory
and deterrent effects of tort law; such a widely supported body of law will not wither without
constitutional fertilizer; ... A rule that may be altered by political actors ought not to be
enforced as if it were constitutional; a rule created by the states should be enforced by the
states.
Id. at 1218 (citation omitted).
84. The Archie court acknowledged that even after Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944), see
supra note 79, and Archie federal equal protection law still might provide a remedy in an appropriate
case where a state official violated state law for a discriminatory reason. Archie, 847 F.2d at 1218 n.7.
85. See, e.g., Doe v. Milwaukee County, 903 F.2d 499, 504-05 (7th Cir. 1990) (based on Archie
and Snowden,
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would seem even more hazardous for them after the Supreme Court
86
decided DeShaney.

Despite both its possible analytical shortcomings8 7 and its vigorous dissents, Taylor established in at least the Eleventh Circuit
that an abused spouse's Roth procedural due process claim was ap-

propriate so long as a statute clearly provided for the protection of
spouses and state representatives failed to perform their duty."8 The
differing approaches of Taylor and Archie would, however, clash
in Roth battered spouse cases soon enough.8 9

B. Denial of Equal Protection
Prior to DeShaney the Supreme Court summed up federal equal
protection law9° in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.9
As the Court there observed, the equal protection clause 92 commands
that states treat all similarly situated people alike. 93 Although most
failure to comply with state child protection statute [which might have created Roth entitlement] because
federal courts do not transmute violations of state law into federal constitutional violations), infra notes
283-87, 303-05 and accompanying text; Colon v. Schneider, 899 F.2d 660, 672 (7th Cir. 1990) (based
on Archie and Snowden, held prison guard's use of chemical mace on prison inmate in violation of
state administrative regulations did not raise Roth issue despite arguable entitlement created by state law
because federal courts do not transmute violations of state law into federal constitutional violations).
86. Archie was also based, in part, on the federalist idea that federal courts in Section 1983 suits
should not transform the fourteenth amendment into a font of tort law that displaces state court adjudication of ordinary tort disputes. 847 F.2d at 1213, 1216; id. at 1225-26 (Posner, J., concurring).
For an extended discussion of the applicability of this doctrine to battered spouses' Roth entitlement
claims against the police, as well as its wisdom, see infra notes 303-05, 444-52 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
88. For a fine discussion of the Roth procedural due process issues presented by Taylor and its
dissents, see Case Comment, supra note 63, at 1198-1204, 1205-06, 1207-09, 1212-15.
89. For more on the availability of a Roth procedural due process remedy in domestic violence
cases, see infra notes 254-374 and accompanying text.
90. For a complete analysis of contemporary equal protection law, see, e.g., L. TumE, supra note
41, at §§ 16-1 to -59; Galloway, Basic Equal Protection Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. Rnv. 121 (1989);
Kushner, Substantive Equal Protection: The Rehnquist Court and the Fourth Tier of JudicialReview,
53 Mo. L. Rnv. 423 (1988); see also, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office,
895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 463 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1075-76 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1295 (1990).
91. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law
(pt. 2), 102 HARv. L. Ray. 1519, 1525 n.46 (1989).
92. "[No] State [shall] ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend XIV, § 1.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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state governmental statutory classifications are upheld so long as
they are rationally related to a legitimate state interest (the rational

basis test), those based on race, alienage, or national origin are
viewed with grave suspicion. 94 The Court applies a strict scrutiny

test to such classification schemes, and sustains them only if they
serve a compelling state interest. 95 Gender-based classifications are

also subjected to a heightened, or intermediate, standard of judicial
review, 96 and fail unless "substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest."

97

Obviously, the validity of a par-

ticular classification will often depend upon whether the classification
is judged by the rational basis test, strict scrutiny test, or substantial
relationship to an important governmental interest test.98
1.

Abused Spouse Equal Protection Case Authorities

A number of courts and other authorities in the pre-DeShaney
period considered whether a police failure to assist battered spouses

constituted a denial of their right to equal protection of the laws
entitling them to a Section 1983 damage action. 99 The ruling in Thur-

94. Id. at 440.
The Supreme Court established in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), that a statute can
be facially valid but be enforced unconstitutionally in violation of the equal protection clause. "It is
well settled that the equal protection clause is applicable not only to discriminatory legislative action,
but also to discriminatory governmental action in administration and enforcement of the law." Thurman
v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1527 (D. Conn. 1984). Accord, e.g., McKee v. City of
Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409, 421 (5th Cir. 1989) (Goldberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 727 (1990); Hynson v. City of Chester Legal Dep't, 864 F.2d 1026, 1029 (3d
Cir. 1988). See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197 n.3. See generally L. Taima, supra note 41, at § 16-17;
Marcus, supra note 10, at 1687-88. This principle has proved significant in battered spouse equal protection cases.
95. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 441. At this point the Court cited two of the most important gender-related Supreme
Court equal protection cases, Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), and
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See, e.g., Hynson v. City of Chester Legal Dep't, 864 F.2d 1026,
1029 (3d Cir. 1988). For more on the constitutionality of gender-based classifications, see, e.g., L. TRmE,
supra note 41, at §§ 16-25 to -26; Galloway, supra note 90, at 142-44; Kushner, supra note 90, at 454-

55.
98. See, e.g., Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 618 (1985).
99. E.g., Hynson v. City of Chester Legal Dep't, 864 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1988); Watson v. City
of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 855 F.2d 1421 (9th
Cir. 1988), amended and withdrawn, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990); Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 665
F. Supp. 381by(E.D.
reconsideration
denied
sub nom.
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man v. City of Torrington'00 was the first significant reported de-

cision to raise the issue. 10
In Thurman, a repeatedly abused wife incessantly sought aid from,
and was rebuffed by, the defendant police.'0 2 She sued under Section

1983 and the equal protection clause. 0 3 The district court upheld
her equal protection complaint against a motion to dismiss, holding
that the police have a duty to protect all citizens.'0 The court found

Pa. 1987), vacated, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988); Trethewey
v. DeKalb County, 662 F. Supp. 246 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Bartalone v. County of Berrien, 643 F. Supp.
574 (W.D. Mich. 1986); Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984); Woods,
supra note 2, at 18-20; Case Comment, supra note 2, at 677-91; Note, supra note 10, at 421-40; Note,
Equal Protection, supra note 2, at 793-809; cf. Marcus, supra note 10, at 1666-1702; Comment, supra
note 4, at 718-27. A subsequent district court decision noted what a major change in equal protection
law these pre-DeShaney sources accomplished-"the use of the equal protection clause to provide a
theory of recovery in [domestic violence] situations ... is a very recent and novel development in equal
protection jurisprudence." Watson v. City of Kansas City, No. 84-2335-S (D. Kan. Feb. 2, 1989) (1989
WtsmTAw 21165, at 2).
100. 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).
101. Before Thurman, several cases raised the equal protection problem. Scott v. Hart, No. C-762395 (N.D. Cal. filed Oct. 28, 1976) (suit against police), and Raguz v. Chandler, No. C-74-1064 (N.D.
Ohio filed Nov. 20, 1974) (suit against prosecutor),
class action suits brought by and on behalf of abused women ... were based in part on
claimed violations of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.... mT1he
plaintiffs argued that no rational basis existed for a classification that would deny full protection of the law to an assault victim simply because she was married to her attacker.
Case Comment, supra note 2, at 676-77 (footnotes omitted). The parties settled both cases before trial.
Id. at 677. For more on Scott and Raguz, see, e.g., Gundle, supra note 20, at 261; Woods, supra note
2, at 13, 14-15, 20; Woods, supra note 11, at 261-63; Comment, supra note 4, at 711 n.64.
Although Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1977), rev'd in part,
appeal dismissed in part, 64 A.D.2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d
976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979), did not involve federal equal protection principles, see, e.g., Woods,
supra note 2, at 20-21; Case Comment, supra, at 676, it raised analogous state concerns about police
practices which were resolved with a consent judgment between battered spouses and the police. See,
e.g., Bruno, 64 A.D.2d at 582-83, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 166; Gundle, supra, at 261-62; Woods, supra note
2, at 25-33 (includes text of consent judgment); Comment, supra, at 711 n.64; Note, Domestic Violence:
Legislative and Judicial Remedies, 2 HLv. WomEN's L.J. 167, 179-84 (1979). For an interesting explanation of why counsel in Bruno chose not to proceed in federal court with an equal protection claim,
see Woods, supra note 2, at 20-21.
102. Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1524-26.
103. Id. at 1524. In her suit the plaintiff alleged that she, and others like her, were denied equal
protection because the Torrington police accorded greater protection to those assaulted by someone with
whom the victim had no domestic relationship than to a woman attacked by a spouse or boyfriend.
Id. at 1526-27. She also alleged the police discriminated against children assaulted by a father or stepfather. Id. at 1527. Her equal protection claim on behalf of her son failed on the facts because he "did
not suffer from a continuous failure of the police to provide him protection . . . ." Id. at 1529.
104. The court observed:
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
City officials and police officers are under an affirmative duty to preserve law and order,

24

Jones: Battered Spouses' Section 1983 Damage Actions against the Unrepon
1991]

BATTERED SPOUSE ACTIONS AFTER DESHANEY

that the Torrington police were utilizing an administrative classification to carry out the law in a discriminatory way, and observed
there was evidence of a police pattern or practice not to protect
abused spouses.10 5 Before the city could discriminate against battered
spouses, the court concluded, "it must articulate an important gov-

ernmental interest for doing

so.'1 °6

It had not articulated such an

107

interest in this case, and the court could not conceive of a valid
justification for such police behavior.10 8 Thus, recovery of damages
for the denial of equal protection might be appropriate. °9
Thurman was important for its conclusion that a governmental
failure to provide police protection to battered spouses in a nonand to protect the personal safety of persons in the community .... This duty applies equally
to women whose personal safety is threatened by individuals with whom they have or have
had a domestic relationship as well as to all other persons whose personal safety is threatened,
including women not involved in domestic relationships. If officials have notice of the possibility of attacks on women in domestic relationships or other persons, they are under an
affirmative duty to take reasonable measures to protect the personal safety of such persons
in the community. Failure to perform this duty would constitute a denial of equal protection
of the laws.
Id. at 1527.
105. Id. The court invoked Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), at this point. See supra
note 94.
The court later highlighted the importance of evidence of such a discriminatory practice, which
can support municipal constitutional tort liability. Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1530; see supra note 36.
Such evidence in this case defeated the City of Torrington's motion to dismiss the claims against it.
Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1530.
106. Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1527. (This statement obviously referred to the intermediate genderbased equal protection standard discussed supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text).
107. Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1528.
At this point, the court noted that "lilt may develop that the classification in the instant case is
not one based on gender, but instead consists of all spouses who are victims of domestic violencemale and female." Id. n.l. The court did not pursue the point, instead accepting as true the plaintiffs'
claims of gender-based discrimination. Id.
108. Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1528. As the court noted:
A man is not allowed to physically abuse or endanger a woman merely because he is
her husband. Concomitantly, a police officer may not knowingly refrain from interference in
such violence, and may not "automatically decline to make an arrest simply because the
assaulter and his victim are married to each other." Such inaction on the part of the officer
is a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
Id. (quoting Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 1049, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 976 (Sup. Ct. 1977), rev'd in
part, appeal dismissed in part, 64 A.D.2d 502, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393
N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979)) (citation omitted). For more on Bruno v. Codd, see supra note
101. This was hardly a fitting time, the court determined, for the police to avoid getting involved in
an intrafamily controversy. Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1529 (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971)).
109. As previously pointed out, Thurman was eventually settled on terms that were very favorable
for the plaintiffs.
SeeResearch
supra noteRepository
21.
Disseminated
by The
@ WVU, 1991
25

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

discriminatory way denies them equal protection." 0 Other district
courts soon adopted its approach.'

110. Most commentators have agreed with Thurman's holding. E.g., Case Comment, supra note
2; Note, supra note 10, at 431-33, 439; Note, Equal Protection, supra note 2, at 794-95.
111. In Lowers v. City of Streator, 627 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ill. 1985), a rape victim sued the
police for failing to act after she was raped initially, thus permitting a subsequent second rape by the
same attacker. Id. at 245. She alleged she was so treated by the police, in violation of her right to
equal protection, because she was a woman. Id. at 246. The court upheld her cause of action and then
determined that, based on Thurman, she had shown a pattern of municipal behavior sufficient to state
a Section 1983 equal protection claim against the city defendant. Id. at 247. For more on the municipal
liability point, see supra note 36.
In Bartalone v. County of Berrien, 643 F. Supp. 574 (W.D. Mich. 1986), the plaintiff claimed she
was shot by her husband after the police did not act on her earlier complaints against him. Id. at 575.
She alleged a denial of equal protection, charging that the police failed to take action against her husband
"because of her sex or marital status, or both." Id. at 577. The court, citing Thurman, held this stated
a valid denial of equal protection cause of action. Id. Her municipal liability claim failed because she
inadequately alleged the facts to support it. Id. at 579.
In Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 665 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa.), reconsideration denied sub nom.
Dudosh v. Warg, 668 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1987), vacated, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988), a woman was shot and killed by her former companion after a long history
of abuse. Id. at 383-86. The administrator of her estate, the plaintiff, sued individual police officers
and the City of Allentown for, inter alia, denial of equal protection. Id. at 387. In reviewing the
defendants' summary judgment motions, the court looked to Bartalone, Lowers, and Thurman as authorities and summarized the controlling equal protection law as follows:
To establish his denial of equal protection claim, the plaintiff must prove that the individual defendants intentionally discriminated against the decedent by failing to accord her
the same amount of police protection they would have provided another member of the community not within the decedent's "class." . . . If it is [the plaintiff's] contention that the
individual defendants failed to protect his decedent because of her sex, i.e., that the individual
defendants would have accorded a man better protection, then the defendants must articulate
an important government interest for doing so.... If it is the plaintiff's contention that the
individual defendants failed to protect his decedent because she had filed a domestic complaint
or because she knew her attacker, i.e., that the defendants would have afforded an individual
who did not know her attacker or who had filed a non-domestic complaint better protection,
then the defendants must articulate a rational reason related to a legitimate government purpose
for doing such since no suspect classification or fundamental right is involved.
Dudosh, 665 F. Supp. at 392 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The court thus categorized the
plaintiff's equal protection complaints as adequately stating that the defendants discriminated against
the decedent "either on the basis of her sex or the nature of her complaint . . . " Id. The consequences
varied according to the basis of the complaint. Id. The court found evidence sufficient to defeat summary
judgment on behalf of both the plaintiff's claims. Id. at 392-94. Turning to the municipal Section 1983
liability issue, the court summarized the governing law and then concluded that the plaintiff had presented
enough evidence of a municipal policy to defeat summary judgment. Id. at 395. On a motion for
reconsideration in Dudosh v. Warg, 668 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1987), vacated, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988), the court reiterated the two theories of unlawful discrimination proposed by the plaintiff and the two avenues of justification the defendants must pursue
by either articulating an "important government interest" or a "rational basis" for the classifications
they made. Id. at 945 n.1, 951 n.10.
The related case of Sherrell v. City of Longview, 683 F. Supp. 1108 (E.D. Tex. 1987), involved 26
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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The original version of Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department

was the first court of appeals-level battered spouse equal protection
opinion. 12 In Balistreri, the Ninth Circuit apparently accepted the
reasoning of Thurman;"' because it detected a police intention to

treat domestic abuse cases as less important than other assaults in
addition to a police animus towards battered women, it reinstated

the plaintiff's equal protection claim despite a meagerly pled complaint.114 It thereby demonstrated a willingness to apply the equal
protection clause in the abused spouse setting.

The Tenth Circuit was equally ready to act in Watson v. City
of Kansas City,"5 another Section 1983 equal protection case decided
only a few weeks after Balistreri.The Watson court concluded that

the police cannot discriminate when they supply police protection."

6

The plaintiff provided statistical proof that domestic assaults in Kan-

sas City were far less likely to be solved with an arrest than nondomestic ones, as well as confirmation that police officers were7
trained to use arrest as a last resort in domestic violence cases."
These items, plus evidence of a police pattern of deliberate indifdenial of equal protection claims in a gross child abuse situation. The plaintiff argued that the abuser,
a City of Longview police officer, was not properly handled by the City when he abused the plaintiff
because the City treated police offenders differently, and less severely, than ordinary citizens. Id. at
1111. The court reiterated that "[o]nce the government has undertaken to provide the public with protection and law enforcement ... it cannot do so in a manner which violates the Constitution, such as
by discriminating against certain persons on an irrational basis." Id. at 1112. It held the state cannot
properly discriminate in favor of a police officer. Id. at 1113. Hence, the court declined to dismiss the
plaintiff's complaint. On the municipal liability point, the court determined that the plaintiff had adequately pleaded the existence of a discriminatory municipal policy or custom in accordance with Monell
and its progeny. Id. at 1114-15.
112. The opinion below, Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 656 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1987),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990), quickly disposed of the plaintiff's equal
protection claim. Id. at 426.
113. Baistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 855 F.2d 1421, 1427 (9th Cir. 1988), amended and withdrawn, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990).
114. Id.
115. 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988). That case featured another tragic story of domestic violence
over an extended period of time. The plaintiff's husband was a Kansas City police officer, and the
police were less than diligent in the way they conducted their investigation of his abusive behavior. The
officer ultimately severely injured the plaintiff before he committed suicide. Id. at 692-93.
116. "Although there is no general constitutional right to police protection, the state may not
discriminate in providing such protection." Id. at 694.
117. Id. at 695-96. This material evidenced the custom or policy to discriminate essential to any
Section 1983 recovery against a municipality or public officials acting in their official capacities. See
supra note 36.
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ference, 118 supported a municipal liability'1 9 equal protection claim
of class-based discrimination because of the plaintiff's status as a
victim of domestic violence.lw2 In Hynson v. City of Chester Legal
2
Department,1
1 the Third Circuit also recognized the validity of abused
spouse equal protection complaints. 22

118. Watson, 857 F.2d at 696.
119. The court was uncertain how to treat the plaintiffs' claims against the defendant police officials
in their individual capacities because of the qualified immunity issue. It remanded the case for the district
court to "determine whether qualified immunity shields these individual defendants notwithstanding the
presence of a section 1983 claim against the city." Watson, 857 F.2d at 697.
On remand, the district court held the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity
because "the law regarding a police officer's duties under the equal protection clause in responding to
domestic assaults was not clearly established at the time of defendants' action .... ." Watson v. City
of Kansas City, No. 84-2335-S (D. Kan. Feb. 2, 1989) (1989 Wasn.Aw, 21165, at 2). For more on the
qualified immunity issue, see supra note 37.
120. Watson, -857 F.2d at 696.
The court noted that in addition to the class-based discrimination claim it upheld, the plaintiff had
articulated a gender-based discrimination claim-"that she was denied police protection because of her
sex." Id. The court rejected this contention based upon its interpretation of Personnel Administrator
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), saying the police protection policy lacked discriminatory purpose. Watson,
857 F.2d at 696-97. For more on Feeney and the definition of "discriminatory purpose" in the nonfacially discriminatory gender-based denial of equal protection case, see infra note 127 and accompanying
text.
121. 864 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1988). In this case, "the plaintiffs alleged that [police] officers pursued
a policy of ignoring domestic abuse complaints and thereby violated the plaintiffs' decedent's right to
equal protection of the laws by failing to arrest the former boyfriend of the decedent who subsequently
killed her at her place of employment." Id. at 1027. The court referred to most of the previously discussed
domestic violence equal protection decisions. Id. n.l.
122. Id. at 1029-31. The court concurred with the panel in Watson, 857 F.2d at 694, 696-97, that:
if the categories used by the police in administering the law are domestic violence and nondomestic violence, this is not sufficient to raise a claim for gender-based discrimination absent
a showing of an intent, purpose or effect of discriminating against women. In order to survive
summary judgment, a plaintiff must proffer sufficient evidence that would allow a reasonable
jury to infer that it is the policy or custom of the police to provide less protection to victims
of domestic violence than to other victims of violence, that discrimination against women was
a motivitating factor, and that the plaintiff was injured by the policy or custom.
Hynson, 864 F.2d at 1031 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted). As in Watson, 857 F.2d at 696-97,
Hynson here applied the Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979), requirement that
plaintiffs in denial of equal protection through non-facial gender-based discrimination cases prove "discriminatory purpose" before they are entitled to the heightened standard of equal protection review.
Hynson, 864 F.2d at 1031. For more on Feeney and "discriminatory purpose," see infra note 127 and
accompanying text.
The court then liberally interpreted the law governing the individual defendant police officers'
qualified immunity claims. Hynson, 864 F.2d at 1031-32. The court noted that a legal right is not "clearly
established" under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), thereby defeating immunity, see supra
note 37, unless it has been recognized in circumstances similar to those that gave rise to the proceeding
in which the plaintiff seeks to hold the individual defendant liable in damages. Hynson, 864 F.2d at

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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2. Abused Spouse Equal Protection Analysis
A few common issues arose in most, if not all, of the Section
1983 battered spouse violation of equal protection suits against the
police before DeShaney. Some authorities proposed that abused
spouses use a number of theories of equal protection attack; 123 however, the battered gained their greatest equal protection successes
when alleging that the police were discriminating against abused

spouses because of improper gender-based classifications that were
not substantially related to sufficiently important governmental interests - a claim for the intermediate, or heightened, standard of
judicial review.
In some cases the exact nature of the purportedly discriminatory

police classification in question was disputed.

24

Exactly how it was

1032. It concluded that:
a police officer loses a qualified immunity to a claim that a facially neutral policy is executed
in a discriminatory manner only if a reasonable police officer would know that the policy
has a discriminatory impact on women, that bias against women was a motivating factor
behind the adoption of the policy, and that there is no important public interest served by
the adoption of the policy. This standard is the result of a careful balance between the plaintiff's right to pursue his or her claim that a statutorily or constitutionally protected right was
violated by a public authority administering or applying an otherwise neutral policy with "an
unequal hand" and the individual public official's right to perform his duties without a constant fear of harassing litigation.
Id. In this Section 1983 domestic violence case, this meant that even if discrimination took place, "the
individual police officers will nevertheless possess a qualified immunity if they can demonstrate that a
reasonable police officer executing the [discriminatory police] policy could not have known that the
conduct violated Ms. Hynson's clearly established right to equal protection." Id.
Thus, in Hynson the court may have severely limited the new cause of action it had only just
approved. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to the individual police defendants
on qualified immunity grounds. Hynson v. City of Chester, 731 F. Supp. 1236, 1240-41 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
123. As one pre-DeShaney author pointed out:
Plaintiffs would have a variety of potentially successful approaches from which to choose,
ranging from the claim of the denial of fundamental rights, which could trigger strict judicial
scrutiny, to the contention of a suspect class, which could invoke strict, or at least heightened,
scrutiny, to the allegation of an impermissible gender-based classification, with its intermediate
level of judicial scrutiny, to the argument that inadequate police protection lacks a rational
relationship to any legitimate state purpose.
Note, supra note 10, at 439 (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Woods, supra note 2, at 19. See supra notes
94-98 and accompanying text.
124. E.g., Hynson, 864 F.2d at 1031; Watson, 857 F.2d at 696-97; Dudosh v. Warg, 668 F. Supp.
944, 951 n.10 (E.D. Pa. 1987), vacated, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1988) (per curiam), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 942 (1988); Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 665 F. Supp. 381, 392 (E.D. Pa.), reconsideration denied
sub nom. Dudosh v. Warg, 668 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1987), vacated, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.) (per
595 F. Supp. at 1528 & n.1.
curiam), cert.
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categorized (based on gender, or perhaps status as a victim of domestic violence) could prove critical. If the reviewing court decided
a police classification was gender-based, the court would subject it
to the heightened standard of review, while if it had some other
basis the classification would be valid so long as it was rationally
related to the achievement of a legitimate state interest. And it could
be difficult to have a classification deemed gender-based. If the police classification was facially discriminatory due to sex it was gender-based, but if it was not facially discriminatory because of gender
in other words, facially neutral - a court would consider it
gender-based and apply intermediate scrutiny only if the equal protection claimant established the classification's actual discriminatory
gender-based effect and the police's deliberate purpose to discriminate. 125 This requirement was rooted in the Supreme Court's mandate in PersonnelAdministrator v. Feeney126 that in facially neutral,
supposedly gender-based classification discrimination cases the party
alleging a denial of equal protection must demonstrate that the government acted with a "discriminatory purpose," leading to a discriminatory effect, when it set up the classification at issue before
127
the party could obtain heightened judicial scrutiny.

125. E.g., Galloway, supra note 90, at 131-32, 142; Case Comment, supra note 2, at 685; Note,
The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law As Sex Discrimination, 98 YAME L.J. 145, 152-53 (1988).
One scholar has outlined what a claimant must establish in a sex discrimination case in order to
be entitled to the heightened standard of review:
In applying the rule that gender-based classifications are subject to intensified scrutiny,
the first question is whether the government used a gender-based classification. If the government action discriminates, on its face, on the basis of gender, intensified scrutiny is applicable. If, on the other hand, the government action does not involve facial gender-based
discrimination, then the [Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)] evil
purpose test applies, and in order to trigger intensified scrutiny, the claimant must show that
the government action discriminates in effect and purpose on the basis of gender.
Galloway, supra, at 142. As Feeney itself stated:
When a statute [or other governmental classification, see Yick Wo.v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886), supra note 94] gender-neutral on its face is challenged on the ground that its
effects upon women are disproportionably adverse, a twofold inquiry is thus appropriate. The
first question is whether the statutory classification is indeed neutral in the sense that it is
not gender-based. If the classification itself, covert or overt, is not based upon gender, the
second question is whether the adverse effect reflects invidious gender-based discrimination.
442 U.S. at 274.
126. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
127. E.g., L. TRmE, supra note 41, at § 16-20, at 1505; Galloway, supra note 90, at 142; Comment,
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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In many of the abused spouse equal protection cases, such as
Thurman 2 and some of the decisions that followed it,129 the courts
apparently, but not clearly, found that the police .classifications evidenced facial gender-based discrimination and accordingly applied
the intermediate standard of review. No defendant in any of these
cases ever proffered a governmental interest sufficiently important
to justify a discriminatory gender-based classification under the
heightened standard. 13 0 Indeed, in many cases the police made no
effort to justify their discriminatory classifications at all.13

criminatory purpose' ... implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.
It implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in
part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." 442 U.S. at
279 (citation omitted) (footnotes omitted). Accord, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987);
Sims v. Mulcahy, 902 F.2d 524, 539 (7th Cir. 1990); Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419, 1431-32

(9th Cir. 1989).
The Feeney proof of discriminatory purpose requirement helped spell doom for several pre-DeShaney battered spouse denial of equal protection through facially neutral, supposedly gender-based
discrimination claims. E.g., Hynson, 864 F.2d at 1031; Watson, 857 F.2d at 696-97.
128. 595 F. Supp. at 1527-29.
Several commentators have noted that the court in Thurman found a gender-based classification
and accordingly utilized a heightened standard of judicial equal protection review. E.g., Case Comment,
supra note 2, at 678-79; Comment, supra note 4, at 720-21; Note, supra note 10, at 431-33; Note, Equal
Protection, supra note 2, at 794-95.
In a footnote the Thurman court left the door ajar for a finding that the discriminatory police
classification at issue was based on a claimant's status as a victim of domestic violence, regardless of
the claimant's sex, rather than gender. 595 F. Supp. at 1528 n.1. See Case Comment, supra, at 68487. However, it had no need to further address this issue since it found presumably facial gender-based
discrimination was present.
129. E.g., Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 665 F. Supp. 381, 392-94 (E.D. Pa.), reconsideration
denied sub nom. Dudosh v. Warg, 668 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1987), vacated, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988); Bartalone v. County of Berrien, 643 F. Supp. 574, 577
(W.D. Mich. 1986); see Balistreri, 855 F.2d at 1427 (court strongly suggested that the facial genderbased classification standard should be applied on remand, but never clearly so stated); cf. Lowers v.
City of Streator, 627 F. Supp. 244, 246-47 (N.D. Ill. 1985). While other courts considered proceeding
under this general approach, they ultimately denied their plaintiffs relief because the police classifications
under consideration were facially neutral and the plaintiffs failed to establish discriminatory purpose
and effect pursuant to Feeney. E.g., Hynson, 864 F.2d at 1031; Watson, 857 F.2d at 696-97.
130. For an idea of some of the justifications for police inaction in domestic violence cases which
were posited, and rejected, during the years before DeShaney, see, e.g., Finesmith, supra note 2, at 8586; Waits, supra note 2, at 299-302; Woods, supra note 2, at 19-20; Case Comment, supra note 2, at
687-90; Comment, supra note 4, at 721, 725-27; Note, supra note 10, at 434-38. As one of these sources
noted when it compiled a list of some supposed excuses for police inaction:
The many rationalizations include preserving the traditional "principle" that "a man's home
is his castle;" avoiding arrest in situations in which the physical abuse of a woman by her
husband is purported to be acceptable within the couple's culture; and maintaining the efficient
and economic administration of the state's law enforcement agencies by regarding wife bat-
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Dudosh v. City of Allentown13 2 recognized that in addition to
facial gender-based classifications, the police could be making classifications in spouse abuse situations based solely upon the type
of complaint, here domestic violence, presented by the complainant. 33 In that latter event, since the classification was purportedly
not gender-based, the police need only have a rational basis underlying it unless the party challenging the classification could meet

the Feeney facially neutral classification test and thus qualify for
intermediate judicial scrutiny. 134 Other courts, including Watson135

tering as a minor crime and the arrest of wife batterers as a low priority. Other rationalizations
have been: (1) avoiding arrest in a class of cases that is alleged to have a high complainant
attrition rate; (2) avoiding arrest in situations in which the family could ill afford the economic
impact of the husband's arrest (e.g., time lost from work); (3) respecting a couple's privacy
by not interfering in private marital matters; and (4) preventing the possibility of harm to
police officers who might be injured in attempting to arrest a violent husband. Further attempts
at justification include preventing the possibility of severe retaliation against the battered wife
by the arrested husband after his release; avoiding arrest in situations in which the battered
wife merely wants to frighten the husband, remove him from the house, or be transported
to the hospital; and preserving the marriage and family, which could be endangered by the
intervention of the criminal justice process.
Note, supra, at 435 (footnotes omitted). The author promptly and convincingly demonstrated the groundlessness of all the excuses. Id. at 435-38.
For more on the harm to police issue, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
131. E.g., Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 665 F. Supp. 381, 392 (E.D. Pa.), reconsideration denied
sub nom. Dudosh v. Warg, 668 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1987), vacated, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988); Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1528.
In Dudosh v. Warg, 668 F. Supp. 944, 951-52 n.10 (E.D. Pa. 1987), vacated, 853 F.2d 917 (3d
Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988), the court acknowledged that the police and municipal
defendants may have proffered a defense against a rational basis standard battered spouse equal protection claim.
132. 665 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa.), reconsiderationdenied sub nom. Dudosh v. Warg, 668 F. Supp.
944 (E.D. Pa. 1987), vacated, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988).
For a description of Dudosh, see supra note 111.
133. Dudosh, 665 F. Supp. at 392. See supra note 111.
134. Dudosh, 665 F. Supp. at 392. See supra note 111.
In Dudosh the court found that the plaintiff had satisfied both the intermediate and rational basis
standards of review sufficiently to defeat the police's equal protection summary judgment motion because
the government had articulated neither an important governmental interest nor a rational basis for its
classifications. 665 F. Supp. at 392, 394.
Some litigants and commentators contended that police "domestic violence" classifications should
be considered gender-based and therefore automatically subject to the heightened standard of review.
See, e.g., Case Comment, supra note 2, at 684; Comment, supra note 4, at 721-22, 723-24; cf., e.g.,
McKee v. City of Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409, 414 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 727 (1990); id.
at 423-24 (Goldberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Howell v. City of Catoosa, 729 F.
Supp. 1308, 1311 n.5 (N.D. Okla. 1990) (Domestic violence classification "[b]y strict definition, a genderneutral class, but predominantly women."); Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1528 n.l. The Hynson and Watson
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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and Hynson, 136 agreed with Dudosh that if the police were treating
victims of domestic violence differently from other citizens the ra-

tional basis standard of equal protection analysis would apply to
such an arguably discriminatory system of classification unless the
1 37
victims satisfied the Feeney criteria.

3.

Summary of Abused Spouse Equal Protection Law

Before DeShaney, under the equal protection clause the police

could not discriminate in the way they guarded the public. If they
discriminated against battered women on the basis of gender, their
action would be unlawful unless it were substantially related to an

important governmental interest. No police defendant in the reported
cases was able to prove that an important governmental interest

required gender-based discrimination. If the police discriminated on
some other basis, such as against the class of victims of domestic
violence, their action would be upheld so long as the classification
was rationally related to a legitimate state interest. If it was unclear
whether the police discriminated on the basis of gender or class, the
reviewing court would apply the Feeney test to determine whether

or not gender-based discrimination was involved. Equal protection
law could provide the battered spouse with a reliable remedy against

police inaction.
C.

Failure to Adequately Train the Police

In the years before DeShaney a victim of domestic violence could
raise a derivative Section 1983 damage claim by asserting that a
courts obviously did not agree with the assertion that the police were guilty of gender discrimination
when they classified some cases as domestic violence, and each applied Feeney's test for facially neutral
classifications when they addressed the domestic violence grouping problem. See supra notes 120, 122.
Hence, abused spouses would only be entitled to equal protection review under the rational basis standard.
This result helps demonstrate the importance of Feeney in the battered spouse equal protection case,
as it could determine whether the abused were entitled, in their challenge to a police classification, to
the heightened or the rational basis standards of equal protection review, and thus how likely they were
to prevail in their suits.
135. 857 F.2d at 695-96. See supra note 120.
136. 864 F.2d at 1030-31. See supra note 122.
137. See, e.g., Balistreri, 855 F.2d at 1427; cf. Sherreli v. City of Longview, 683 F. Supp. 1108,
1112-13 (E.D. Tex. 1987); Trethewey v. DeKalb County, 662 F. Supp. 246, 248-50 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
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municipal defendant3 8 was liable to the victim because the municipality's failure to adequately train its police how to deal with do-

mestic violence incidents had caused police officers to commit
unconstitutional acts, such as failures to protect in violation of due
process or equal protection law, which led to the battered spouses's
harm. 139 This failure to train the police allegation had a rather checkered history. 14

In Monroe v. Pape,141 the Supreme Court had ruled that a municipality could not be held liable under the terms of Section 1983.
Seventeen years later the Court reevaluated the point. Under Monell

v. Department of Social Services, 4 2 a municipality cannot be held
vicariously liable, through respondeat superior or otherwise, in a
Section 1983 suit for the unconstitutional actions of its officials. 143
However, it can be held liable under Section 1983 for constitutional
violations which it caused through something akin to a policy or
custom.'"
Various post-Monell litigants argued that a derivative municipal
failure to train the police claim' 45 could be one way to establish that
municipal fault produced the plaintiff's harm. The failure to train
action was derivative to the actions of a municipality's officials in
the sense that it only existed if some police officer (or other mu-

138. For more on municipal defendants in Section 1983 cases, see supra note 36.
139. E.g., Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 629 F. Supp. 849 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
140. See, e.g., Languirand v. Hayden, 717 F.2d 220, 226-27 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1215 (1984); Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 873 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 833
(1982); Dudosh, 665 F. Supp. at 395 & n.7 (collecting cases); Oliver, supra note 28, at 153 ("Lower
court treatment of inadequate training as a basis of recovery has been confused and unclear ...
168.
141. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
142. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See supra note 36.
143. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95.
144. Id. at 690. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
145. A claim that a municipality failed adequately to supervise, discipline, and otherwise control
the police would be accorded essentially the same treatment. E.g., Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380,
1391 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027 (1988); Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1259
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Bergquist v. County of Cochise, 806 F.2d 1364, 1369-70 (9th Cir. 1986); Lenard v.
Argento, 699 F.2d 874, 885-86 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983); see, e.g., M. ScWARTZ
& J. Kmracu, supra note 31, at §§ 4.9-.10; Comment, Liability of a Municipality For Acts Committed
by Its Police Officers: Inadequate TrainingDemands Strict Custom or Policy Test, 53 U. C. L. Rev.
525, 528 & n.26, 529 & n.31 (1984) (gives good background on early failure to train police law).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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nicipal representative) violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights
and that underlying violation somehow was caused by the municipality's inappropriate failure to properly train the officer. 146 Thus,
a threshold question in any failure to train suit against a municipality
was whether an underlying constitutional tort was committed by an
inadequately trained municipal representative. If so, the municipality
could be liable if its failure to train caused the victim's injury. If
not, no Section 1983 failure to train claim would exist regardless of
how deficient the municipality's police training program may have
been. 147
A Section 1983 litigant who asserted that a municipality had

failed to adequately train the police to deal with the myriad law
enforcement situations with which they must cope had to prove various elements of the cause of action. 48 Many United States Courts

146. See, e.g., City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 n.8; Brown, supra note 36, at 628 n.22; Oren,
supra note 22, at 730 n.512.
147. The operation of failure to train law was illustrated by the various discussions in the Dudosh
v. City of Allentown series of cases, listed here in chronological order, which characterized failure to
train claims depending on whether their underlying constitutional violations were denial of due process
or equal protection rights. Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 629 F. Supp. 849, 852 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Dudosh
v. City of Allentown, 665 F. Supp. 381, 387, 396 (E.D. Pa.), reconsiderationdenied sub nom. Dudosh
v. Warg, 668 F. Supp. 944, 946, 950-51 (E.D. Pa. 1987), vacated, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988); Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 722 F. Supp. 1233, 1234, 1236 (E.D.
Pa. 1989). If no viable underlying constitutional violation existed, the Dudosh court appropriately terminated the corresponding failure to train claim. Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 665 F. Supp. 381, 396
(E.D. Pa.), reconsiderationdenied sub nom. Dudosh v. Warg, 668 F. Supp. 944, 951 (E.D. Pa. 1987),
vacated, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 492 (1988); Dudosh v. City of
Allentown, 722 F. Supp. 1233, 1236 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
148. In Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027 (1988), the
Fourth Circuit summarized the then-existing failure to train law:
The way in which a municipal police force is trained, including the design and implementation of training programs and the follow-up supervision of trainees, is necessarily a
matter of "policy" within the meaning of Monell. To the extent a particular training policy
is fairly attributable to a municipality, it is "official municipal policy." To the extent such
an official municipal policy has deficiencies resulting from municipal fault that then cause
specific constitutional violations by deficiently trained police officers, the municipality is liable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Such a training policy is fairly attributed to a municipality when it is designed, implemented, and its trainees supervised by municipal officials to whom the municipal governing
body has effectively delegated final authority so to act. Delegation to such policymakers may
be by formal directive, such as a job description, or by informal acquiescence in a known,
continued exercise of authority, or by both in combination. Policymaking authority with respect to police training, as generally, is final if it is effectively final; the mere fact that the
ultimate
official @
retains
bodyResearch
or some other
governing
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of Appeal recognized the new action, 149 while others greeted it less

enthusiastically. 150 The courts which accepted the claim usually only
held a municipality liable in the case of a grossly negligent or reckless
failure to train, or perhaps if it exhibited deliberate indifference
5
towards the constitutional rights of its denizens.1 '

In City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 52 a divided Supreme Court
invalidated a $1.5 million jury verdict against the municipal defendant because the trial court had instructed the jury that it could

infer the existence of a city policy for inadequate police training

police training policy and policymakers does not allow a municipality to disclaim the policy
as its own.
...
[iraining policy deficiencies for which municipal liability may be imposed include
not only express authorizations of specific unconstitutional conduct, but tacit authorizations,
and failures adequately to prohibit or discourage readily foreseeable conduct in light of known
exigencies of police duty.
Finally, a sufficiently close causal link must be shown between potentially inculpating
training deficiency or deficiencies and specific violation. This requires first that a specific
deficiency rather than general laxness or ineffectiveness in training be shown. It then requires
that the deficiency or deficiencies be such, given the manifest exigencies of police work, as
to make occurrence of the specific violation a reasonable probability rather than a mere possibility.
Id. at 1389-90. Accord, e.g., Gerhardt, supra note 36, at 604-05.
For more on the Section 1983 inadequate police training cause of action, see, e.g., Brown, supra
note 36; Gerhardt, supra, at 603-14; Oliver, supra note 36, at 152-53, 161-85; Taylor, Municipal Liability
Litigation in Police Misconduct Cases From Monroe to Praprotnik and Beyond, 19 Curiia. L. REv. 448
(1989); Note, Municipal Liability for Police Misconduct: Must Victims Now Prove Intent?, 97 YALE
L.J. 448 (1988).
149. See, e.g., Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027 (1988);
Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Warren v. City of Lincoln, 816 F.2d 1254 (8th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2431 (1989); Bergquist v. County of Cochise, 806 F.2d 1364 (9th
Cir. 1986); Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922 (1987);
Kibbe v. City of Springfield, 777 F.2d 801 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 475 U.S. 1064 (1986), cert.
dismissed, 480 U.S. 257 (1987).
150. See, e.g., Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 1338 (1989); Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d 874 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983).
151. While a few courts apparently held that the municipal defendant could be held liable on a
mere showing of ordinary negligence, see, e.g., McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1391 (7th
Cir. 1984) (supervisor case, see supra note 36); Brandon v. Allen, 719 F.2d 151, 153-54 (6th Cir. 1983)
(supervisor case, court indicated simple negligence applicable standard but did not reach issue because
concluded qualified immunity present), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S.
464 (1985); Greenberg v. Mynczywor, 667 F. Supp. 901, 906-07 (D.N.H. 1987), most required proof
of considerably greater culpability. See, e.g., Spell, 824 F.2d at 1390 & n.11; Bergquist, 806 F.2d at
1370; Fiacco, 783 F.2d at 326. For the final resolution of the degree of culpability dispute, see infra
notes 408, 414 and accompanying text.
152. 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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because of one instance of extremely excessive force.153 A plurality

of the Court concluded that more than a single unlawful act must
be proved in order to justify such a failure to train recovery.1 54 The

Court, which had never previously determined the soundness of a
failure to train the police suit, was unable to agree whether an in"'
adequate police training claim could ever be valid. 55
After Tuttle, the Dudosh v. City of Allentown l56 court considered

how the derivative inadequate police training cause of action would

apply in a domestic violence case. As the court noted, neither the
Supreme Court 5 7 nor the Third Circuit, of which the Dudosh court
was part, had definitively addressed the validity of the claim,

the Dudosh court eyed suspiciously.

59

58 which

The court granted summary

judgment for the municipal defendant on the plaintiff's denial of
equal protection failure to train count without deciding whether the

overall failure to train theory was viable. The court perceived that
the plaintiff had not proved that the police who arguably violated

the plaintiff's constitutional equal protection rights were inade153. Id. at 813-14.
154. Id. at 823-24.
155. See id. at 824 n.7.
The Court later missed a golden opportunity (1) to settle the question of the validity of the Section
1983 inadequate police training cause of action once and for all and (2), if necessary, to define the

standard of culpability requisite for liability, see supra note 151 and accompanying text, when it dismissed
a writ of certiorari it had previously granted in a case where these issues could have been decided. Kibbe
v. City of Springfield, 777 F.2d 801 (lst Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 475 U.S. 1064 (1986), cert. dismissed,
480 U.S. 257 (1987) (per curiam). See Spell, 824 F.2d at 1389 n.10.
In an extended dissent from the dismissal order, four justices, led by Justice O'Connor, discussed
the merits of constitutional inadequate police training actions under Section 1983, and concluded that
in their view "the 'inadequacy' of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where
the failure to train amounts to a reckless disregard for or deliberate indifference to the rights of persons
within the city's domain." City of Springfleld, 480 U.S. at 268-69 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent
specifically decried the First Circuit's broad application of the failure to train tort in Kibbe. Id. at 27072. Thus, while the dissenters recognized the cause of action, they did so grudgingly and only in the
most extreme of circumstances.
156. 665 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa.), reconsiderationdenied sub nom. Dudosh v. Warg, 668 F. Supp.
944 (E.D. Pa. 1987), vacated, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988).
For background on Dudosh, see supra note 111. See also supra note 147.
157. See supra note 155.
158. Dudosh, 665 F. Supp. at 395.
159. The court derailed the plaintiff's denial of due process failure to train count when it held
that no underlying due process constitutional violation of the plaintiffs rights had been committed by
the police. Dudosh v. Warg, 668 F. Supp. at 949-51; Dudosh, 665 F. Supp. at 387-91. See supra note
147.
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quately trained. If they were, the plaintiff had not demonstrated
that the inadequate training caused the possible denial of equal pro-

tection that resulted in the plaintiff's death.160 Thus, the plaintiff
had not established the elements requisite to a successful failure to
train claim. In the process, the court evidenced little sympathy for
the failure to train suit.' 6 ' Several other reported pre-DeShaney domestic violence or related nonfeasance cases at least briefly considered the derivative municipal liability cause of action. 62 A number

160. Dudosh, 665 F. Supp. at 396. The court reaffirmed this holding on reconsideration. Dudosh
v. Warg, 668 F. Supp. at 951.
In reaching this result, the Dudosh court garnered support from several earlier district court decisions
from inside the Third Circuit which had also assumed the failure to train claim was valid without deciding
the point and then dismissed the case for lack of proof that the training was inadequate or, if it was,
that the inadequate training had caused the plaintiff's harm. Mariani v. City of Pittsburgh, 624 F. Supp.
506 (W.D. Pa. 1986); Sewell v. Dever, 581 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1984). The court also cited Justice
O'Connor's anti-failure to train dissent in City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 260-72 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting), see supra note 155, as support on the failure of proof of causation holding.
Dudosh, 665 F. Supp. at 396.
A few months after Dudosh was decided, in Lach v. Robb, 679 F. Supp. 508 (W.D. Pa. 1988),
the court also took a hard line on the failure to train cause of action. Id. at 513 (citing Chinchello v.
Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 132-34 (3d Cir. 1986)). And a few months after Lach was decided, the Third
Circuit itself demonstrated in Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 672-73 (3d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989), that it felt a level of hostility towards the new cause of action
akin to that of the Kibbe dissenters. Thus, the Third Circuit and its subordinate courts were not the
forums in which to bring successful failure to train claims in the period before DeShaney.
161. See Dudosh, 665 F. Supp. at 396. This lack of sympathy was reflected by the Third Circuit
and other law the court chose to follow. See supra note 160.
162. Turner v. City of North Charleston, 675 F. Supp. 314, 320 (D.S.C. 1987) (battered spouse
case, turned on failure to protect/"special relationship" substantive due process issue, since court found
no underlying substantive due process violation of plaintiffs' rights, at least partially due to qualified
immunity doctrine, failure to train claim evaporated as well); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 656 F.
Supp. 423, 424-25 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (battered spouse who police did not assist despite numerous calls
for assistance alleged "defendants failed to properly supervise, train and/or discipline Pacifica police
officers which resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's civil rights," id. at 424; court never addressed
merits of failure to train claim because it dismissed plaintiff's allegations of underlying denial of substantive due process and equal protection constitutional rights), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 901 F.2d
696 (9th Cir. 1990); Bartalone v. County of Berrien, 643 F. Supp. 574, 578 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (domestic
violence case where court apparently endorsed failure to train police claim when there is a sufficiently
culpable municipal defendant, stating that: "A conscious choice not to establish or to enforce a procedure
for treating spouse abuse victims on an equal basis as other persons could constitute authorization or
approval of, or knowing acquiescence in, unconstitutional conduct," and "[municipal] liability may result
'where there is essentially a complete failure to train the police force, or training that is so reckless or
grossly negligent that future police misconduct is almost inevitable."' (quoting Hays v. Jefferson County,
668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 833 (1982))); cf. Sherrell v. City of Longview, 683
F. Supp. 1108, 1114-15 (E.D. Tex. 1987) (child abused and severely injured by municipal police officer
stated viable Section 1983 claim against municipality when alleged that, despite repeated complaints about
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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of them, contrary to Dudosh, presaged a favorable reception to a

failure to train claim when it arose in appropriate future litigation.

63

On this record it would have been possible before DeShaney to
foresee a mixed, but generally positive, future for the inadequate
municipal police training litigation theory in battered spouse damage

cases where an underlying constitutional violation was committed
by a municipal official whose actions were attributable to a blame-

worthy municipal failure to train. Dudosh, the only pre-DeShaney
domestic violence case to apply the theory, was from a circuit very
hostile to the cause of action. Not surprisingly, perhaps, it rejected

it without really determining its merits. Had the Dudosh court been
from a circuit friendlier to the claim, 164 it might have made things

easier for plaintiffs both on the ultimate merits of the cause of action
and in such areas as proof, causation, or degree of culpability. 165
Certainly, other courts indicated that they would accord a much
warmer reception to the municipal failure to train in domestic violence cases assertion once it was presented to them. Ample evidence
was available which established that police training for domestic

66
violence situations was inadequate in many areas of the nation.

municipal policy or custom not to restrict police officers' behavior in domestic violence situations); Caplan
v. Roseman, 667 F. Supp. 549, 555-56 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (suit over police involvement in child custody
dispute included inadequate police training and supervision complaint, court held no underlying constitutional violation had been proven in this case but observed, as dictum, that, unlike child custody
and visitation cases, "this Court concurs with the plaintiffs that police officers should undergo some
special training concerning the handling of domestic violence cases."); Lowers v. City of Streator, 627
F. Supp. 244, 247 (N.D. IM. 1985) (female rape victim who police ignored after she was attacked, thus
allowing second rape by same attacker, stated Section 1983 cause of action against municipal defendant
for alleged municipal policy discouraging vigorous prosecution of violent crimes against women); Jensen
v. Conrad, 570 F. Supp. 114, 120-25 & n.23 (D.S.C. 1983) (estates of abused children who died from
their injuries sued various defendants for failing to investigate reports of child abuse previous to children's
deaths, part of case was claim that state officials in their individual capacities failed adequately to train
protective service caseworkers how to investigate suspected child abuse situations), aff'd in part, dismissed
in part on other grounds, 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
163. E.g., Caplan, 667 F. Supp. at 555-56; Bartalone, 643 F. Supp. at 578; cf. Sherrell, 683 F.
Supp. at 1114-15; Lowers, 627 F. Supp. at 247.
164. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
165. Such as was done by the First Circuit in Kibbe v. City of Springfield, 777 F.2d 801 (1st Cir.
1985), cert. granted, 475 U.S. 1064 (1986), cert. dismissed, 480 U.S. 257 (1987).
166. See, e.g., Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 696 (10th Cir. 1988); D. RHODE,
supra note 2, at 239; Finesmith, supra note 2; Gondolf & McFerron, supra note 9; Note, The Casefor
Legal Remedies for Abused Women, 2 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 135, 145 & n.73 (1977); Note,
Duties, supra note 2, at 941-43; cf. Caplan, 667 F. Supp. at 555-56.
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In any event, this potentially promising situation was the state of
affairs in Section 1983 municipal inadequate police training in do-

mestic violence claim derivative damage litigation when DeShaney
was decided.
III. DESHANEY V. WINNEBAGO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES

As even Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged in his majority
68
opinion in DeShaney,167 which was joined by five other justices,

"[t]he facts of this case are undeniably tragic."' 6 9 Joshua DeShaney
was severely abused by his father, Randy DeShaney, starting at as
early an age as two or three. 170 Randy DeShaney had gained custody
of Joshua at the time of Randy's 1980 Wyoming divorce from Joshua's mother, and soon thereafter moved to a city in Winnebago
County, Wisconsin.17' In January 1982 Joshua's stepmother, Randy's second wife, reported the abuse. 72 Representatives from the

Winnebago County Department of Social Services ("Department")
interviewed Randy, who denied the abuse allegations, but they took
73
no other action.
In January 1983 Joshua was hospitalized for suspected abuse,
and the Department briefly had him judicially placed in the hos167. 489 U.S. at 191.
For some of the numerous commentaries on DeShaney, see, e.g., Abernathy, supra note 24, at
1488-90; Braverman, Children, Poverty and State Constitutions,38 EMoRY L.J. 577, 591-93 (1989); First,
supra note 68; Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative Rights View
of the Constitution, 43 VAwD. L. Ray. 409 (1990); Oren, supra note 22; Soifer, Moral Ambition, Formalism, and the "Free World" of DeShaney, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1513 (1989); Strossen, Recent
U.S. and InternationalJudicialProtection of Individual Rights: A Comparative Legal ProcessAnalysis
and ProposedSynthesis, 41 HAsrnws L.J. 805, 873-75 (1990); The Supreme Court, 1988 Term - Leading
Cases, 103 HAiv. L. Ray. 137, 167-177 (1989) [hereinafter Supreme Court]; Note, Section 1983, supra
note 2, at 1369-73; Note, supra note 11; Note, Snake Pits, supra note 42, at 783-88; Note, Constitutional
Approval, supra note 42, at 192-99; Case Note, 20 CumB. L. Rav. 195, 195-99 (1989); Case Note, 12
HAmnsNE L. Ray. 421, 422-31 (1989); Case Note, 25 LAND & WATER L. REv. 251 (1990); Recent Development, 28 DuQ. L. 1,Ev. 387, 387-95, 408-11 (1990).
168. Justices White, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy all joined in the Chief Justice's
opinion. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 190.
169. Id. at 191.
170. Id. at 191-92.
171. Id. at 191.
172. Id. at 192.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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pital's custody. 174 While the Department ultimately decided there was
insufficient evidence of child abuse to keep Joshua in judicial custody, it took several steps to protect him. 7 5 A month later Joshua
was again treated at the hospital for probable abuse, and emergency
room personnel reported their observations to the Department caseworker assigned to Joshua's case. 176 Over a period of months the
caseworker regularly visited Joshua at the DeShaney home and duly
documented a series of suspicious observations which led her to
believe Joshua probably was being physically abused, but she took
77
no other actions.
When Joshua was hospitalized anew for probable abuse, the Department was again notified but the caseworker and the Department
still did nothing. 7 8 Finally:
In March 1984, Randy DeShaney beat 4-year-old Joshua so severely that he
fell into a life-threatening coma. Emergency brain surgery revealed a series of
hemorrhages caused by traumatic injuries to the head inflicted over a long period
of time. Joshua did not die, but he suffered brain damage so severe that he is
expected to spend the rest of his life confined to an institution for the profoundly
79
retarded.'

Joshua and his mother sued Winnebago County, the Department,
and various individual Department employees under Section 1983
for denial of due process due to the failure to protect Joshua from
his father's abuse.8 0 The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin's unreported ruling dismissed the DeShaneys'
claims on summary judgment because "the failure of a state agency
to render protective services to persons within its jurisdiction does
not violate the due process clause."''

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.

177. Id.at 192-93
178. Id.at 193.
179. Id.Randy DeShaney was later tried and convicted of child abuse, id., and sentenced to two
to four years imprisonment. DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep't of Social Services, 812 F.2d 298, 300 (7th
Cir. 1987), aff'd, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). The Seventh Circuit's opinion gave an even more chilling account
of Joshua DeShaney's tragic story than that of Chief Justice Rehnquist. 812 F.2d at 299-300.
180. 489 U.S. at 193; 812 F.2d at 300-01.
181. 812byF.2d
301.
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The Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's action.8 2 It rejected
the DeShaneys' claim that the Department denied Joshua due process because it failed to protect him from injury by his father pursuant to the prior Seventh Circuit and other precedents holding the
government has no constitutional duty to protect its citizens. 183 The
panel specifically disavowed the "special relationship" due process
approach followed by some courts. 184
The DeShaney majority affirmed the Seventh Circuit's narrow
view of due process. Chief Justice Rehnquist first characterized the
DeShaneys' "special relationship" due process claim as a substantive
due process one. 185 He then declared that the due process clause does
not impose a duty of protection on the State. 86 "Its purpose was
to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State
protected them from each other. The Framers were content to leave
the extent of governmental obligation in the latter area to the democratic political processes. 11 87 Accordingly, the majority held, "we
conclude that a State's failure to protect an individual against private
violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process
Clause."188

In the process of reaching this result, the Court specifically rejected the "special relationship" substantive due process approach
employed by a number of cases, and included Balistreri by name
on a list of disapproved decisions. 89 It acknowledged that in a few
prior cases the Court had recognized that a state can have an affirmative due process duty to care for and protect limited groups
of individuals such as incarcerated prisoners or involuntarily committed mental patients. 90 But the Chief Justice distinguished such
182. DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep't of Social Services, 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 489

U.S. 189. (1989)
183. Id. at 301. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.

184. 812 F.2d at 303-04. See supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text.
185. 489 U.S. at 195.
186. Id. at 195-96.
187. Id. at 196.

188. Id. at 197.
189. Id. at 197-203 & n.4.

190. Id. at 198-99 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (duty to protect involuntarily
committed mental patients); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (duty to protect incarcerated prisoners);
also cited City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hosp., 463 U.S. 239 (1983) (duty to provide medical
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
42
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cases from Joshua DeShaney's situation because in them the due

process claimants were involuntarily in state custody, and therefore
unable to care for themselves. When the State deprived these individuals of their freedom, the majority noted, it became obligated

under the due process clause to provide them with some basic level
of care and protection. 1 1 The majority determined that Joshua

DeShaney, on the other hand, was in a completely different category
of substantive due process claimant, as he was not in state custody
when his father abused him - indeed, he was in the father's courtgranted custody. 192 While the State may have suspected the existence
of Randy DeShaney's dreadful behavior it did nothing either to cre-

ate the behavior or to make Joshua more subject to it.9 3 The majority concluded that even though the State once briefly took custody
of Joshua, its action did not give rise to a substantive due process

right.

94

Clearly, the custody/non-custody distinction was critical to

the Court; only those in custody henceforth should bother suing for

due process relief.
The Court then noted that a state might impose common law
tort liability upon itself in a case like Joshua's. 195 But that, the Court

191. Id. at 198-200.
192. Id. at 201.
At this point, the Court observed that if instead of being in his father's custody when he was
abused Joshua had been placed by the State in a foster home and been cruelly treated there, he might
have had a due process right of protection because his situation might have been sufficiently analogous
to that of the incarcerated prisoner or the involuntarily committed mental patient. Id. n.9. The Court
referred to some of the federal appellate decisions which had found such a right existed in foster home
situations. E.g., Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 794-97 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 1337 (1989); Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 649 F.2d 134, 141-42 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983). This discussion could prove important, both for its potential
addition to the rights of abused foster children and because it helps indicate the exact parameters of
DeShaney's custody prerequisite to a due process right of protection. See infra notes 225-28, 429 and
accompanying text.
193. 489 U.S. at 201.
194. The Court stated:
That the State once took temporary custody of Joshua does not alter the analysis, for when
it returned him to his father's custody, it placed him in no worse position than that in which
he would have been had it not acted at all; the State does not become the permanent guarantor
of an individual's safety by having once offered him shelter. Under these circumstances, the
State had no constitutional duty to protect Joshua.
Id.
195. Id. at 201-03. This, of course, is something some states definitely might do. See supra notes
text.
3, 13, 20 and
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concluded, did not mean that a federal constitutional tort had been
committed.1 96 The Court left it for the people of Wisconsin, if they
wished, to require, pursuant to their common law system of tort
law, that Joshua and others like him be compensated by the State
for the injuries they sustained under such sad circumstances.1 97 The
Supreme Court would not require the people to do so under the
guise of federal substantive due process.' 98
The Chief Justice included two footnotes in his opinion which
may prove extremely important in battered spouse constitutional tort
litigation. In one, the Court affirmed that "[tihe State may not, of
course, selectively deny its protective services to certain disfavored
minorities without violating the Equal Protection Clause." 99 While
arguably this language endorsed equal protection claims for some
battered spouses in police nonfeasance cases in accordance with the
existing equal protection law, their status is not entirely clear.
In the other footnote, the Court dealt with the Board of Regents
v. Rothw procedural due process cause of action which may help
battered spouses in jurisdictions with certain types of spousal protection statutes. The DeShaneys' employed both Roth and Taylor
v. Ledbetter201 in their briefs, 202 contending that the Wisconsin child
protection statutes applicable to Joshua created entitlements because
they were similar to the Georgia laws construed in Taylor.203 The
196. 489 U.S. at 202.

197. Id. at 203. In so doing, the majority adopted the approach frequently employed by the Seventh
Circuit decisions cited supra note 42. See, e.g., Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1223-24 (7th
Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989); Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507, 510-11 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1205-06 (7th Cir.

1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618-19 (7th Cir. 1982).
198. 489 U.S. at 203.
199. Id. at 197 n.3 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)). See supra note 94. The

Court observed that no such equal protection argument had been made in DeShaney. 489 U.S. at 197
n.3.

200. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
201. 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989).

202. Brief for Petitioners at 24-29, Reply Brief for Petitioners at 9-11, DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, (1989) (No. 87-154).

203. As the Court observed: "Petitioners also argue that the Wisconsin child protection statutes
gave Joshua an 'entitlement' to receive protective services in accordance with the terms of the statute,
an entitlement which would enjoy due process protection against state deprivation under our decision

in [Roth]." 489 U.S. at 195 n.2.
For more on Taylor and the Georgia statutes construed there, see supra notes 69-74 and accom-

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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Chief Justice refused to entertain the claim because the DeShaneys
only first raised it in their Supreme Court brief on the merits.2 It
is uncertain how the Court would regard a properly presented Roth
due process argument in a battered spouse case.
The DeShaney dissenters challenged what they perceived as the
Chief Justice's negative view of constitutional rights. 2 5 Justice Brennan read the earlier Supreme Court precedents upholding a due process right of protection in situations the majority characterized as
solely custodial far more broadly. 20 6 He believed the Wisconsin child
protection statutes created a Departmental obligation for positive
action which was constitutionally enforceable, 2 7 and generally decried the majority's decision. 20 8 Justice Blackmun agreed with Justice
Brennan's approach, advocating in the process a broad, or sympathetic, reading of the fourteenth amendment rather than the restrictive one adopted by the majority, 209 as well as various courts
below.210
DeShaney was a landmark decision for the field of abused spouse
litigation against police inaction. It resolved the division in the lower
courts over the special responsibility federal denial of due process
claim by adopting the Seventh Circuit's narrow reading of the fourteenth amendment. Only those individuals who were in some form
of state custody would be able, post-DeShaney, to raise a substantive
due process-based objection to a governmental failure to act. Since
none of the reported domestic violence cases arose when the victims
were in any form of state custody, DeShaney presumably struck a
mortal blow to battered spouses' denial of substantive due process
204. As the Court stated:
But this argument is made for the first time in petitioners' brief to this Court: it was not
pleaded in the complaint, argued to the Court of Appeals as a ground for reversing the District
Court, or raised in the petition for certiorari. We therefore decline to consider it here.
489 U.S. at 195 n.2 (citations omitted).
205. Id. at 204-06 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
206. "I would read [those precedents] to stand for the much more generous proposition that, if
a State cuts off private sources of aid and then refuses aid itself, it cannot wash its hands of the harm
that results from its inaction." Id. at 207.
207. Id. at 208-10.
208. Id. at 211-12.
209. 489 U.S. at 212-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
210. See
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claims against the non-responsive police. Apparently, the only causes
of action the DeShaney Court clearly endorsed for governmental
nonfeasance cases, and which would be available in abused spouse
situations, were state common law negligence-based ones. The next
segment of this article will recount DeShaney's reception by both
courts and commentators, hopefully clarifying in the process its impact on domestic violence victim Section 1983 damage litigation
against the police.

IV.

DESHANEY's IMPACT ON BATTERED SPOUSES'
SECTION 1983 DAMAGE LITIGATION

Not surprisingly, perhaps, DeShaney's result and rationale, with
its custody/non-custody dichotomy in "special relationship" substantive due process cases, have been roundly condemned by the
21
vast majority of the commentators who have studied the decision. '
Only a few authors have supported the DeShaney majority opinion. 212 Still, its effect on at least some battered spouse Section 1983
damage suits against the non-responsive police has been quick and
dramatic. DeShaney most affected the denial of substantive due
process "special relationship" cause of action in non-custodial situations, possibly followed in at least one court by the denial of
equal protection claim. Also influenced was the less-frequently raised
Board of Regents v. Roth procedural due process assertion. DeShaney indirectly, but significantly, affected the derivative municipal
failure to adequately train the police contention.
A.

Denial of Due Process

Before DeShaney, the vast majority of the due process challenges
to police inaction in domestic violence situations were substantive
attacks on the failure to protect. 213 After DeShaney, the Roth pro-

211. E.g., Braverman, supra note 167, at 592-93; First, supra note 68, at 534; Gerhardt, supra

note 167; Oren, supra note 22; Soifer, supra note 167; Strossen, supra note 167, at 875; Supreme Court,
supra note 167, at 172-77; Note, supra note 11, at 508; Note, Section 1983, supra note 2, at 1389; Case
Note, 12 HaNm L. RIv. 421, 446 (1989); Case Note, 25 LAND & VATER L. Ray. 251, 260-65 (1990).
212. E.g., Note, Snake Pits, supra note 42, at 812-21; Recent Development, supra note 167, at
410-11.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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cedural due process allegation generally proved more fruitful.

1. "Special Relationship" Substantive Due Process Cases
a.

General Rejection of Claims

As one would expect, the lower federal courts immediately en-

forced the Supreme Court's DeShaney mandate in substantive due
14
process failure to protect cases. Upon reconsideration, the BalistrerP
court reversed its previous pro-battered spouse holding and dismissed

the substantive due process claim. Based on DeShaney, the Dudosh
2
v. City of Allentown215 court, in its most recent reported decision,

16

refused on reconsideration to reinstate such a cause of action despite
the administrator of the deceased battered spouse's estate's argument
that his decedent should be considered to have been in custody at
the time of her death and thus should still have been allowed to
recover despite DeShaney.2 7 Other courts rushed to invalidate non-

custody "special relationship" substantive due process causes of action, and have consistently continued to do so. 2 8 Several of these

214. Balistred v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699-700 (9th Cir. 1990). For more on the
various Balistreri opinions, see supra note 50.
215. Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 722 F. Supp. 1233, 1234-35 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
216. For more on Dudosh's various incarnations and issues, see supra notes 111, 132-34, 156-61
and accompanying text, infra notes 411-12 and accompanying text.
217. On the day of Kathleen Dudosh's death, her former male cohabitant unlawfully entered Dudosh's apartment. Dudosh called the police, and when two officers arrived she met them outside her
home and showed them a copy of a state court Protection-from-Abuse order which required the former
cohabitant to leave her alone. Dudosh then voluntarily escorted the officers upstairs to her apartment
door. She unlocked the door, and when it opened the former cohabitant shot her dead through the
doorway. Soon thereafter, he committed suicide. Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 665 F. Supp. 381, 38486 (E.D. Pa.), reconsiderationdenied sub nom. Dudosh v. Warg, 668 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1987),
vacated, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988). Dudosh's administrator
contended that this fact situation established that Dudosh was in police custody when she was murdered,
but the court on reconsideration held she was not in custody and accordingly, pursuant to DeShaney,
refused to alter its previous grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the substantive due process
claim. Dudosh, 722 F. Supp. at 1235.
218. E.g., Ross v. United States, 910 F.2d 1422, 1428 (7th Cir. 1990); Bryson v. City of Edmond,
905 F.2d 1386, 1392-93 (10th Cir. 1990); Doe v. Milwaukee County, 903 F.2d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 1990);
Piechowicz v. United States, 885 F.2d 1207, 1214-15 (4th Cir. 1989); de Jesus Benavides v. Santos, 883
F.2d 385, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1989); Philadelphia Police & Fire Ass'n for Handicapped Children, Inc. v.
City of Philadelphia, 874 F.2d 156, 166-68 (3d Cir. 1989); Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Dep't of
Social Services,
871 F.2d
474, 476-77,
479 (4th
Cir.), 1991
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cases, in addition to Balistreriand Dudosh, featured abused spouses'
police inaction due process claims which either were derailed by
DeShaney or would have been so treated had the substantive due
process point been raised.219
b.

DeShaney's "Custody" Test

Some litigants have attempted to evade DeShaney, arguing they

met its custody test, by demonstrating that they were subjected to
a "similar restraint of liberty" to incarceration or involuntary institutionalization.m For example, in Pagano v. Massapequa Public
Schools, 2 the district court held that a public elementary school
student who was required by law to attend school was, as a student,
sufficiently close to being in custody that the school he attended
owed him a duty of protection.2 2 Accordingly, the student's suit
survived the school system and individual school officials' motion
to dismissYm This fairly broad interpretation of what constituted a
State of Tennessee, 738 F. Supp. 258, 259-60 (M.D. Tenn. 1990); Hynson v. City of Chester, 731 F.
Supp. 1236, 1238-39 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (battered spouse case); Dimas v. County of Quay, 730 F. Supp.
373, 375-80 (D.N.M. 1990); Henke v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 96, 101, 775 P.2d 1160, 1165 (Ct. App.
1989) (Section 1983 claim); Garcia v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 728, 738-41, 789 P.2d 960, 966-68,
268 Cal. Rptr. 779, 785-87 (1990) (Section 1983 claim); Makris v. City of Grosse Pointe Park, 180 Mich.
App. 545, 553-56, 448 N.W.2d 352, 356-57 (1989) (Section 1983 claim); Marshall v. Winston, 239 Va.
315, 320, 389 S.E.2d 902, 905 (1990) (Section 1983 claim); see Coffman v. Wilson Police Dep't, 739
F. Supp. 257, 263-64 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (battered spouse case, in dicta court stated DeShaney would bar
substantive due process claim had plaintiff brought one).
219. E.g., Coffman, 739 F. Supp. at 263-64; Hynson, 731 F. Supp. at 1238-39.
220. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text. DeShaney itself held that the "custody" requisite to a substantive due process governmental inaction cause of action is only present in cases where
the State takes a person into custody and holds them there against their will through incarceration,
involuntary commitment to a mental institution, or a "similar restraint of personal liberty." 489 U.S.
at 199-202. See, e.g., Germany v. Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 23 (Ist Cir. 1989) (on reconsideration) (juvenile
under control of Massachusetts Department of Youth Services was in DeShaney-required custody). The
DeShaney Court never defined what constitutes such a "similar restraint." See J.O. v. Alton Community
Unit School Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1990).
221. 714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
222. The student had had an extended series of abusive acts perpetrated against him by other
students. When the student had advised school officials of the attacks the officials had promised to
protect him, but allegedly failed to do so. Id. at 642.
223. Id. at 643. See Stoneking v. Bradford Area School Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 723-24 (3d Cir. 1989)
("The situation of school children, compelled by state law to attend school, who are physically mistreated
by School District employees, may not be dissimilar to that of children in foster homes mistreated by
their foster parents." (emphasis added) (dictum)), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 840 (1990); Robert G. v.
Newburgh City School Dist., No. 89 Civ. 2978 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1990) (1990 WEsrAw 3210, at I & 48
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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"similar restraint of liberty" and "custody" under DeShaney was,
according to the Pagano district court, 224 justified by a footnote in

DeShaney which noted, but expressed no view on, several cases which
had held foster children placed in foster homes by the State could
raise substantive due process failure to protect objections when they

were abused. 22 Doe v. New York City Department of Social
Services226 and Taylor v. Ledbetter,227 the abused foster child cases

to which DeShaney referred, have generated considerable interest
since DeShaney arguably indicated a substantive due process "custody" status might be available to their class of plaintiffs. Several
recent courts have upheld substantive due process failure to protect
claims by abused state-placed foster children because they were

deemed by the courts to have their liberty sufficiently restrained to
be in the DeShaney mandated state "custody."m
Other cases have stretched the limits of DeShaney's custody con-

cept. In Horton v. Flenory, 29 for instance, the Third Circuit held
n.1); see also White v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 88 Civ. 7536 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19,
1990) (1990 WETLAw 33747, at 12 & n.17) (hospital admitted infant plaintiff as voluntary patient, would
not allow parents to stay overnight with her, child abducted allegedly due to hospital policy not to
enforce security precautions, court observed in dicta that "combination of affirmative action and a
custodialrelationship that may or may not have been voluntary" (emphasis added) might satisfy DeShaney
custody requirement). But see J.O. v. Alton Community Unit School Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272-73
(7th Cir. 1990) ("Schoolchildren are not like mental patients and prisoners such that the state has an
affirmative duty to protect them."); cf.Jordan v. State of Tennessee, 738 F. Supp. 258, 259-61 (M.D.
Tenn. 1990) (voluntary resident of state residential facility for twenty-four hour care of severely retarded
individuals was not in DeShaney custody and hence no duty to protect was owed by state to him).
224. 714 F. Supp. at 643.
225. See supra note 192.
226. 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
227. 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987) (en bane), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1337 (1989).
228. E.g., Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474, 475-76 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
111 S.Ct. 182 (1990); Artist M. v. Johnson, 726 F. Supp. 690, 699 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Aristotle P. v.
Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1008-09 (N.D. Ill. 1989); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1393-96
(N.D. Ill. 1989); see, e.g., Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1439 (5th Cir. 1990); DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 812 F.2d 298, 303 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Had Joshua [DeShaney]
been a foundling in the custody of the state, which then placed him with foster parents who it knew
or strongly suspected would abuse the child, this case would be like Doe ....But he was not." (emphasis
in original) (citation omitted)), affd on other grounds, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). See generally Note, supra
note 11, at 504-06. But see Eugene D. v. Karman, 889 F.2d 701, 710-11 & n.10 (6th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 2631 (1990); Doe v. Bobbitt, 881 F.2d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 1989) ("mhe decision in
Doe depended upon an absolutely novel analogy between incarceration and placement in a foster home,
an analogy that has yet to be endorsed by either the Supreme Court or the Seventh Circuit."), cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 2560 (1990).
229. 889 F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1989).
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that a casual employee of a private club, who was beaten to death

during questioning by the club's owner about a burglary at the club,
had his liberty sufficiently restricted to be in state custody when the
municipality had an official policy relegating law enforcement in
private clubs to their proprietors and in this case a police officer
knew about the proprietor's investigation and took no steps to avert
the employee's ultimate demise. 230 The court contrasted DeShaney's
passively neglectful social workers with Horton's more actively dormant police officer, and concluded that the municipal and individual
officer defendants could be held liable due to what DeShaney would

consider a significant state restriction of the employee's freedom. 23

Some post-DeShaney decisions have focused during custody status

determinations on a pre-DeShaney sub-category of "special relationship" cases which held that persons have a due process claim
against the state when state action placed the persons in a position
of danger and the state then failed to protect them.2 Leading il230. Id. at 455-58.
231. Id. at 458. Later courts have noted that Horton apparently somewhat expanded DeShaney's

custody concept. E.g., Coffman v. Wilson Police Dep't, 739 F. Supp. 257, 263 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1990);
Hynson v. City of Chester, 731 F. Supp. 1236, 1239 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1990); see also Fisher v. City of
Reading, No. 89-8148 (E.D. Pa. April 2, 1990) (1990 WEsT.Aw 39872, at 5 n.7). Without clearly so
stating, the Horton court may have applied the "special danger" special relationship law discussed infra
notes 232-49 and accompanying text.
The Horton court further concluded that the state had delegated the state function of criminal
investigation to the club owner, and thus was responsible for his actions. 889 F.2d at 458. This finding,
of course, could support the panel's decision upholding a verdict for the plaintiffs regardless of the
rightness of the DeShaney custody determination. See id. (citing authorities).
For a discussion concerning whether Horton was a DeShaney custody case at all, see infra note
252 and accompanying text.
232. E.g., Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 1784 (1990); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 341
(1990); see Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990) ("It is not clear ... how large a role
the state must play in the creation of danger and in the creation of vulnerability before it assumes a
corresponding constitutional duty to protect. It is clear, though, that at some point such actions do
create such a duty ... a constitutional duty to protect an individual against private violence may exist
in a non-custodial setting if the state has taken affirmative action which increases the individual's danger
of, or vulnerability to, such violence beyond the level it would have been at absent state action." (citations
omitted) (emphasis added)); Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1226 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc)
(Posner, J., concurring) ("The distinction between putting someone in a place of danger and enhancing
the danger faced by someone who already is in danger (but through no fault of government) is a subtle
one.... [Iun the former case the government's conduct is apt to create a greater incremental probability
of harm, and thus be a more palpable cause of the victim's injury, than in the latter case. The distinction
is only one of degree, but perhaps of sufficient degree to make a constitutional difference .... "), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989); G-69 v. Degnan, 745 F. Supp. 254, 264-65 (D.N.J. 1990).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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lustrations of these "special danger" cases were White v. Rochford' 3
and, to a lesser degree, Nishiyama v. Dickson County. Cases that

followed White frequently considered it the exception to the general
rule of no recovery in governmental inaction cases because of the
position of danger to which police officers actively exposed the

plaintiff children when the officers left them stranded on the roadside following the arrest of their driver. 23- Nishiyama was interpreted
similarly. 236 Some post-DeShaney courts have equated these "special

233. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979). In White v. Rochford, police officers arrested a driver on a
Chicago-area expressway for a traffic offense and took him away, knowingly leaving behind three child
passengers in the driverless car. The weather was inclement and the driver begged the officers to transport
the children to a safer place, but they refused. Id. at 382. The Seventh Circuit upheld a Section 1983
claim for the children, holding, according to a later court, that "a police officer may be liable under
section 1983 when he abandons passengers of arrested drivers under circumstances which expose them
to unreasonable danger." Wood, 879 F.2d at 593.
234. 814 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1987) (en banc). In Nishiyama, the court held that when the Dickson
County Sheriff permitted a convicted felon who was an inmate on "trusty" status in the Dickson County
Sheriff's Department's custody to drive a marked Department patrol car and he used the car to pull
over a woman who he then beat to death, id. at 279, a special relationship was established towards the
woman such that the defendants could be held liable for denial of due process. Id. at 282-83. Without
so stating, the court applied "special danger" case analysis. Id. See Nishiyama v. Dickson County, 779
F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1985) (text in WVasmTAw, at 4-5, 6), vacated, 814 F.2d 277, 278-79 (6th Cir. 1987) (en
banc); Note, Snake Pits, supra note 42, at 817 & n.349.
235. E.g., Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1226 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Posner, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989), see supra note 232; DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Social Services, 812 F.2d 298, 303 (7th Cir. 1987) ("If the state, having arrested a child's
parents, leaves the child alone in a situation where he is quite likely to come to grief because no one
is watching over him, and he is injured, the state is a cause of the injury."), aff'd on other grounds,
489 U.S. 189 (1989); Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507, 511 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986);
Ellsworth v. City of Racine, 774 F.2d 182, 185 (7th Cir. 1985) (classified White v. Rochford with prisoner
and mental patient cases of the type that DeShaney later held give rise to custodial status), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1047 (1986); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1983) (classified White
v. Rochford with prisoner cases of the type that DeShaney later held give rise to custodial status), cert.
1986) (classified
denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984); Mendez v. Rutherford, 655 F. Supp. 115, 119-20 (N.D. I11.
White v. Rochford with Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), and other prisoner and mental patient
cases of the type that DeShaney later held give rise to custodial status); see Escamilla v. City of Santa
Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1986); Bowers v. Devito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982). As Bowers
said: "If the state puts a man in a position of danger from private persons and then fails to protect
him, it will not be heard to say that its role was merely passive; it is as much an active tortfeasor as
if it had thrown him into a snake pit." 686 F.2d at 618.
236. E.g., Dimas v. County of Quay, 730 F. Supp. 373, 378-79 (D.N.M. 1990); Lee v. Gateway
Inst. & Clinic, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 572, 577 (W.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd, 908 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1990); Estate
of Tittiger v. Doering, 678 F. Supp. 177, 180-81 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
While neither Doe nor Taylor cited to either White v. Rochford or Nishiyama, each may have
been, at least in part, a "special danger" case. See Taylor, 818 F.2d at 797-98 (citing and quoting Bowers
v. Devito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982)'s "special danger" language); Note, Snake Pits, supra
n.349.
note 42, at by
817The
Disseminated
Research Repository @ WVU, 1991
51

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW RE VIEW

[Vol. 93

danger" cases with the post-DeShaney custody mandate, and said

the endangered persons' status should be considered as custodial. 237
Certain language in DeShaney itself may support such a conferring
of custodial status. 238

237. See Griffith v. Johnson, 899 F.2d 1427, 1439 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1990) (court listed cases that
exemplify apparent categories of "similar restraint[s] of personal liberty" that satisfy DeShaney's custody
test, including Doe, Taylor, and White v. Rochford; Griffith court acknowledged that "[t]he 'liberty
interests' recognized in these cases have not been considered by our court or by the Supreme Court.");
Archuleta v. McShan, 897 F.2d 495, 499 (10th Cir. 1990); Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880
F.2d 348 (l1th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1784 (1990); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, III S.Ct. 341 (1990); G-69 v. Degnan, 745 F. Supp. 254, 264-65 & n.10 (D.N.J.
1990); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1394-95 (N.D. I11.
1989); Garcia v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.
3d 728, 740-41 n.11, 789 P.2d 960, 967-68 & n.11, 268 Cal. Rptr. 779, 786-87 n.11 (1990) (Section 1983
claim); Note, supra note 11, at 501-04 ("position of danger" test may determine DeShaney custodial
status); Note, Snake Pits, supra note 42, at 817 ("position of danger" test may determine DeShaney
custodial status); see-also Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 54-55 (8th Cir. 1990) (when police arguably
increased danger battered spouse faced from abusive husband she might have been in DeShaney custody);
Swader v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 743 F. Supp. 434, 439 (E.D. Va. 1990) ("special danger" case
where prison nurse and her daughter resided on prison premises pursuant to State rule requiring that
employees do so, daughter raped and murdered by unsupervised inmate, court held she was in DeShaney
custody); White v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 88 Civ. 7536 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1990)
(1990 WsnTAw 33747, at 12 n.17) (hospital admitted infant plaintiff as voluntary patient, would not
allow parents to stay overnight with her, child abducted allegedly due to hospital policy not to enforce
security precautions, which arguably created a "special danger," court observed in dicta that "combination of affirmative action and a custodial relationship that may or may not have been voluntary"
(emphasis added) might satisfy DeShaney custody requirement); Comment, Actionable Inaction, supra
note 35, at 1062-63. But see Wood, 879 F.2d at 599-600 (Carroll, J., dissenting); cf. Jordan v. State
of Tennessee, 738 F. Supp. 258, 260 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (voluntary resident of state residential facility
for twenty-four hour care of severely retarded individuals was not in DeShaney custody and hence no
duty to protect was owed by State to him despite allegations of unsafe conditions at facility due to
understaffing, poor maintenance, improper staff training, and failure adequately to fence in pond where
resident drowned).
The custody finding in Horton arguably was at least partially based on its municipal defendant's
endangering the murdered private club employee through its policy for dealing with private club disturbances and the police officer's subsequent inaction. Horton, 889 F.2d at 458. The court's custody
determination could also be attributed to a general view that when the effect of the municipal policy
was coupled with the officer's inexcusable behavior, custody resulted. See id. See also supra note 231.
238. In DeShaney, as described supra note 194, the Supreme Court pointed out that when the
Winnebago County, Wisconsin Department of Social Services once briefly took Joshua DeShaney from
his abusive father's custody and then returned Joshua to the father it had not placed Joshua in more
danger of harm than he would have faced had it never intervened. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201. One
can guess what the Court would have said if the State had put Joshua in greater danger because of its
actions. Arguably, he then might have merited substantive due process protection through a custody
finding, or otherwise have had a substantive due process protection right. See Freeman v. Ferguson,
922 F.2d 52, 54-55 (8th Cir. 1990); Swader v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 743 F. Supp. 434, 436-44
(E.D. Va. 1990); cf. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 205-06 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (argued substantive due
process ought to cover such situations).
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For example, in Wood v. Ostrander23 9 the Ninth Circuit liberally

construed DeShaney's custody requirement in a "special danger"
situation. In that case, at 2:30 a.m. a Washington State Trooper
stopped a car in which the plaintiff was a passenger, arrested the

driver for driving while intoxicated, and impounded his car, leaving
the plaintiff on the side of the road in a high crime area.M The

plaintiff ultimately was raped by an unknown man with whom she
accepted a ride. 241 The Wood court, relying heavily on White v.
Rochford, maintained that the trooper's action in arresting the driver,

impounding his car, and apparently stranding the plaintiff created
a "special danger" which was, in turn, sufficient to satisfy DeShaney's mandate and thus support a substantive due process governmental nonfeasance recovery.2 2 Like Horton, Wood seemed to
expand the bounds of DeShaney, whose existence it barely
acknowledged 243 - indeed, the lone dissenter in Wood strongly argued that the Wood plaintiff was never in state custody, that the

State did not create the unknown dangers she faced from the man
who picked her up (thus discounting any "special danger" custody
status rule), and that the majority was ignoring DeShaney's custody
requirement. 244 Still, considerable justice may support the Wood result.

239. 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 341 (1990).
240. Id. at 586. It was disputed whether the officer offered to assist the plaintiff in obtaining
transportation home. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 590.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 598-600 (Carroll, J., dissenting). As Judge Carroll contended:
[Like Joshua DeShaney], [the plaintiff] was never in the State's custody. The person
from whom [the plaintiff] accepted a ride and who allegedly raped her was not a state actor.
Assuming the State was aware of the speculative dangers that [the plaintiff] faced ... the
State played no part in their creation. Neither did the State render her more vulnerable than
any other member of the general public in that area ....
The State patently did not become the guarantor of [the plaintiff's] safety when it arrested
the drunken driver of the car in which she was riding.... Consistent with DeShaney, the
State owed no constitutional duty to [the plaintiff].
rd. at 599-600.
Judge Carroll attacked the Wood majority's reliance on White v. Rochford and pointed out that
in Justice Brennan's DeShaney dissent, 489 U.S. at 205 (Brennan, J., dissenting), the Justice arguably
recognized that White v. Rochford was inconsistent with the DeShaney holding. Wood, 879 F.2d at 600
(Carroll, J., dissenting); accord Note, Section 1983, supra note 2, at 1372 & n.114. Whether Judge
Carroll was by
correct
his attack Repository
on the Wood@
majority's
implicit custody finding is questionable. Justice 53
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A another "special
And in Cornelius v. Town of HighlandLake,24
danger" case, the Eleventh Circuit found that a municipal employee
sufficiently established DeShaney custody for a court to permit her
case to go to trial when she alleged her Alabama municipal employer
and various public officials placed her in danger, failed to protect
her, and caused her considerable harm. 246 The panel held there was
Brennan's DeShaney dissent's reference to White v. Rochford was sufficiently ambiguous not to preclude
a finding of custody in such a situation. Arguably, sufficient state restraining action occurred in White
v. Rochford (and Wood and Horton, as well as in Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348
(11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.1784 (1990)) that a post-DeShaney Court might uphold a finding
of custody there. See infra notes 431-41 and accompanying text.
Judge Carroll argued that the police behavior in Wood was not sufficiently active to meet DeShaneys custody test. Wood, 879 F.2d at 600 (Carroll, J., dissenting). The best response to his position
may be to refer again to the language from DeShaney, see supra note 220, and ask what more the
trooper in Wood needed to have done to the plaintiff than he did before he would have restrained her
freedom enough to establish "special danger" status/meet the custody test-he stopped the car in which
she was riding, arrested her driver, and impounded the vehicle by having it towed away, thus leaving
her alone and exposed on the road. See Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1222-23 (7th Cir.
1988) (en banc) ("When the state puts a person in danger, the Due Process Clause requires the state
to protect him to the extent of ameliorating the incremental risk. When a state cuts off sources of
private aid, it must provide replacement protection." Id. at 1223.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989);
First, supra note 68, at 532.
As for Judge Carroll's contention that White v. Rochford was only decided as it was because
children were affected by the police action, Wood, 879 F.2d at 603-05 (Carroll, J., dissenting) ("Could
anyone fairly conclude that the White [v. Rochford] court would have found the same 'constitutional'
violation if [the adult] Ms. Wood had been the passenger left sitting in the car on the Chicago Skyway,
rather than the minor children? I submit not." Id. at 605 (emphasis in original).), although some later
decisions did at least somewhat focus on that aspect of White v. Rochford, see, e.g., Arehie, 847 F.2d
at 1223; DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 812 F.2d 298, 303 (7th Cir. 1987),
aff'd on other grounds, 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507, 511 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 994 (1986); Ellsworth v. City of Racine, 774 F.2d 182, 185 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1047 (1986); Mendez v. Rutherford, 655 F. Supp. 115, 119 (N.D. Ill. 1986), they did not limit
the application of its principle to child victim cases. E.g., Griffith v. Johnson, 899 F.2d 1427, 1439 &
n.8 (5th Cir. 1990); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982); G-69 v. Degnan, 745 F. Supp.
254, 264 n.10 (D.N.J. 1990); Mendez, 655 F. Supp. at 119. Child victim status should be only one
factor, albeit a very important one, in a DeShaney "similar restraint of liberty" custody determination
inquiry. It might prove significant in a close case, but generally should not be dispositive.
If, of course, a court should conclude that a case like Wood, Horton, White v. Rochford, or
Cornelius was not controlled by DeShaney at all because the relevant governmental behavior was too
active, custody might no longer be an issue. For more on the applicability of DeShaney in such circumstances, see infra note 252 and accompanying text.
245. 880 F.2d 348 (l1th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1784 (1990).
246. "[W]ith gross negligence and deliberate indifference ... [to] her constitutionally protected
liberty interests .... ." Id. at 351. Ms. Cornelius claimed the defendants did so by having inadequately
supervised prison inmate work squads, with dangerous criminals as members, laboring in the community.
They toiled, among other places, in the town hall where Ms. Cornelius worked as Town Clerk. Two
work squad prisoners abducted Ms. Cornelius from her job site and held her hostage for three days
while she and the inmates fled across three states. The escapees finally left Ms. Cornelius tied to a
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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a factual question whether a special relationship existed between the

employee and the defendant municipality and public officials that
met the custody mandate after citing various pre-DeShaney "special
danger" cases, 247 with a particular focus on Nishiyama,24 8 and reviewing DeShaney's "similar restraint of liberty" custody test lan249
guage.

These liberal interpretations of DeShaney's custody requirement
are potentially important for domestic violence litigation against the
inactive police. The more the DeShaney custody rule is extended,

the more battered spouses can rely upon it. For example, if the
Dudosh court had followed such an approach, it might have found
custody present under the particular facts of that case. 5 0 At present,

247. Id. at 354-55.
248. The court extensively discussed the similarity it perceived between Ms. Cornelius's situation
and that of the "special danger" case plaintiff in Nishiyama. Cornelius, 880 F.2d at 356-59. In so doing
the panel seemed to view DeShaney less like a "bright line limit to the substantive component of the
Due Process Clause. . .," McKee v. City of Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409, 417 (5th Cir. 1989) (Goldberg,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 727 (1990). See Note, Snake Pits,
supra note 42, at 816, and more like a mere continuation of pre-DeShaney "special danger"/"special
relationship" law.
249. Cornelius, 880 F.2d at 355-56. As the panel observed:
In this case, the defendants did indeed create the dangerous situation of the inmates' presence
in the community by establishing the work squad and assigning the inmates to work around
the town hall. Moreover, the defendants increased Mrs. Cornelius's vulnerability to harm by
regularly exposing her to the work squad inmates by virtue of her position as Town Clerk.
These actions, coupled with the degree of control the town officials exercised over Mrs. Cornelius as Town Clerk, lead us to conclude that there is a genuine issue relevant to the existence
of a special relationship between the town officials and the plaintiff implicating her due process

rights.
Id. at 356 (footnote omitted).
Other post-DeShaney courts have wrestled with DeShaney's custody requirement and the "special
danger" situation discussed supra notes 232-48 and accompanying text. E.g., Freeman v. Ferguson, 911
F.2d 52, 54-55 (8th Cir. 1990) (when police arguably increased danger battered spouse faced from abusive
husband she might have been in DeShaney custody); G-69 v. Degnan, 745 F. Supp. 254, 262-65 (D.N.J.
1990) (when state endangered informant informant could recover despite DeShaney); Swader v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 743 F. Supp. 434, 436-44 (E.D. Va. 1990) ("special danger" case where prison
nurse and her daughter resided on prison premises pursuant to State rule requiring that employees do
so, daughter raped and murdered by unsupervised inmate, court held she was in DeShaney custody);
White v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 88 Civ. 7536 (S.D.N.Y. Mar., 19, 1990) (1990
VEsrLAW 33747, at 12 n.17) (hospital admitted infant plaintiff as voluntary patient, would not allow
parents to stay overnight with her, child abducted allegedly due to hospital policy not to enforce security
precautions, court observed in dicta that "combination of affirmative action and a custodial relationship
that may or may not have been voluntary" (emphasis added) might satisfy DeShaney custody requirement).
250. See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text. The argument might have been that the police
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custody appears to require a case-by-case determination which must
be addressed in any battered spouse or other substantive due process

case in which it is disputed. The dispositive question in each case
will be whether, pursuant to DeShaney, the restraint on the plaintiff's freedom is sufficiently similar to penal incarceration or involuntary commitment to equate with them,251 or even whether
DeShaney and its custody rule apply at all.212 Some courts, like those

officers somehow placed Ms. Dudosh in a sufficient "special danger" to support a custody finding. See
Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 54-55 (8th Cir. 1990) (when police arguably increased danger battered
spouse faced from abusive husband she might have been in DeShaney custody). But see Dean v. Raucci,
No. 87-C-7697 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1989) (1989 WEsTAw 48892, at 4) (non-battered spouse case otherwise
similar on custody issue to Dudosh, court ultimately held police not liable for plaintiff's stab wounds).
251. Another species of governmental nonfeasance which is closely related to the "special danger"
precedents may give rise to custody status in the post-DeShaney era of Section 1983 substantive due
process law. In Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972), the Seventh Circuit held that police officers
who witness fellow officers unlawfully beating third persons are liable for failing to protect them. Id.
at 10-11. As the court observed, "one who is given the badge of authority of a police officer may not
ignore the duty imposed by his office and fail to stop other officers who summarily punish a third
person in his presence or otherwise within his knowledge." Id. at 11. Both supervisory and nonsupervisory
officers owe others the Byrd v. Brishke duty. Id. A number of subsequent decisions have reaffirmed
the validity of this type of failure to protect liability. E.g., Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269, 276
(7th Cir. 1986) (collecting cases); Masel v. Barrett, 707 F. Supp. 4, 8-9 & n.4 (D.D.C. 1989) (collecting
cases). Several pre-DeShaney Seventh Circuit decisions categorized a Byrd v. Brishke claim with one
under White v. Rochford, holding both involved a custodial status and hurling a person into a Bowers
v. Devito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982), snake pit which gave rise to a "special relationship."
E.g., Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1222-23 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 1338 (1989); Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d 1443, 1446-47 (7th Cir. 1984). See Note, supra note 11,
at 503 n.120. Although no post-DeShaney cases have considered a Byrd v. Brishke scenario, it can be
anticipated that courts which follow the lead of Wood, Cornelius, or Horton would assign custody status
to its victims as readily as to those asserting claims under the White v. Rochford or Nishiyama v.
Dickson County "special danger" lines of authority. Few battered spouses may qualify for the Byrd v.
Brishke cause of action, cf. Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988) (police officer
repeatedly abused his wife and police responded inadequately to wife's calls for assistance); Sherrell v.
City of Longview, 683 F. Supp. 1108 (E.D. Tex. 1987) (police officer attacked child after other officers
failed to arrest him for previous abusive behavior); Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306
(D.C. App. 1983) (police arguably failed to prevent police officer from ultimately murdering his wife,
state law negligence "special relationship" case), but those who do should be able to enjoy the fruits
of DeShaney custody status. See First, supra note 68, at 532.
252. Ward v. City of San Jose, 737 F. Supp. 1502 (N.D. Cal. 1990), opined that cases like Horton,
Wood, Cornelius, and White v. Rochford may not fall under the DeShaney substantive due process
umbrella at all because they featured more active police behavior than the governmental nonfeasance
cases such as DeShaney or Balistreri.But see Wood, 879 F.2d at 599-600 (Carroll, J., dissenting). Cases
like these were different from the DeShaney scenario, the Ward court contended, because in those cases
the government agent helped cause the harm. "Many courts have established a person's right to be free
from being placed in a dangerous situation by a police officer or other government employee." Ward,
737 F.Supp. at 1507. The independent substantive, see DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195, due process right
involved, Ward stated, is one of governmental protection when the state itself has put a person in danger. 56
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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deciding Horton, Wood, and Cornelius, might be particularly susceptible to a custody argument in a "special danger" situation where

737 F. Supp. at 1507-08. Such a cause of action could prove highly useful in some battered spouse
cases which the DeShaney custody mandate otherwise would bar. It might have meant, for example, a
recovery against the police who escorted Kathleen Dudosh to her death.
If DeShaney does not apply to Horton, Wood, Cornelius or White v. Rochford, they tell nothing
about its custody condition, and may instead illustrate a new substantive due process remedy for domestic
violence victims and others endangered by the actions of government officials such as the police. If,
however, it does, they are important to the determination of custody status in similar cases since they,
at least between the lines, necessarily featured pro-custody rulings as prerequisites to their favorable
holdings for their plaintiffs. And the Ward court was probably ill-advised in the creative analysis which
led it to conclude that DeShaney was inapplicable to such decisions. Ward, 737 F. Supp. at 1509, held
that the new due process cause of action exists based upon various pre-DeShaney "special relationship"
precedents which in fact did not go so far as to create a new claim. See, e.g., Ketchum v. Alameda
County, 811 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1987); Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1986);
Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986); Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d
84 (4th Cir. 1983); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982); White v. Rochford; see also Wood.
Instead, all but Wood merely held that the plaintiff was, or might have been, in a position of "special
danger" and therefore qualified for a due process right of protection under the pre-DeShaney law. After
DeShaney such a plaintiff would have a good claim for custody status, but not for a separate cause
of action DeShaney did not control. And Wood apparently also stands for the proposition that a position
of danger case like it similarly merits such treatment.
None of the authorities Ward cited have been construed elsewhere to create an independent substantive due process right not to be placed in danger by a government official's actions. In Horton, the
court clearly believed DeShaney applied to its fact pattern, and prominantly featured a DeShaney custody
analysis. 889 F.2d at 458. See also Jordan v. State of Tennessee, 738 F. Supp. 258, 259-61 (M.D. Tenn.
1990) (voluntary resident of state residential facility for twenty-four hour care of severely retarded individuals was not in DeShaney custody and hence no duty to protect was owed by state to him despite
allegations of unsafe conditions at facility, court extensively discussed DeShaney); White v. New York
City Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 88 Civ. 7536, (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1990) (1990 WnsriAw 33747 at
12 n.17) (hospital admitted infant plaintiff as voluntary patient, would not allow parents to stay overnight
with her, child abducted allegedly due to hospital policy not to enforce security precautions, court
repeatedly discussed DeShaney). Wood's slighting treatment of DeShaney, see supra note 243 and accompanying text, might support Ward's premise that an independent substantive due process right was
involved, but only barely. Cornelius certainly paid at least lip service to DeShaney. 880 F.2d at 35556.
After DeShaney, it appears unlikely that the Supreme Court, or any lower court, will authorize
any new substantive due process rights in the general right of protection field such as that suggested
by the Ward court. If, however, the approach to DeShaney "special danger" case custody analysis
discussed above is not accepted in an appropriate case where governmental behavior places someone in
danger and that danger results in injury-or in the parlance of Bowers, if a government agent throws
them into the proverbial snake pit, they get bitten, and become ill or die, see 686 F.2d at 618-Ward's
approach, with its independent right not to be placed at risk by government action, may merit reconsideration by the person's counsel. See also Swader v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 743 F. Supp. 434,
443-44 (E.D. Va. 1990) ("special danger" case where prison nurse and her daughter resided on prison
premises pursuant to State rule requiring that employees do so, daughter raped and murdered by unsupervised inmate, court arguably held situation gave rise to independent cause of action outside the
scope of DeShaney).
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the State has arguably placed the plaintiffs at risk and then failed

to adequately protect them. 53
c.

Summary of Abused Spouse Substantive Due Process Law

The overwhelming majority of post-DeShaney Section 1983 sub-

stantive due process governmental inaction claims have been summarily rejected by the state and lower federal courts, exactly as the
DeShaney majority intended. The only current real hope for battered
spouses with substantive due process cases is to convince the relevant
court that they were in state custody at the time of injury, or perhaps

that DeShaney does not apply to their claim at all. In most situations
such arguments will fall on deaf judicial ears. The typical abused
spouse now needs to pursue other, non-substantive due process Sec-

tion 1983 remedial damage options against the inactive police such
as the denial of procedural due process or equal protection causes

of action, as well as the inadequate police training derivative claim.
2.

Board of Regents v. Roth Procedural Due Process Cases

Following the Supreme Court's grudging DeShaney footnote reference to the Board of Regents v. Roth procedural due process remedy in governmental inaction situations,254 a number of courts in
Section 1983 actions addressed the remedy at least briefly in nonfeasance cases. 2 55 None of them expressly stated that DeShaney had

253. But see, e.g., de Jesus Benavides v. Santos, 883 F.2d 385, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1989), infra note
439 and accompanying text. So far, the Supreme Court has failed to resolve the validity of these courts'
DeShaney custody determinations by denying the petitions for writs of certiorari filed by the unsuccessful
governmental defendants in Cornelius and Wood. Thus, the custody question in "special danger" cases,
and the other custody determinations reviewed supra notes 220-49 and accompanying text, remains unresolved. See White v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 88 Civ. 7536 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19,
1990) (1990 WV-rrsw 33747, at 12 n.17) ("Mhe line between conduct that is actionable and that which
is not actionable under DeShaney has not yet been clearly defined ... ." (1990 \VssnAw 33747, at 12
n.17) (comparing cases)).
For more on the merits of the post-DeShaney custody decisions, including Horton, Wood, Cornelius,
and Pagano, see infra notes 429-43 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 200-04 and accompanying text.
255. E.g., Doe v. Milwaukee County, 903 F.2d 499, 502-05 (7th Cir. 1990) (abused child
case)[hereinafter Doe II], aff'g 712 F. Supp. 1370, 1376-78 (E.D. Wis. 1989)[hereinafter Doe 1]; Meador
v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474, 476-77 (6th Cir.) (abused foster child case), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 182 (1990); Eugene D. v. Karman, 889 F.2d 701, 707 n.8 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 11058
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any effect on the Roth claim, and all applied the previously outlined
procedural due process law precedents.25 6 The cause of action re-

ceived varying judicial treatments in domestic violence and child
abuse cases. 57
a. Roth in Spouse Abuse Cases

(1).

Liberal Roth Interpretations

The first group of post-DeShaney Roth spouse abuse decisions
wholeheartedly endorsed the procedural due process doctrine's ap-

25 8
plication to such claims. In Coffman v. Wilson PoliceDepartment,

a battered spouse case, 219 the district court addressed the plaintiff's
contention that the defendants deprived her of the entitlement to
police protection from abuse she derived from Roth and the Pennsylvania Protection From Abuse Act, 260 an order of protection pro-

vision, and thus denied her procedural due process. 261 After
summarizing the Roth holding, the court proceeded to determine
whether the Protection From Abuse Act created a property right

under Pennsylvania law.2 62 The court concurred in an earlier court's
finding that the Act itself did not do so.263 Rather than stopping

there, however, the Coffman court looked further. It concluded that
S. Ct. 2631 (1990); Coffman v. Wilson Police Dep't, 739 F. Supp. 257, 263-66 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (battered
spouse case); Hynson v. City of Chester, 731 F. Supp. 1236, 1239-40 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (battered spouse
case); Del A v. Edwards, No. 86-0801 (E.D. La. Jan. 25, 1990) (1990 VEmAw 6035, at 2 n.10); K.H.
v. Morgan, No. 87 C 9833 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 1989) (1989 VzsrAw 105279, at 10-12) (abused foster
child case), aff'd in part, remanded in part on other grounds, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990); B.H. v.
Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1399-1400 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
256. See supra notes 57-89 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 22.
258. 739 F. Supp. 257, 263-66 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
259. In Coffman, a long history of spousal abuse had characterized Terry Coffman's marriage to
Wayne Barber and led her to obtain a temporary protective order against him. The Wilson Police
Department was fully aware of the order yet allegedly failed adequately to respond to Ms. Coffman's
frequent complaints about her husband's violations of it. Her husband ultimately shot her, causing her
permanent bodily and mental injuries. Id. at 259-60.
260. 35 PA. STAT. Am. §§ 10181-90 (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1989).
261. Coffman, 739 F. Supp. at 260.
262. Id. at 264. For more on the use of state law to determine entitlement status, see supra note
64 and accompanying text.
263. Coffman, 739 F. Supp. at 264.
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a court order, like an order of protection, could create a Roth entitleiient to police protection, 26 and did so in this case, because a

Pennsylvania state court would recognize a common law special
relationship 265 in an order of protection/police nonfeasance situation. That state right was definite enough to render the judicial order
an entitlement. 266
264. The court noted that no such order was involved in Hynson v. City of Chester, 731 F. Supp.
1236, '1239-40 (E.D. Pa. 1990), the prior precedent that held that the Act did not create a statutory
entitlement, see infra note 273. Coffman, 739 F. Supp. at 264 n.8. In Hynson, the battered spouse/
murder victim's previous protection from abuse order against her former boyfriend had expired on
October 11, 1984. A hearing had been held on that date and a new order was approved, but it was
not signed until October 16, 1984. The boyfriend murdered the abused spouse on October 15, 1984.
731 F. Supp. at 1237.
265. See supra note 3.
266. Coffman, 739 F. Supp. at 265-66. The court first observed that a judicial order of protection
was as unambiguous and mandatory as any Roth statutory entitlement. Id. at 264. Nothing, it argued,
precluded a judicial decree from entitlement status:
Although, in the context of Roth, property interests generally arise from sources other than
judicial orders, it is in no way remarkable that an order could create an entitlement. After
all, courts have held that employment contracts can create property interests removable only
by due process of law. Courts are more clearly sources of state law than are middle-ranking
functionaries in a college employment office. Furthermore, the court derived its power to issue
orders from the legislature. Although the legislature did not itself grant a protectible interest,
it enabled the court to create one (just as the legislature may not have created an interest in
continued employment by a state employee, but may have empowered a state actor to create
such an interest by issuing an employment contract).
Id. (citing Perry v. Sindermarn, 408 U.S. 593, 601-03 (1972)). See Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d
1211, 1225 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989).
Next, the court turned to the particular judicial order in question and inquired whether Pennsylvania
law recognized it had a special status. It noted that in general, like most states, Pennsylvania held there
is no common law duty for the State to protect individual citizens. Coffman, 739 F. Supp. at 265.
However, a state law special relationship can create such a duty, and the court concluded that the order
of protection did so in this case. Id. It cited both Baker v. City of New York, 25 A.D.2d 770, 269
N.Y.S.2d 515 (1966), supra note 3, and Nearing v. Weaver, 295 Or. 702, 670 P.2d 137 (1983), supra
note 20 and accompanying text, for the proposition that protective orders create common law special
relationships. Coffman, 739 F. Supp. at 265.
Finally, the court determined, after utilizing a weighing process, that the property right in question
was sufficiently definite to merit protection as an entitlement:
The plaintiff's property right is to reasoned police response ... There is, of course, a great
deal of discretion in police work, and so the property right here is not reducible to a sum
certain. But this is true of most property rights; a right to hold a job, for example, carries
with it the qualifications that one may be fired for cause, or if financial straits require it, or
for any of a number of other justifications. The well-developed body of case law and practice
that governs proper police response makes the scope of this property interest certain enough
to be protectible.
Id.
In sum, the court decided that a judicial order can create a Roth property entitlement and that
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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Coffman clearly was the least restrictive abused spouse Roth procedural due process decision to date. No other case in that field has
extended entitlement status to a judicial, rather than legislative, decree. Still, adequate precedent may support the Coffman court's
267
analysis and result.
The other, and more orthodox, decision enthusiastically to apply
Roth in such a setting was the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Meador
v. Cabinet for Human Resources.268 In Meador, an abused foster
child case, the Sixth Circuit followed the ruling in Taylor v.
Ledbetter2 9 applying Roth to the Georgia child foster care laws when
similar Kentucky statutes were at issue. 270 The Meador court concluded that, like the Georgia provisions, "[t]he Kentucky statutes
at issue in the instant case create a ...

framework of entitlements"

of which foster children could not lawfully be deprived without due
process of law. 271 In the process, it demonstrated a willingness to
liberally construe statutes when the court was confronted with the
question whether the provisions were sufficiently definite and restrictive to create an entitlement. Like the majority of the en banc
Eleventh Circuit in Taylor v. Ledbetter, the Meadorpanel apparently
overlooked several potentially significant procedural due process is27 2
sues when it ceased its analysis at a preliminary stage.
(2).

Intermediate Roth Interpretations

Not all post-DeShaney cases were as willing to apply Roth to
specific statutes in the battered spouse setting as Meador. Three
decisions implicitly acknowledged that state statutes could create an

relationship between the plaintiff and the police and this relationship was sufficiently definite to justify

protecting it as an entitlement.
267. See infra notes 315-17 and accompanying text.
268. 902 F.2d 474 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 182 (1990).
269. 818 F.2d 791, 818-22 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989); see

supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
270. Meador, 902 F.2d at 476-77.
The Meador court also followed Taylor's ruling, 818 F.2d at 794-98, that an abused foster child
has a substantive due process claim. Meador, 902 F.2d at 476. In the process, it joined the courts which
have held that DeShaney's custody requirement is satisfied in abused foster child cases. Id. at 475-76.
271. Meador, 902 F.2d at 476-77.
272. For
on this subject,
see supra
741991
and accompanying text.
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entitlement in such actions, but determined that the state statutes
in question were insufficiently mandatory/excessively discretionary
to create a legitimate claim of entitlement. 273 Each seemed to parse
the pertinent statute far more closely-than, for instance, the en banc
majority of the Eleventh Circuit in Taylor v. Ledbetter or the Sixth
Circuit panel in Meador.
(3). Restrictive Roth Interpretations
A final post-DeShaney case, which built on Seventh Circuit procedural due process entitlement law precedents, 274 entirely ruled out

any procedural due process claims for battered spouses based on
the Roth entitlement theory pioneered by Taylor v. Ledbetter.

In Doe v. Milwaukee County275 (DoeII), a Seventh Circuit panel
viewed the implication of entitlements from protection statutes far
more restrictively than the cases employing an intermediate Roth
level of scrutiny. Unlike them, the Doe II court's analysis precluded
all abused spouses from achieving entitlement status under any state
statutory scheme. The panel first 276 stated that not all state or local
273. Hynson v. City of Chester, 731 F. Supp. 1236, 1238-40 (E.D. Pa. 1990); B.H. v. Johnson,
715 F. Supp. 1387, 1399-1400 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Doe I, 712 F. Supp. at 1376-78.
The B.H. court cited various Seventh Circuit precedents including Eidson v. Pierce, 745 F.2d 453,
459-60 (7th Cir. 1984), see supra notes 68, 74, infra note 282 and accompanying text, as it determined
whether state law had created an entitlement, and noted that:
In Hewitt v. Helms, [459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1983)], the Supreme Court held that for state
statutory language to create a legitimate claim of entitlement, mandatory language must be
combined with "specific substantive predicates." Thus, under Hewitt, an entitlement is created
only where the occurrence of a specific predicate event triggers provision of specific services.... the cited provisions do not contain the "specific substantive predicates" required by
Hewitt. Indeed, plaintiffs concede as much when they agree that, while the mandatory language
gives [the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)] no discretion as to
whether to provide services, the broad statutory language grants DCFS discretion about what
particular services to provide. This is insufficient to establish a liberty or property right under
Hewitt.
715 F. Supp. at 1400 (emphasis in original). Like Doe I and Eidson, B.H. made it extremely difficult
to establish that a governmentally-bestowed right was a Roth entitlement.
The court in Doe I noted that "[ain entitlement is not present where an individual has only 'an
abstract need or desire' for the benefit. 'He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it."' 712
F. Supp. at 1377 (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577).
274. See supra note 68.
275. 903 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1990).
276. Due to its somewhat confused presentation, it often is difficult to ascertain the exact order
of Doe IPs holdings and analysis. What it determined, however, appears clear and is described infra
notes 277-87 and accompanying text.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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statutes or regulations create Roth entitlements, 277 and that mere

state law procedural guarantees do not give rise to a fourteenth
amendment property right. 278 Then it rejected the lower court's ap-

parent belief that a statute like the Wisconsin child protection statute
in question could, if worded appropriately, create a Roth entitlement. 279 It did so because it considered the protections such a stat-

utory scheme would provide to be merely procedural and thus
2 80
insufficient to create "benefits" under due process jurisprudence.
It held that a legitimate claim of entitlement only comes about when
one holds "a legally enforceable interest in receiving a governmentally conferred benefit, the initial receipt or the termination of
which is conditioned upon the existence of a controvertible and controverted fact.' '281 When the case presented no such fact issue, there
was no reason to hold a due process hearing and accordingly no
entitlement was present. 82
Stepping beyond the cases that strictly defined entitlements, the
Doe II court finally held that the plaintiffs had no claim regardless
of whether the state right in question otherwise would grant an entitlement because they had no underlying due process right in the
first instance. It based its rejection of the plaintiffs' entitlement argument on Archie v. City of Racine,283 which it interpreted as hold-

277. Doe I, 903 F.2d at 502.
278. "'It is by now well-established that in order to demonstrate a property interest worthy of
protection under the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, a party may not simply rely upon the
procedural guarantees of state law or local ordinance."' Id. at 503 (quoting Cain v. Larson, 879 F.2d
1424, 1426 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 540 (1989)); accord, e.g., Archie, 847 F.2d at 1217.
"[Clonfusion would ... result from elevating a state-mandated procedure to the status of a constitutionally protected property interest." Id. at 503.
279. Doe 11, 903 F.2d at 503-04.
280. Id. at 503.
281. Id. (quoting Geneva Towers Tenants Org. v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d 483,
495-96 (9th Cir. 1974) (Hufstedier, J., dissenting)). "'Such an interest cannot be impaired or destroyed
without prior notice to the beneficiary and a meaningful opportunity for him to be heard for the purpose
of resolving the factual issue."' Id. (quoting Geneva Towers, 504 F.2d at 496 (Hufstedier, J., dissenting)).
282. Id. at 504. Under prior Seventh Circuit precedents, see supra note 68, the Doe 11 panel noted,
'a legitimate claim of entitlement is created only when the statutes or regulations in question establish
a framework of factual conditions delimiting entitlements which are capable of being explored at a due
process hearing."' Doe II, 903 F.2d at 503 (quoting Eidson v. Pierce, 745 F.2d 453, 459-60 (7th Cir.
1984)).
283. 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989). See supra notes
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ing, in a precursor to the Supreme Court's DeShaney decision ,284

that an act of governmental nonfeasance, "while possibly tortious,
did not amount to a violation of substantive or procedural due process. ' 12 5 Such was the case, the Doe II court determined, because
"not every violation of state law infringes upon constitutional
rights. 286 The plaintiffs' remedy, the Doe II panel concluded in
accordance with Archie, was through an action in Wisconsin state
court, not under Section 1983 for either a procedural or substantive
due process violation.287
Although it barely referred to DeShaney in the procedural due

process context,2 8 portions of the Seventh Circuit's ultimate Doe II
holding have clear parallels to DeShaney and its predecessor Seventh
Circuit due process cases, most notably Archie.

89

DeShaney, Doe

II, and Archie all concluded that governmental inaction in the face
of state law, standing alone, does not violate federal due process

rights. 290 They each left the plaintiffs before them to a state law
remedy in the courts of Wisconsin. 291 Doe 11 and Archie merely
extended the DeShaney spirit somewhat further than it had been
previously. 292 Perhaps they were DeShaney's logical expansion. In

any event, at least one other post-DeShaney decision applied enti284. And subsequent to its panel decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services, 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
285. Doe II, 903 F.2d at 504.
286. Id. (citing Archie, 847 F.2d at 1216-18).
287. Id. at 504-05. A denial of equal protection claim might merit different treatment. See Archie,
847 F.2d at 1218 n.7, supra note 84.
288. See Doe II, 903 F.2d at 504 n.9.
289. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
290. E.g., DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195-97; Doe II, 903 F.2d at 504-05; Archie, 847 F.2d at 121618, 1220-23. As the DeShaney Court explained:
[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the
life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors. The Clause is
phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal
levels of safety and security. It forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty,
or property without "due process of law," but its language cannot fairly be extended to
impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to
harm through other means.
489 U.S. at 195.
291. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202-03; Doe II, 903 F.2d at 505; Archie, 847 F.2d at 1226-27 (Posner,
J., concurring).
292. Compare Doe II, 903 F.2d at 504-05 and Archie, 847 F.2d at 1216-18 with DeShaney, 489
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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tlement law in the governmental inaction field in a similarly narrow
fashion. 293 If Doe II is generally adopted, it could sound the death's
knell for battered spouses' Roth procedural due process claims even
more completely than DeShaney did for substantive ones.
b.

Analysis of Roth Spouse Abuse Case Issues

The post-DeShaney Roth cases raised a number of questions about
the existence and nature of Roth procedural due process remedies
for victims of domestic violence. The first consideration is whether
their cause of action against the police is viable at all. 294 The next
problem is, assuming the assertion is valid in theory, to what statutes
or other provisions does it apply. 295 A third question is to what
process is the Roth claimant due. 96 The final issue is what remedies
would be available to the plaintiffs who successfully proved the police improperly denied them the process they were due before the
297
police deprived them of their entitlement to police assistance.
293. K.H. v. Morgan, No. 87 C 9833 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 1989) (1989 WEsmAw 105279), aff'd in
part, remanded in part on other grounds, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990), was another abused foster child
case where the abused plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendant Illinois Department of Children
and Family Services and some of its officials "deprived [the plaintiff] of her procedural due process
right to notice and hearing before she was deprived of certain entitlements created by federal and state
statutes all in violation of the fourteenth amendment." Id., slip op. at 1, 1989 WVsrLAw 105279, at 2.
The K.H. court summarized Seventh Circuit procedural due process Roth entitlement law, including
Eidson v. Pierce, 745 F.2d 453, 459-60 (7th Cir. 1984), and then addressed Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818
F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989), which the plaintiff had offered
as precedent for her Roth claim. K.H., slip op. at 5, 1989 WsmAw 105279, at 10-11. Instead of following
the Taylor majority's approach, as the K.H. plaintiff had hoped it would do, the K.H. court found
the partial dissents more compelling. It focused on Judge Tjoflat's contention, Taylor, 818 F.2d at 822
(Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), that a Roth action was analytically and remedially
unsuited to a governmental nonfeasance case. K.H., slip op. at 5, 1989 WEsTAw 105279, at 11. The
K.H. court ultimately concluded that no Roth claim was present in the plaintiff's action due both to
the Eidson line of Seventh Circuit authorities and Judge Tjoflat's view that a governmental nonfeasance
Roth case was inconceivable because it was analytically unsound and remedially unworkable. K.H., slip
op. at 5, 1989 NVEs-.Aw 105279, at 10-11.
Although Doe I~s ideological approach may endure and even prevail, K.H.'s is less vital in light
of recent developments in procedural due process law. See infra notes 318-72 and accompanying text,
infra note 374.
294. See infra notes 298-307 and accompanying text.
295. See infra notes 308-17 and accompanying text.
296. See infra notes 318-52 and accompanying text.
297. See infra notes 353-72 and accompanying text.
As in all Section 1983 cases, see supra note 35, Roth claimants must establish causation of their
losses by the governmental defendants. See Archie, 847 F.2d at 1225 (Posner, J., concurring); Coffman,
739 F. Supp. at 266.
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Viability of Roth Claims

The stated, and fundamental, reason for the holdings in Archie
and Doe II that Roth procedural due process protections are unavailable in all government nonfeasance situations is that the plaintiffs
there, according to the Archie and Doe II courts, 291 were merely
alleging violations of state tort law2" and then attempting, by employing a syllogism, 3°° to transform them into constitutional violations actionable in a Section 1983 suit. The Archie and Doe 11 courts
based their rejection of this effort on a long line of precedents, many
from the Seventh Circuit, which have held in a variety of situations
that simple violation of state common law or statutes does not transgress the Constitution, but rather should be dealt with in state court
(or, presumably, a federal diversity court in the rare event one should
be available3 1).30 2 They also relied303 upon Supreme Court and re-

298. Doe II, 903 F.2d at 504-05; Archie, 847 F.2d at 1216-17.
299. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201-03, supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
300. Archie explained the syllogism the majority determined the plaintiffs attempted to employ
there
in an effort to transmute a common law tort into a constitutional tort: state law required
[the fire department dispatcher] to render competent rescue services; this was a duty; officials
of the government must do their duty; failure to do one's duty is an abuse of one's office;
abuse of office is abuse of governmental power; abuse of governmental power violates the
Constitution.
847 F.2d at 1216.
The Seventh Circuit detected a similar syllogism in Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200 (7th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984), where it observed that "the plaintiffs have another
argument: The Fourteenth Amendment forbids a state to deprive anyone of his life without due process
of law; to deprive a person of his life through negligence is the antithesis of due process; therefore the
complaints state a cause of action under section 1983." Id. at 1204. The court rejected this contention,
as "[t]o accept the plaintiffs' syllogism would be to impose by another route a duty to provide basic
services [such as law enforcement or fire protection]." Id.
301. One would anticipate that most cases involving governmental inaction would arise between
the government and its own non-diverse citizens. In case of a noncitizen plaintiff, a federal diversity
case could be appropriate if the elements of diversity were present. For more on diversity claim law,
see, e.g., 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West Supp. 1990); 7B J. MOORE, M. WAxma, H. FnI-, D. EpsTmN &
G. GROTHEER, Moopm's FEDaLu PRACTICE § 1332 (1990); 13B C. WiuoT, A. M=Ran & E. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTCE Am PRocmEUR §§ 3601-30 (1985 & Supp. 1990); 14 C. Wmoirr, A. MMI.ER & E.
CooPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3631-50 (1985 & Supp. 1990). The eleventh amendment
would raise a barrier in some inaction cases against certain defendants. See supra note 36.
302. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11 (1944), recited, in pertinent part, that "[m]ere violation
of a state statute does not infringe the federal Constitution." Archie, 847 F.2d at 1216-17, and numerous
prior and subsequent courts have followed this idea. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91,
108-09 (1945); Hebert v. State of Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926); Barney v. City of New York,
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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lated authorities which were opposed to making the fourteenth
amendment "a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever
systems may already be administered by the states." 3 °4 DeShaney

Communications v. Chicago Cable Comm'n, 879 F.2d 1540, 1546 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 839 (1990); Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 944
(D.C. Cir. 1988); Fleury v. Clayton, 847 F.2d 1229, 1231 (7th Cir. 1988); Neuwirth v. Louisiana State
Bd. of Dentistry, 845 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1988); Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates,
844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1988); Arkhola Sand & Gravel Co. v. City of Booneville, 694 F.2d 528,
530 (8th Cir. 1982); Ortega Cabrera v. Municipality of Bayamon, 562 F.2d 91, 102 (Ist Cir. 1977);
Oberndorf v. City & County of Denver, 696 F. Supp. 552, 561 (D. Colo. 1988), aff'd, 900 F.2d 1434,
1442 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 129 (1990). See supra notes 79-80, 83-84 and accompanying
text.
303. Archie, 847 F.2d at 1213, 1216.
304. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976); see, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
392 (1989); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-33 (1986) ("Our Constitution deals with the large
concerns of the governors and the governed, but it does not purport to supplant traditional tort law
in laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend living together in society."
Id. at 332); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981), the court stated: "To accept respondent's
argument that the conduct of the state officials in this case constituted a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment would almost necessarily result in turning every alleged injury which may have been inflicted
by a state official acting under 'color of law' into a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment cognizable
under § 1983. It is hard to perceive any logical stopping place to such a line of reasoning," overruled
on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S.
277, 285 (1980); Baker v. McCoilan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979) ("Section 1983 imposes liability for
violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort
law. Remedy for the latter type of injury must be sought in state court under traditional tort-law
principles."); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); D.T. v. Independent School Dist. No. 16,
894 F.2d 1176, 1188-89 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 213 (1990); Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v.
City of Pontiac, 887 F.2d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 1989); Arnaud v. Odom, 870 F.2d 304, 309 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 159 (1989); Willard v. City of Myrtle Beach, 728 F. Supp. 397, 404-05 (D.S.C.
1989). But see Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975, 996 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (attacked
majority's decision, discussed infra notes 335-47 and accompanying text, for making the fourteenth
amendment a font of tort law in derogation of Paul, Parratt,etc.). Thus, in Jackson v. City of Joliet,
715 F.2d 1200, 1205 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984), one of the series of Seventh
Circuit governmental failure to act cases that led up to Archie, the court refused to find liability in a
governmental nonfeasance situation because state tort law must not be subsumed by Section 1983. Id.
Accord, e.g., Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507, 511 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986).
Interestingly enough, in Easter House v. Felder, 879 F.2d 1458, 1481 n.1 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc)
(Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 110
S. Ct. 1314 (1990), Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Cudahy, the author of Doe II, had bitterly objected
to Seventh Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook's inference that a federal procedural due process claim
should be resolved by state courts, pursuant to Parrattand on the basis of DeShaney and Archie. Id.
at 1478 (Easterbrook, J., concurring). Judge Cudahy argued that the claim of a procedural due process
entitlement holder such as the EasterHouse plaintiff - or, arguably, the abused child plaintiff in Doe
II- "has a much firmer grounding in the text of the fourteenth amendment than the arguments advanced
in either DeShaney or Archie." Id. at 1482 n.1 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis in original). It is unclear how Judge Cudahy went, in less than a year, from championing
the cause of the procedural due process claimant in Easter House against the onslaught of DeShaney
the complete
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itself echoed this concern against preempting state tort remedies with
fourteenth amendment actions in the substantive due process context.3 0 5 When these federalist 30 6 concepts were joined, it is possible
to see how Archie and Doe II could have concluded that a Roth

procedural due process cause of action could not coexist with them
in the standard governmental inaction case.3 07
The courts which have recognized the theoretical validity of Roth

claims in spouse abuse cases obviously have either not accepted the
Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Archie and Doe 11 or not considered
it. In many jurisdictions the same sort of reception greeted the Seventh Circuit cases that ultimately were embraced by the Supreme

Court in DeShaney. Such Supreme Court acceptance eventually may
also be accorded to Archie and Doe II by a Court which wants to
minimize interference with state court adjudication of what are really
state tort law cases. Meanwhile, it is necessary to address the next
step in Roth case analysis - assuming the cause of action is available
in at least some inaction situations, which specific statutes or other
provisions give rise to Roth entitlements.
(2). Scope of Viable Roth Claims
The battered spouse who desires to successfully assert a Roth
procedural due process violation of an entitlement right must first
that they had been deprived of an entitlement without being accorded procedural due process. Compare
Easter House, 879 F.2d at 1458 with Doe 11, 903 F.2d at 499.
305. As the DeShaney Court held, "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ...
does not transform every tort committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation." 489 U.S. at
202.
306. See, e.g., R. BERGER, FEDmEAsrm: Tb- FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987); Brown, Municipal Liability
Under Section 1983 and the Ambiguities of Burger Court Federalism:A Comment on City of Oklahoma
City v. Tuttle and Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati-The "Official Policy" Cases, 27 B.C.L. Rlv. 883,
884-85 (1986); Brown, supra note 29; Burnham, supra note 29; Gerhardt, supra note 167, at 411-12;
Nahmod, supra note 29, at 1745-47; Nichol, Federalism, State Courts, and Section 1983, 73 VA. L.
REv. 959 (1987); Smolla, Displacement, supra note 68; Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 Micu. L.
Rnv. 5 (1980). In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971), Justice Black defined the doctrine known
as "Our Federalism" as representing:
a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National
Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate
and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will
not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.
Id.
307. See infra notes 444-52 and accompanying text.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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convince the reviewing court that the state order of protection or
related statute in question is not a mere procedural guideline, but
rather that it creates a legitimate claim of entitlement. A litigant
may experience considerable difficulty in proving that the requisite
meaningful statutory limitation of governmental discretion exists.
Of all the government inaction Roth decisions, only in Meador
did the court unanimously find that a statutory entitlement was present.30 8 In Taylor, the court divided over whether the statute under
review sufficiently restrained state officials to create an "entitlement," with the majority holding that it did. 309 In the intermediate
Roth interpretation cases, the plaintiffs lost their Roth claims because the courts found the statutes insufficiently restrictive to generate "entitlements," and in Coffman, K.H. v. Morgan,310 and Doe
11 the courts also agreed that no statutory entitlements were present.3 11 Other cases have demonstrated how difficult it can be to establish a Roth statutory entitlement, although it certainly can be
done.31 2 Moreover, as mentioned above, 31 3 the Seventh Circuit and
its constituent lower courts make it particularly difficult to prevail
in Roth cases by recognizing statutory entitlements only under a very
few statutes which are extremely restrictive of governmental discretion, and even then only when a due process hearing would prove
beneficial. Still, in the appropriate case even the Seventh Circuit
rules can lead to findings of statutory entitlements. 3 4 While order
308. See supra notes 268-71 and accompanying text. For more on entitlement law, see supra notes
61-68 and accompanying text.

309. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
310. No. 87 C 9833 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 1989) (1989 WVEsmAw 105279), aff'd in part, remanded in

part on other grounds, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990), see supra note 293.
311. See supra notes 263, 273, 276-82, 311 and accompanying text.

312. Compare, e.g., Evans v. Pugh, 902 F.2d 689, 691-92 (8th Cir. 1990) (state age discrimination
statute too discretionary to create entitlement for continued employment after age seventy) and Mercado
v. Kingsley Area Schools/Traverse City Pub. Schools Adult Educ. Consortium, 727 F. Supp. 335, 343-

44 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (state law did not create entitlement to adult education program) with, e.g.,
Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, 896 F.2d 1228, 1232 (10th Cir. 1990) (state wrecker law created entitlement) and Midtown School of Business, Inc. v. Foley, No. 90-CV-172 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1990)
(1990 NVsLAw 21287, at 6-7) (state tuition assistance program provision created private business school's

entitlement to eligibility for tuition assistance funds).
313. See supra notes 68, 273, 276-82 and accompanying text.
314. See, e.g., Continental Training Servs., Inc. v. Cavazos, 893 F.2d 877, 893 (7th Cir. 1990);

Thornton v. Barnes, 890 F.2d 1380 (7th Cir. 1989); Easter House v. Felder, 879 F.2d 1458, 1465 (7th
Cir. 1989) (en bane), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 110 S. Ct. 1314 (1990); Fleury v. Clayton,
F. Supp. 346 (S.D. Ind. 1990).
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of protection statutes should be parsed carefully in the process of
ascertaining entitlement status, at least some courts in Section 1983
cases probably will continue, like those in Taylor and Meador, to
permit the claims to survive this degree of scrutiny.
Coffman raised a different, albeit related, procedural due process
law question - whether an entitlement can be bestowed by something besides a statute, such as, perhaps, a government employment
contract or a court order like the judicial order of protection featured in Coffman. 315 Roth's companion case, Perry v. Sinderman,316
determined that an employment contract could generate an entitlement. Other liberal entitlement determinations have indicated that

interests akin to a judicial order of protection could qualify for
entitlement status. 317 The Coffman language is compelling and should
control, such that all other things being equal to a statutory entitlement, a clear and definite judicial order can create a procedural
due process law entitlement.

315. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
316. 408 U.S. 593, 601-03 (1972).
317. See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430-31 (1982); Barry v. Barchi,
443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1978); Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Katz v. Klehammer, 902 F.2d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 1990); Easter House
v. Felder, 879 F.2d 1458, 1465 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 110
S. Ct. 1314 (1990); Shahawy v. Harrison, 875 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir. 1989); Ransom v. Marrazzo,
848 F.2d 398, 409 (3d Cir. 1988); Elrod, supra note 68, at 706-19. Roth itself held that "rules or
understandings" could create entitlements. 408 U.S. at 577, see supra note 64. As Seventh Circuit Judge
Richard Posner stated in Archie:
So plastic is the language of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment...
that a respectable textual argument can be made in favor of the proposition that [the defendant
dispatcher] deprived [the hyperventilating decedent] either of her property or her life without
due process of law. It is true that a right to the dispatch of an ambulance is remote from
conventional notions of property, but this is not decisive against the argument, because the
Supreme Court has, for purposes of the due process clause in any event, jettisoned those
notions in favor of equating property to entitlement, and by doing so has brought within the
protection of the clause all sorts of interests, such as tenure-employment rights, that are remote
from traditional conceptions of property. See [Roth], and particularly Goss v. Lopez [419
U.S. 565, 573 (1975)], where the right to attend public school was deemed a property right
of which the plaintiff was held to have been deprived by a brief suspension. Although an
entitlement for these purposes cannot be built on an expectation created merely by practices
or probabilities ... the ordinances and policies of the City of Racine can be viewed as a
commitment to the residents of the city to dispatch an ambulance without fail in the event
of an emergency.
Archie, 847 F.2d at 1225 (Posner, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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What Process Is Due

Assuming that (1) notwithstanding Doe H and Archie, a Roth
claim is viable in the governmental nonfeasance context, and (2)
despite the restrictive entitlement determination rules, a court decides
that a specific statute or other decree has created a Roth entitlement
for the particular claimant involved, the next question which must
be addressed in a battered spouse case is what process did the police
owe the victims of domestic violence before they more than negligently decided not to provide them the protection mandated by the
order of protection at issue.
Under Mathews v. Eldridge,1 8 predeprivation notice and a hearing comprise the process which is normally required.3 19 But some
prior precedents have concluded that the idea of a predeprivation
hearing makes no sense in the context of the usual domestic violence
case, 320 which features a random unauthorized action by some state
official, usually a police officer, who failed to provide the security
mandated by an order of protection. In situations like this, the Su-

318. 424 U.S. 319 (1976), supra note 63.
319. An abused spouse should, pursuant to Mathews, qualify for predeprivation notice and hearing
under the Mathews tripartite test, see supra note 63. First of all, the private interest to be affected by
the deprivation is extremely significant, since the consequences of a police failure to enforce an order
of protection could easily range from severe personal injury to death. E.g., Coffman; Hynson; Dudosh
v. City of Allentown, 665 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa.), reconsideration denied sub nom. Dudosh v. Warg,
668 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1987), vacated, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
942 (1988); cf., e.g., DeShaney; Doe II; Meador. Second, the police practices or policies that lead to
the deprivation risk erroneous deprivation of the entitlement to protection, and predeprivation notice
and hearing could greatly reduce, if not outright eliminate, this risk. Finally, the burden on the government to provide predeprivation notice and hearing is far outweighed by the cost of not requiring
them. For all these reasons, although a case-by-case determination of what process is due will usually
be made by the court applying the Mathews test, as a general rule in domestic violence situations
predeprivation notice and hearing are the process that is due before the police fail to enforce the entitlement created by an order of protection. See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975, 984, 987
(1990); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
579 (1975); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974); Doe II, 903 F.2d at 504; Colon v.
Schneider, 899 F.2d 660, 670 (7th Cir. 1990); Taylor, 818 F.2d at 822 (Tjoflat, I., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Coffman, 739 F. Supp. at 265; K.H., slip op. at 5, 1989 WVsnAw 105279, at
10; supra note 63.
320. See, e.g., Doe II, 903 F.2d at 504; Archie, 847 F.2d at 1217; Taylor, 818 F.2d at 822 (Tjoflat,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 827 (Anderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); K.H., slip op. at 5, 1989 Wvzsn w 105279, at 11.
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322
preme Court held in Parrattv. Taylor 21 and Hudson v. Palmer
that the state need only provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy,
usually a state law tort action3 23 for erroneous negligent or intentional deprivation, 324 to the person deprived of procedural due process in place of any federal deprivation remedy. This was the case
because such an adequate postdeprivation was the only remedy the
state reasonably could be expected to provide for such an unpredictable action. 325 Thus, the Court determined there was no fourteenth amendment violation in those cases at all. 326 This ruling was
intended to minimize federal court intrusion into the resolution of
state law problems and preclude turning the fourteenth amendment
into the dreaded "font of tort law. ' 327 In these cases the postdeprivation state law litigation remedy was the only process that was
32
due under Mathews. 8

The Archie court and a Taylor dissenter said that Parrattand
Hudson effectively precluded Roth procedural due process claims in
battered spouse and related cases because those decisions would leave
victims of domestic violence with state court tort claims as their
only process. 329 This may well have been true-while the Parratti
Hudson result could be avoided in a number of ways, such as by
a showing that the deprivation of procedural due process was caused
by an established state procedure and thus was exempt from Parratt

321. 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31
(1986).
322. 468 U.S. 517 (1986).
323. See supra notes 3, 20 and accompanying text; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
324. Parrattinvolved a negligent deprivation, Hudson an intentional one. Zinermon v. Burch, 110
S. Ct. 975, 985 (1990). Parrattwas decided before the Supreme Court held in Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327, 336 (1986), that negligent acts of government officials do not violate due process. Zinermon,
110 U.S. at 985 n.14; see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
325. See Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. at 984-85; supra notes 63, 82 and accompanying text.
326. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 531, 533; Parratt,451 U.S. at 542-43.
327. Parratt,451 U.S. at 544 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)). See supra notes
86, 303-05 and accompanying text, infra notes 444-52 and accompanying text.
328. Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. at 985. "[N]o matter how significant the private interest at stake and
the risk of its erroneous deprivation, the State cannot be required constitutionally to do the impossible
by providing predeprivation process." Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
329. Archie, 847 F.2d at 1217, see supra note 82 and accompanying text; Taylor, 818 F.2d at 827
(Anderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), see supra note 63. See Case Comment, supra
note 63, at 1203, 1208, 1214-15.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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and Hudson,330 that it was not random or unauthorized, 331 that predeprivation due process was not impossible, 332 or that no adequate
state remedy was available to satisfy the requirements of due process, 333 many decisions indicate how difficult it was in many courts
to evade the clutches of Parrattand Hudson.334 Only if an abused
spouse were among the relative few fortunate enough to be able to
prove that the deprivation fell outside of the scope of ParrattiHudson and that predeprivation notice and a hearing were required under
Mathews was a federal damages remedy available. This status quo
was significantly altered when the Supreme Court decided Zinermon

330. See, e.g., Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. at 985; id. at 991 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Hudson, 468
U.S. at 532; Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-36 (1982); Parralt, 451 U.S. at 541;
Hale v. Hardiman, No. 87 C. 10541 (N.D. M11.
Mar. 15, 1990) (1990 WrrSsAw 37679, at 4). Of course,
battered spouses who could prove the existence of police procedures not to enforce orders of protection
would thereby avoid Parrattand Hudson and be able to employ a Section 1983 damage action as the
remedy for the police's deprivation of their right to procedural due process. See infra notes 353-72 and
accompanying text.
331. See Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. at 989, 990.
332. See id.at 989-90.
333. Parrattheld that state postdeprivation remedies were adequate even though they did not provide all the relief that would have been available under Section 1983 (there state law provided "only
for an action against the State as opposed to its individual employees, it contain[ed] no provisions for
punitive damages, and there [was] no right to a trial by jury."). 451 U.S. at 543-44. Accord Hudson,
468 U.S. at 535. Later decisions have indicated that state law can differ markedly from that under
Section 1983 without being held to provide no adequate state law remedy. E.g., Huron Valley Hosp.,
Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 887 F.2d 710, 716 (6th Cir. 1989); Weimer v. Amen, 870 F.2d 1400, 1405 (8th'
Cir. 1989) (state remedy held adequate although state law would not permit recovery of attorneys' fee
that would be recoverable under federal law); Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. San Luis Obispo County,
841 F.2d 872, 879-80 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 827 (1988); Economic Dev. Corp. of Dade
County, Inc. v. Stierheim, 782 F.2d 952, 955-56 (l1th Cir. 1986) (state remedy held adequate although
state law precluded recovery of punitive damages); Rittenhouse v. DeKalb County, 764 F.2d 1451, 145758 (11th Cir. 1985) (state remedy held adequate although state law immunity would bar recovery), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986). But see Caine v. Hardy, 905 F.2d 858, 860 n.2 (5th Cir. 1990) (expressed
doubt over adequacy of Mississippi Chancery Court as forum for postdeprivation remedy), reh'g en
banc granted, 905 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc). See Brown, supra note 29, at 837-43; Smolla,
Displacement, supra note 68, at 871-86.
The state law tort proceedings available in most jurisdictions, see supra note 3, would be deemed
adequate by the vast majority of Section 1983 courts, but abused spouses, as a last ditch effort, could
always attempt to thwart any otherwise valid Parratt/Hudsonreferral of their actions against the police
to state court by arguing that, despite the aforementioned authorities, no adequate remedy was available
there.
334. E.g., Easter House v. Felder, 879 F.2d 1458, 1466-76 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), vacated and
remanded, 110 S. Ct. 1314 (1990); Fields v. Durham, 856 F.2d 655, 657-60 (4th Cir. 1988), vacated
and remanded, 110 S. Ct. 1313 (1990); Holloway v. Walker, 790 F.2d 1170, 1172-74 (5th Cir. 1986)
(on rehearing); National Communication Sys., Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 789 F.2d 370, 373
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986).
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v. Burch;335 afterwards, the standard for what process was due to
battered spouses who were denied the security to which orders of
protection entitled them apparently was considerably broader due
to Zinermon's limitation of the reach of Parrattand Hudson.
In Zinermon, the majority336 of the Court apparently significantly
limited the Parratt/Hudsonrule.3 37 Initially, the Court implicitly determined that, under Mathews, a predeprivation hearing was necessary to protect the former mental patient plaintiff's rights. 338 Then,
turning to the Parratt/Hudsonexception, which could eliminate the
predeprivation hearing otherwise required, the. Court held it was
unavailable in Zinermon. When the state argued that the problem
was the random and unauthorized actions of individual state officials
so that the only process to which the patient was due was a postdeprivation state law suit under Parrattand Hudson,3 39 the Court
held those decisions inapplicable because (1) the official's actions
were not unpredictable, but rather could be anticipated at a specific
point in the voluntary/involuntary state mental hospital admission
process, 340 (2) predeprivation procedural safeguards were possible to
prevent state officials from admitting mentally incompetent persons
under the voluntary admission process, 341 and (3) the officials' actions were not "unauthorized" since the state delegated to the officials the authority to do exactly what they did. 42 Since the Parratti
Hudson defense was unavailable in Zinermon, the Court observed
that the patient could pursue his Section 1983 deprivation of procedural due process suit and might be able to recover actual damages
343
for the state's failure to provide him with a predeprivation hearing.

335. 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990).

336. Zinermon was decided on a five-to-four vote, with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Scalia joining in Justice O'Connor's dissent to Justice Blackmun's majority opinion. Id. at
977.

337. As the Court noted, it granted certiorari in Zinermon to resolve the then-existing conflict that
had arisen "in the Courts of Appeals over the proper scope of the Parrattrule." Id. at 978 & n.2.
Apparently it did so, and in a manner restrictive of Parrattand Hudson.
338. See id. at 984.
339. Id. at 986.
340. Id. at 989.
341. Id. at 989-90.
342. Id. at 990.
343. Id. at 988 & n.19. As the Court observed, the patient could recover actual damages, in74
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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In dissent, Justice O'Connor, on behalf of herself and the three
other dissenters, 344 vigorously and extensively argued that the Zi-

nermon majority was drastically restricting the Parratt/Hudsontest
by holding that the test did not preclude federal relief for a plaintiff

whose claim clearly fit its traditional parameters.3 45 The dissenters
obviously believed that the majority had severely undermined Mathews, Parratt, and Hudson in Zinermon.3 46 Some subsequent de-

cisions have agreed with the dissenters that Zinermon cut back
strongly on Parrattand Hudson such that their scope in future cases

will be far less than that in those before it was issued.3 47 Whether

accordance with Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978), and its progeny,
if he can show either that if the proper procedure had been followed he would have remained
at liberty and that he suffered harm by being confined, or that even if he would have been
committed anyway under the involuntary placement procedure, the lack of this procedure
harmed him in some way.
Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. at 988 & n.19. See infra notes 353-72 and accompanying text.
344. See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
345. Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. at 990-97 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). As Justice O'Connor stated: "The
Court's opinion unnecessarily transforms well-established procedural due process doctrine and departs
from controlling precedent." Id. at 990. She contended that: "Only by disregarding the gist of [the
respondent]'s complaint - that state actors' wanton and unauthorized departure from established practice
worked the deprivation-.., can the Court attempt to distinguish this case from Parrattand Hudson."
Id. at 990-91 (emphasis in original). She argued that the state officials' behavior reviewed in Zinermon
was random and unauthorized by the State so that the respondent should, under Parrattand Hudson,
find the process due him solely in the adequate postdeprivation remedies available pursuant to state law.
Id. at 992.
346. Id. at 995-96. Justice O'Connor said: "In place of the border clearly dividing the duties
required by Mathews from those required by Parratt,the Court marks out a vast terra incognita of
unknowable duties and expansive liability of constitutional dimension." Id. at 996 (emphasis in original).
She later referred to the "strained reading of controlling procedural due process law that the Court
today adopts." Id. at 997. Apparently the majority had resolved the conflict over the scope of Parratt
and Hudson. See supra note 337.
347. See, e.g., Matthias v. Bingley, 906 F.2d 1047, 1056-57 (5th Cir. 1990); id. at 1058 (Jones,
J., concurring); Caine v. Hardy, 905 F.2d 858, 862 (5th Cir. 1990) ("The lesson of Zinermon is that
the Parratt/Hudsondoctrine is restricted to cases where it truly is impossible for the state to provide
predeprivation procedural due process before a person unpredictably is deprived of his liberty or property
through the unauthorized conduct of a state actor." (emphasis in original)), reh'g en banc granted, 905
F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc); id. at 865-66 (Jones, J., dissenting) ("Zinermon requires a hard
look at a ParrattlHudsonclaim to determine whether the state official's conduct, under all the circumstances of the deprivation, could have been adequately foreseen and addressed by procedural safeguards. If it could, then the case requires classic Mathews balancing and has stated a claim for relief....
Zinermon employs and hence requires case-by-case analysis of the deprivation at issue." (emphasis in
original)). But'see Katz v. Klehammer, 902 F.2d 204, 207 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1990); Swank v. Smart, 898
F.2d 1247, 1261-62 & n.5 (7th Cir. 1990) (Manion, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
A few days after the Court handed down Zinermon, it vacated and remanded for reconsideration
in light of Zinermon two of the broader expansions of the Parratt/Hudsondoctrine, see supra note
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these predictions ultimately prove to be correct remains to be seen.
Zinermon should prove to be extremely important in domestic
violence victims' Roth cases due to its apparent retrenchment of
Parrattand Hudson. Just like the mental patient in Zinermon, bat-

tered spouses can argue that their deprivation of notice and a hearing
before the police declined to honor their orders of protection was

not unpredictable.3 48 Second, they will contend that predeprivation
process was possible since the state could anticipate the police failure
to enforce protection orders and take steps to preclude its happening

without predeprivation due process (if at all).3 49 Finally, they may
assert that police behavior that fails to honor their protection orders
is not unauthorized since the state delegates law enforcement power,
including that to enforce orders of protection, to individual officers
and must be responsible for their failure properly to exercise it.35°
334 and accompanying text, Easter House v. Felder, 879 F.2d 1458 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), vacated
and remanded, 110 S. Ct. 1314 (1990), and Fields v. Durham, 856 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1988), vacated
and remanded, 110 S. Ct. 1313 (1990). As one later court has observed, this action bodes ill for future
broad applications of Parrattand Hudson. Caine, 905 F.2d at 862. Caine also pointed adversely to
another broad pre-Zinermon Parratt/Hudsondecision, Holloway v. Walker, 790 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir.
1986) (on rehearing), see supra note 334. Caine, 905 F.2d at 861.
On remand from the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit ultimately upheld the Parratt/Hudson
termination of the plaintiff's procedural due process claim in Fields v. Durham, 909 F.2d 94 (4th Cir.
1990). The Seventh Circuit acted similarly in Easter House v. Feldon, 910 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1990)
(en banc).
348. See Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. at 989. Arguably, the state's situation in the battered spouse case
more resembles that in Parratt,451 U.S. at 541, and Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533, where the deprivation
was random and unpredictable, than in Zinermon, when it would arise at a given moment during the
admission process. 110 S. Ct. at 989. The exact level of randomness and predictability present will have
to be determined in future individual abused spouse case Parratt/Hudson/Zinermonanalyses. Some
courts might consider the deprivation to be at least somewhat predictable, as it could only arise after
an order of protection was issued. That might or might not be deemed more predictable than the official
actions in Parrattand Hudson.
349. See Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. at 989-90. Again, arguably the battered spouse case raises different
issues concerning the possibility of predeprivation process than were addressed in Zinermon, as the time,
place, and manner of deprivation are far less predictable or avoidable. As in the predictability case,
future Roth courts will have to assess the relationship of domestic violence case scenarios and the Parratti
HudsonlZinermon test. See Katz v. Klehammer, 902 F.2d 204, 207 & n.l (2d Cir. 1990).
350. See Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. at 990. But it will be awfully difficult to distinguish on a factual
basis between the relative lack of authority that the Court found in Parratt and Hudson justified the
postdeprivation state law remedy rule, see Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. at 994-95 (O'Connor, J., dissenting),
and the "broad authority" which precluded it in Zinermon. Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. at 990. Which way
the facts point in domestic violence victims' Roth suits will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis,
see id. at 995 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Caine v. Hardy, 905 F.2d 858, 865 (5th Cir.) (Jones, J.,
dissenting), reh'g en banc granted, 905 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), with the court focusing each
time on how much authority the government gave the officials who deprived the battered spouses of
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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It is by no means certain that Zinermon frees abused spouses'

Roth suits from the shackles of the Parratt/Hudsonrule to which
previous nonfeasance cases probably had condemned them. Reasonaply compelling arguments can be posited to explain why Parratt

and Hudson should still apply.35 1 Still, Zinermon will be significant

in battered spouse Roth cases both because of whatever degree to

which it actually reduced the expanse of the Parratt/Hudsonrule
and for its general tone indicating that lower courts should be less
eager to terminate procedural due process cases on the grounds of

Parrattand Hudson and more willing to send the claimants' actions
35 2
on for a determination of what remedy to which they are entitled.

Damage Remedy for Denial of Procedural Due Process
If battered spouses employ the apparent window of opportunity
provided by Zinermon to get past the Parratt/Hudsonhurdle (or
(4).

avoid it altogether in case of a defective state procedure 353), the remaining matter to be determined is the appropriate remedy for the

government's failure to give notice and a hearing to them before it
deprives them of their order of protection-granted right to protec-

tion. One form of relief for a police failure to provide a battered
spouse with a predeprivation hearing could be an injunction barring
deprivation of the plaintiff's rights without due process and res-

toration of the status quo before the original deprivation. 35 4 This
remedy, of course, would be essentially worthless to a battered spouse

who had already been injured or killed.3 55 Compensatory, and even
351. See pupra notes 348-50; see also Caine v. Hardy, 905 F.2d 858, 865-66 (5th Cir.) (Jones, J.,
dissenting), reh'g en banc granted, 905 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc). Even if Zinermon does not
help them, battered spouses can still escape Parrattand Hudson by demonstrating that they were deprived
of their procedural due process right to notice and a hearing before the police decided not to enforce
their right to protection pursuant to an established state procedure. See supra note 330 and accompanying
text. Once they show this, they are free to seek a Section 1983 damage remedy, see infra notes 353-72
and accompanying text.
352. Zinermon's tenure could be brief. Supreme Court Associate Justice William Brennan cast one
of the five majority votes in that case. 110 S. Ct. at 977. Now that Associate Justice David Souter has
taken Justice Brennan's seat on the Court, Parrattand Hudson quickly could be revitalized (to the
extent that Zinermon devitalized them).
353. See supra note 330 and accompanying text.
354. Taylor, 818 F.2d at 822 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Mathews,
424 U.S. at 349). But see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
355. See Taylor, 818 F.2d at 822 (Tioflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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punitive, 356 damages also could be available to such victims of domestic violence or their survivors. 357
Section 1983 money damages for the governmental failure to
provide the process due under an entitlement are appropriate, albeit

sometimes difficult to quantify.3 58 In Carey v. Piphus 359 the Supreme
Court recognized that those who are deprived of procedural due

process can recover actual damages in a Section 1983 action to compensate them for those losses they suffered which were caused by
the deprivation. 36 The Court specifically acknowledged that such
deprivations can cause compensable mental and emotional distress
to those deprived of the process due them.3 61 The Court held that

if a deprivation is substantively justified but procedurally defective,
only damages for the injury caused by the deficient procedure will
be recoverable; nothing is owed for the substantively correct action.3 62 Both Carey and the subsequent Memphis Community School
District v. Stachura63 agreed that the level of damages recoverable
in Section 1983 actions should be determined in accordance with
356. Under Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983), public officials acting in their individual capacity
can be held liable in a Section 1983 suit for punitive damages when their conduct is reckless or callously
indifferent to the Section 1983 plaintiff's federally protected rights. Id. at 56. Accord, e.g., Kentucky
v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.13 (1985). Punitive damages may not be awarded against municipal
bodies or individual municipal officials acting in their official capacity. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981); O'Leary v. Luongo, 692 F. Supp. 893, 904 (N.D. Ili. 1988); Farris v. Moeckel,
664 F. Supp. 881, 893 (D. Del. 1987); Brown v. Town of Allenstown, 648 F. Supp. 831, 840 (D.N.H.
1986). Punitive damages have been awarded against a number of individual public officials for reckless
or indifferent deprivations of procedural due process. See, e.g., Kercado-Melendez v. Aponte-Roque,
829 F.2d 255, 267 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1044 (1988); Washington v. Kirksey, 811 F.2d
561, 565 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 827 (1987); Abraham v. Pekarski, 728 F.2d 167, 173 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1242 (1984).
357. For an overview of damages in the Section 1983 setting, see, e.g., S. NAumOD, supra note
31, at §§ 4.01-.03, 4.05; M. ScawARuz & J. Knuan, supra note 31, at §§ 14.1, .3-.5; Nahmod, Damages
and Injunctive Relief under Section 1983, 16 URB. LAw. 201 (1984); Spurrier, Federal Constitutional
Rights: Priceless or Worthless? Awards of Money Damages Under Section 1983, 20 TlsA L.J. 1 (1984);
Comment, Compensatory Damage Awards in Section 1983 Actions Based on Federal Statutory Violations, 34 WAYNE L. Rnv. 1373 (1988).
358. See Rotenberg, PrivateRemedies for Constitutional Wrongs - A Matter of Perspective, Priority, and Process, 14 HAsrmros CoNsT. L.Q. 77, 86 (1986).
359. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
360. See id. at 254, 255-57, 260, 263.
361. Id. at 263-64. Accord, e.g., Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299,
307 (1986).
362. Carey, 435 U.S. at 263 & n.19.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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common law tort principles, 364 and that the purpose of such damages
is to compensate plaintiffs for the injuries caused them by defen-

dants' constitutional torts. 65 Many Section 1983 claimants have been
awarded substantial compensatory damages for the tangible injuries

3
they suffered because of the violation of their rights. 6
Before Roth claimants can recover compensatory monetary damages for a procedural due process violation they must prove what

actual injury was caused by the deprivation, either distress attrib-

utable to the denial of due process or the injuries caused by the
deprivation which due process would have averted.3 67 In the case of

a battered spouse who was severely injured, or even murdered, by
the person subject to an order of protection, that should be a simple
matter through the standard methods of proof of personal injury,

emotional distress, and unlawful death. Presumably the police could
never establish that deprivation of a domestic violence victim's entitlement to protection was substantively justified unless, perhaps,
the order of protection itself somehow was invalid.
Once Section 1983 claimants prove violation of procedural due

process and damages, they will prevail in their cases unless defendants can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that there
was no causal connection between the plaintiffs' injuries and the

constitutional lapse - i.e., that the plaintiffs would have suffered
the harm complained of regardless of whether due process had been
provided them, or that public policy precludes the imposition of
liability for so remote an injury.3 68 As one commentator has observed
364. Stachura, 477 U.S. at 306; Carey, 435 U.S. at 257-58.
365. Stachura, 477 U.S. at 306, 307; Carey, 435 U.S. at 254-55, 257.
366. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Comas, 888 F.2d 899, 906 (lst Cir. 1989); Gutierrez-Rodriguez v.
Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 578-79 (lst Cir. 1989); Jackson v. Crews, 873 F.2d 1105, 1109 (8th Cir. 1989);
Davis v. Little, 851 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1988); Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1400 (4th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027 (1988). See also Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. at 988 & n.19, see supra note 343
and accompanying text.
367. See, e.g., S. NAHmOD, supra note 31, at §§ 4.01, .03, .05; M. ScnwA'Rz & J. Kmiia, supra
note 31, at § 14.5; Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. R.y. 1007, 105253 (1989).
368. E.g., Carey, 435 U.S. at 260, 263; Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1195-96 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 101 (1989); Donald v. Polk County, 836 F.2d 376, 380 (7th Cir. 1988); Morton v.
Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986); Lossman v. Pekarske, 707 F.2d 288, 290-91 (7th Cir. 1983);
Cir. 1981);
1322 & n.4 (5th
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about cases where the state has failed to act, to the detriment of
injured persons:
Where procedures would have resulted in the state conferring the [entitlement] it
promised, the state is liable to the full extent of the injury that would have been
prevented [had it done so]. For example, a foster child who would have been
saved from abuse had the state adequately considered its decision to withdraw
promised protection would be able to recover for all injuries resulting from the
abuse.369

Abused spouses should be able to avoid any cause in fact 370 or proximate causation 371 problems by demonstrating, as they should be able
to do, that if the police had followed procedural due process mandates and accorded them notice and a hearing before deciding not
to enforce their valid orders of protection, the police invariably would
have decided to enforce the orders and would have arrested the
abusive spouses or taken other steps which would have prevented
the attacks which caused the injuries suffered by the battered spouses.
Public policy, through the proximate cause doctrine, should not preclude a recovery in such a case so long as it permits the basic Roth
cause of action to exist in the first place.
Few of the reported battered spouse/abused child Roth cases
have clearly considered the remedial or causation issues. Only Coffman overtly recognized the two points; the court there indicated that
a battered spouse's Roth action could satisfy both remedial and
causation tests. 372 This approach may, and ought to, prevail.
c. Summary of Abused Spouse Procedural Due Process Law
Battered spouses who allege the state has denied them procedural
due process must cover a number of analytical steps. First, they
Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355-56 (9th Cir. 1981); S. NAHMOD, supra note 31, at §§ 4.02, 4.05; M. ScHWAxRZ
& J. KnucuN, supra note 31, at § 14.5. See infra notes 370-71 and accompanying text. See also Archie,

847 F.2d at 1225 (Posner, J., concurring) (noted causation was present in potential Roth governmental
nonfeasance situation).
369. Comment, Actionable Inaction, supra note 35, at 1071-72.

370. See Archie, 847 F.2d at 1225 (Posner, J., concurring) (noted causation was present in potential
Roth governmental nonfeasance situation). For an overview of the law of causation in fact, see W.
KEmToN, D. DoBBs, R. K=ON & D. Owmq, PRossER AND KmnToN ON Tim LAW oF ToRTS § 41 (5th
ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988).
371. See W. YEaON, D. DoBBs, R. KEzTON & D. OwmE, supra note 370, at §§ 42-44.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
372. Coffman, 739 F. Supp. at 266.
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must meet a threshold requirement by convincing the reviewing court
that procedural due process law extends to protect their interests.
If they do so, they then must prove that they had an entitlement
because of the statute or judicial order that gave them the right of
protection that was to be enforced by the police.
Assuming that an entitlement is present, the next issue is what
process are domestic violence victims due. Since the Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Zinermon v. Burch the application of
the rule in Parrattand Hudson seems to have changed, at least for
now, 373 so that henceforth it will be easier to keep federal procedural
due process claims in a court applying federal law. If battered spouses
avoid the Parratt/Hudsontrap, the Mathews v. Eldridge tripartite
test should mandate predeprivation notice and a hearing before the
police deprive them of their entitlement to police protection. The
police will violate the right to this notice and hearing when, as often
happens, they unilaterally fail to enforce orders of protection.
Once a court holds the police deprived abused spouses of their
entitlement to procedural due process, the remaining question will
be what remedy is appropriate for the deprivation. Under Carey v.
Piphus and its progeny, victims of domestic violence should be able
to recover actual damages to compensate them for any physical injury or emotional distress they suffered. Their survivors would be
able to recover for their deaths. Punitive damages may also be available. Causation can present a particular hazard in the procedural
due process field, but many courts should accept the clear, albeit
rambling, causation present in the abused spouse scenario.374
B. Denial of Equal Protection
1. Cases Clearly Applying Pre-DeShaney Law
Most authorities would agree that the evolving body of Section
1983 equal protection law applied to suits by victims of domestic
373. See supra note 352.
374. Abused spouses' Roth procedural due process claims ought not to be defeated by the analytical
and remedial objections of the Taylor dissenters or of the K.H. court. See supra notes 74, 293 and

accompanying text. Once an entitlement exists, battered spouses probably have a predeprivation hearing
right under Mathews. If this right is not honored, they are due postdeprivation procedural due process

remedies unless Parrattand Hudson apply. At least some domestic violence victims probably will avoid
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violence against the nonresponsive police was generally unaffected

by DeShaney. For example, the final post-DeShaney version of
Balistreri'75 contained the same equal protection holding, and es-

sentially the same analysis, as that in the original pre-DeShaney edition. On remand to the district court in Hynson v. City of Chester, 76
the court also applied the pre-DeShaney standard of equal protection

analysis of battered spouse case classifications. 377 And in Coffman
v. Wilson PoliceDepartment,378 the district court declined to dismiss
the denial of the equal protection count of the plaintiff's complaint

because of the precedents set by Hynson, Balistreri, Watson, and
Thurman 379
375. 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990). The court concluded that Ms. Balistreri's response to the defendants' motion to dismiss, and a reference to Thurman, articulated a denial of equal protection cause
of action. Id. at 700-02.
376. 731 F. Supp. 1236 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
377. The court first outlined the nature of the denial of equal protection assertion:
Plaintiffs' equal protection claim is based on the alleged discriminatory impact of a policy
of the Chester Police Department to treat incidents of domestic violence less seriously than
nondomestic violence. The claimed discrimination occurs because the class of domestic violence
victims in Chester are predominantly women. Thus, as a result of the policy, plaintiffs maintain
that women receive a lower level of police protection.
Id. at 1240.
After quoting the equal protection standard that the Third Circuit set in Hynson in applying the
PersonnelAdministrator v. Feeney test, see supra note 122, the district court reviewed the plaintiffs'
"expert's analysis of the characteristics of victims of violence and the subsequent police response in
Chester .... Central to the report are statistics demonstrating a lower level of police response to female
victims of domestic violence." 731 F. Supp. at 1240. The judge concluded that this evidence was sufficient
to defeat the defendants' summary judgment motion, id. - it met the Feeney requirement that plaintiffs
in denial of equal protection through facially neutral gender-based classification cases prove discriminatory
purpose and effect before they qualify for the intermediate standard of judicial equal protection case
scrutiny. Thus, the expert's study revived a previously moribund equal protection claim.
378. 739 F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
For a summary of the facts in Coffman, see supra note 259. Terry Coffman sued various defendants
for, interalia, denial of equal protection "by creating a policy of failing to respond properly to complaints
by women of spousal assault or abuse.. .," Coffman, 739 F. Supp. at 260-an apparent claim of
a facially gender-based discriminatory police classification.
379. Coffman, 739 F. Supp. at 262 n.5. The Coffman court also cited to Comment, supra note
4, and Note, Equal Protection,supra note 2, concerning the viability of the victim of domestic violence's
denial of equal protection claim against the nonresponsive police.
Another battered spouse equal protection case, Howell v. City of Catoosa, 729 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D.
Okla. 1990), also arguably endorsed the Thurman line of holdings. Id. at 1311-12. The Howell court,
citing Watson, id. at 1312, determined after considerable discussion that the Howell plaintiffs' statistical
evidence of police/municipal gender or class (domestic violence victim)-based discrimination was insufficient for their denial of equal protection claim to survive summary judgment. Id. at 1311-12. In so
doing it obviously recognized the applicability of the previously discussed domestic violence equal prohttps://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
tection precedents such as Thurman, Watson, and Hynson. The Howell court also discussed McKee v. 82
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McKee v. City of Rockwall

Not all post-DeShaney courts may have viewed the equal pro-

tection claim so benignly. In McKee v. City of Rockwall3 80 the majority of a Fifth Circuit panel seemed to assess DeShaney's impact
on battered spouse equal protection cases somewhat differently than
Balistreri,Hynson, and Coffman. McKee featured another domestic

violence situation in which a denial of equal protection was alleged. 381 The court granted summary judgment against the plaintiff's
facially neutral discriminatory gender-based classification claim be-

cause it concluded she provided insufficient evidence of discrimination, 382 a not particularly controversial ruling which was certainly
in line with pre-DeShaney equal protection law. But the majority
went further than this ruling on the merits of the case. In dicta, it
City of Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 727 (1990), see infra notes
380-99 and accompanying text, touching on both its insufficiency of statistical evidence ruling, see infra
note 382 and accompanying text, and its majority's unique observations about DeShaney's overall impact
on the equal protection field, see infra notes 383-84 and accompanying text. Howell, 729 F. Supp. at
1312.
Apparently, Howell's grant of summary judgment against its plaintiffs was actually based on the
insufficiency of the plaintiffs' evidence of discrimination and not on the court's aside about the McKee
majority's musings about DeShaney and the future viability of battered spouse equal protection claims.
See id. at 1311-12.
380. 877 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 727 (1990).
381. Gayle McKee alleged that she was attacked by her male cohabitant, Harry Streetman, and
called the police for assistance. when the police officers arrived she asked them to arrest Streetman or
at least take her to her parent's home, but they refused to do either. They also declined to transport
her to the police station to file a complaint against Streetman because she was inappropriately dressed.
The officers suggested that Ms. McKee work out her problems with Streetman. They did drive Ms.
McKee to a different apartment located fifty yards from the one she shared with Streetman. He followed
her there and cut her with a knife. Id. at 410-11.
Ms. McKee alleged she was denied equal protection by a municipal police policy "which discouraged
officers from making arrests in domestic violence cases." Id. at 411. As support for her claim she relied
on statistics comparing the rate of arrests in the City of Rockwall for assault cases generally and for
domestic violence calls, as well as on her mother's affidavit which stated that the Rockwall police chief
had told her mother that "his officers did not like to make arrests in domestic assault cases since the
women involved either wouldn't file charges or would drop them prior to trial." Id. at 411-12.
The district court denied the defendants' summary judgment motion, which was premised, inter
alia, on qualified immunity, lack of causation, and a failure "to present any evidence that the City
maintained a sexually discriminatory policy or custom which discouraged officers from making arrests
for assaults arising in connection with domestic violence .... " Id. at 412.
382. The panel rejected Ms. McKee's statistical and affidavit evidence, see supra note 381, as lacking
probative value. 877 F.2d at 415-16. In so doing it employed a strict application of the standards of
proof with which the dissenter took strong exception. See id. at 423-25 (Goldberg, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Accordingly, it reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment
F.2d at 416.
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construed DeShaney as holding that, in either a substantive due
process or equal protection context, as a general principle the 'dem-

ocratic political processes"' should decide how much the government
must do to protect private parties from one another. 383 The majority
determined that parties cannot automatically bring as equal protec-

tion claims all actions that DeShaney bars as substantive due process
suits merely by alleging state officials have unequally exercised their
3 4
discretion in governmental inaction situations.
Judge Irving Goldberg vigorously dissented from the McKee

court's DeShaney reasoning, although he concurred in most of its
ultimate result.3 85 He noted the majority's statement that DeShaney's
substantive due process analysis applied in an equal protection case
as well, and concluded from this that "[t]he majority apparently
views DeShaney as a general statement that governmental officers,
in their actions, enjoy a zone of discretion regardless of the Fourteenth Amendment right involved." 8 6 He then argued that DeShaney
has no role in an equal protection case.3 87 He discussed the differ383. 877 F.2d at 413 (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196). The majority further noted that under
DeShaney: "There is no constitutional violation when the 'the most that can be said of . . . state
functionaries ... is that they stood by and did nothing when suspicious circumstances dictated a more
active role."' Id. (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203).
384. Hence, the majority decided: "Footnote three [of DeShaney] does not permit plaintiffs to
circumvent the rule of DeShaney by converting every Due Process claim into an Equal Protection claim
via an allegation that state officers exercised their discretion to act in one incident but not in another."
877 F.2d at 413 (emphasis in original). See Howell v. City of Catoosa, 729 F. Supp. 1308, 1312 (N.D.
Okla. 1990), infra note 400 and accompanying text.
385. Judge Goldberg concurred in the dismissal of the plaintiff's equal protection claims against
the individual officer defendants because he concluded they were entitled to the qualified immunity
defense. 877 F.2d at 425-26 (Goldberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He compellingly
argued that, contrary to the majority's finding, Ms. McKee had presented sufficient statistical and affidavit evidence to defeat the defendants' summary judgment motion, id. at 423-25, and possibly enough
to prevail in her claim against the individual officer defendants but for their use of the qualified immunity
defense.
In the course of an extensive review of applicable federal gender-based discrimination law, Judge
Goldberg cited various of the pre-DeShaney battered spouse equal protection precedents, including Baistreri, Watson, Hynson, and Thurman, as enduring statements of the governing law. Id. at 421-24.
Thus, he signalled his belief that DeShaney had not adversely affected their validity.
386. Id. (Goldberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original). As discussed
infra notes 389, 394-95 and accompanying text, Judge Goldberg thought the majority's language gave
government officials a license to discriminate invidiously.
387. "DeShaney seeks to define a bright line limit to the substantive component of the Due Process
Clause. DeShaney specifically does not address claims based upon illegitimate distribution of public
services in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause." McKee, 877 F.2d at 417-18 (Goldberg, J.,
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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ences some perceive between substantive due process and equal protection values, whereby due process protects against the state's
affirmative act of interference with an individual's freedom to act
while equal protection is concerned with preventing the government
from making improper distinctions among those it serves.38 8 Because
of these differences, Judge Goldberg concluded, the majority was
ill-advised when it arguably held DeShaney permits government officials to discriminate because "[t]here can be no 'discretion' to dis-

criminate invidiously.'"389
The exact import of the McKee majority's observations about
DeShaney's role in equal protection cases is somewhat unclear due,
in large part, to the majority's failure to fully explain the ramifications of its comments. Both the McKee majority and Judge Goldberg apparently applied the previously-described body of preDeShaney victim of domestic violence denial of equal protection law
in McKee, the majority doing so automatically without ever really
discussing what law controlled. 390 This action would seem to indicate
that neither had any real doubt that the old law was still valid. Yet
there remains the majority's DeShaney colloquy. The majority's
words could merely mean that DeShaney protects police officers or
other officials from equal protection liability in nonfeasance situations when they exercise their discretion not to act.3 91 In the battered
spouse context, for example, the majority might have been saying
that when the police counsel peace between the spouses and refuse
to arrest the abusive party they are not liable for their actions unless

388. Id. at 418. But see infra note 399 and accompanying text.
389. 877 F.2d at 418 (Goldberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Goldberg
further stated:
The "democratic political processes" upon which the majority rests its hope that all
people receive equal protection of the law is not adequate for the task of protecting people
when distinctions are made upon suspect and quasi-suspect classifications. We hold dear equal
protection values, in large part, because the legislative process may fall short of the Constitution's commands.
Id. (citations omitted).
390. See supra notes 382, 385 and accompanying text.
391. McKee, 877 F.2d at 414. As the majority put it: "The DeShaney rule leaves officers and law
enforcement agencies with some discretionary authority: they need not fear that, in any close case, they
must choose between liability for a potential false arrest and liability for a potentially actionable nonarrest." Id.
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they do so with discriminatory motives. 392 If they act with such a
purpose, the majority may have been saying, the police can be held
liable for an equal protection violation in a Section 1983 suit. If
they do not, on the other hand, they cannot be forced to pay in a
denial of equal protection action for their DeShaney-authorized discretionary choice not to act.393
If this interpretation of the McKee majority's DeShaney dicta is
correct, the observations are hardly controversial, if somewhat unnecessary, and would not alter pre-DeShaney equal protection law.
DeShaney, according to the McKee majority, would merely have
added weight to the view that a simple police exercise of discretion,
standing alone, is not actionable.
Judge Goldberg, however, feared that the majority's words meant
far more than a small exclamation point added to prior equal protection law language, and that they would seriously damage what
he referred to as "equal protection values." He believed the majority
used DeShaney to create a new unfettered discretion for public officials that would let them make improper distinctions among those
otherwise entitled to government services. Judge Goldberg emphasized the "illegitimate distribution" of such services that so concerned him, 394 and spoke of "invidious" governmental
discrimination. 395 But the McKee majority never either obliquely or
explicitly authorized illegitimate or invidious government actionsit seemingly merely said that before a police exercise of discretion
392. Id. "McKee can sustain her claim only by showing that the non-arrest [of Harry Streetman]
was the result of discrimination against a protected class." Id.
393. Id.

394. McKee, 877 F.2d at 417 (Goldberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
added).
395. Id. at 418 (emphasis added).
Judge Goldberg created a hypothetical to illustrate his concern about the ramifications of the
majority's DeShaney language:

Imagine that in DeShaney, Winnebago County had an intentional policy to intervene
only in family abuse cases when the family is white, not to intervene when the family is black,
that Joshua DeShaney was black and died because of the County's failure to intervene. The

majority would have us believe that no equal protection violation exists because "[flootnote
three [of DeShaney] does not permit plaintiffs to circumvent the rule of DeShaney by converting every Due Process claim into an Equal Protection claim via an allegation that state
officers exercised discretion to act in one incident but not in another."

Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting McKee, 877 F.2d at 413).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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not to act in a particular situation would violate equal protection,
it must be based on discriminatory motives.3 96 Thus, both the majority and Judge Goldberg applied essentially the same pre-DeShaney

equal protection law, with perhaps a slightly different ideological
twist.
If, of course, the McKee majority actually found, as Judge Gold-

berg feared, that DeShaney in fact gave state officials a license to
discriminate by providing state services to only a favored few under

the guise of exercising their discretion, it would be a dramatic, and
highly questionable, result. Not incidentally, such a holding would
seem to fly in the face of both footnote three of DeShaney397 and

the Seventh Circuit decisions which preceded

it.398

The majority opin-

ion, however, cannot fairly be said to call for such a conclusion.

As for Judge Goldberg's contrast of equal protection and substantive
due process values,3 99 it is jurisprudentially informative but functionally irrelevant in light of the majority's true holding.

396. Thus, the answer to Judge Goldberg's hypothetical, supra note 395, is that under the majority's
dicta DeShaney would not protect the public officials in question if a discriminatory motive drove their
failure to intervene. Since under the hypothetical they probably had such a purpose, they would be liable
for a denial of equal protection unless they could establish a nondiscriminatory explanation for their
seemingly blameworthy behavior.
397. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
398. See, e.g., Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1218 n.7 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989); Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d 1443, 1448 (7th Cir. 1984); Jackson v. City
of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984); Bowers v. DeVito,
686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
399. See supra note 388 and accompanying text.
Professor Cass Sunstein's article, upon which the "equal protection values" portion of Judge Goldberg's opinion at least partially was based, grew out of equal protection cases that attempted to resolve
whether the substantive due process Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), decision also applied in
the denial of equal protection context. See Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution:A Note
on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 1161, 1161-70,
1178 (1988). Professor Sunstein contended that Bowers did not because of the differences between the
values that gave rise to the due process and equal protection clauses. Id. at 1170-78, 1179. He argued
that Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1339-42 (9th Cir. 1988), correctly held Bowers
inapplicable to an equal protection case because of the distinctions between due process and equal
protection precepts, and criticized Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987), which took
the contrary position and utilized Bowers in an equal protection setting. Sunstein, supra, at 1164-70.
Watkins, however, was withdrawn, Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en
banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 384 (1990), in a decision that explicitly avoided reaching the equal
protection issues discussed in the prior panel opinion. Id. at 705. But see id. at 716-20 (Norris, J.,
concurring) (agreed with Professor Sunstein's position that due process and equal protection values should
be viewed differently). Contra High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563,
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The only reported decision to directly refer to the McKee ma-

jority's DeShaney dicta said nothing to cause one to challenge this
characterization of it. Instead, it simply paraphrased McKee's principle as a statement that there is no due process or equal protection

violation when government officials simply stand around and do
nothing. 4 ° This is hardly inconsistent with the added gloss that this

rule applies only so long as those officials have no invidious motives
underlying their inaction.
3.

Summary of Abused Spouse Equal Protection Law

In sum, DeShaney had no significant impact on the pre-existing
corpus of the equal protection law applied in victim of domestic
violence situations. 401 Even McKee, the one equal protection case to
significantly deal with DeShaney, saw all judicial parties apply the
prior law when they reached the merits of the dispute. 02 The ju573 n.9 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejected Judge Norris' Watkins concurrence pro-Sunstein argument). Ultimately,
the circuits addressing the scope of the Bowers issue have all agreed that a substantive due process
doctrine is applicable to an equal protection problem. See, e.g., High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573 n.9;
Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 465 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990); Woodward
v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1075-76 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1295 (1990); Padula,
822 F.2d at 103. Contra High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375, 37879 (9th Cir. 1990) (Canby, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc). Thus, in at
least the Bowers area none of the circuits which have considered fears of the type Judge Goldberg voiced
about the mingling of due process and equal protection values, regardless of their absolute merit, ultimately have respected them.
400. Howell v. City of Catoosa, 729 F. Supp. 1308, 1312 (N.D. Okla. 1990), stated that: "McKee
explains that DeShaney v. Winnebago, while sounding in due process rather than equal protection,
...
holds that there is no constitutional violation when the most that can be said is state functionaries stood
by and did nothing when suspicious circumstances dictated a more active role." Id. (emphasis in original)
(citation omitted).
401. See First, supra note 68, at 534.
Should proposed S. 2754, see supra notes 3, 18 be enacted, it should at least indirectly improve
the status of battered spouses' denial of equal protection claims against the inactive police because of
its inclusion of a provision outlawing, in language similar to that of Section 1983, any person's, including
state actors', gender-motivated crimes of violence. S. 2754, § 301, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 Coo.
Rsc. S8263, S8268 (daily ed. June 19, 1990). Among the findings of that section is one stating that
"crimes motivated by the victim's gender constitute bias crimes in violation of the victim's right to equal
protection of the laws." Id.
402. Judge Laughlin Waters' partial dissent to the 897 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1990) version of Balistreri
is also consistent with this result. Judge Waters argued that the Balistreri majority had stretched equal
protection law beyond its limits when it found Ms. Balistreri had stated a denial of equal protection
claim, but did so because he perceived she inadequately had pleaded her gender-based discrimination
claim. Id. at 374-77 (Waters, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He never questioned the 88
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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risprudential effect of the spirit of DeShaney may prove to be a

more troubling matter.
C.

Failure to Adequately Train the Police

The Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney at least indirectly
adversely affected battered spouses' Section 1983 municipal failure
to train the police damage litigation. 40 3 A municipality is only liable

for the actions of its representatives, which are caused by its failure
to adequately train them and result in injury, if they violated the
Constitution. DeShaney eliminated many of the pre-existing con-

stitutional claims domestic violence victims could assert against unresponsive police officers and officials, thus limiting the number of

potential failure to train recoveries. DeShaney did not, however,
preclude failure to train liability in all cases.
A week after it issued DeShaney, the Court decided City of Canton v. Harris.4a On its surface, City of Canton seemed favorable
to the failure to train contention since the Court finally4°5- formally
recognized the assertion. 406 However, significant strings were at-

tached to this acceptance. The Court resolved the question 4°7 that
validity of the underlying body of battered spouse equal protection law, and never mentioned any adverse
effect of DeShaney on it. Indeed, he cited both Thurman and Bartalone v. County of Berrien, 643 F.
Supp. 574 (W.D. Mich. 1986), with apparent approval. Balistreri, 897 F.2d at 376 (Waters, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Judge Waters ultimately withdrew his partially concurring and partially
dissenting opinion without stating the reason for his action. Balistreri,901 F.2d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 1990)
(Waters, J., concurring). He may have done so because the majority altered the procedural/appellate
remedy status of Ms. Balistreri's equal protection case between the 897 F.2d and 901 F.2d versions of
its decision, possibly in accordance with his prior partial dissent. Compare Balistreri, 897 F.2d at 374
with Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 701-02.
For more on the various versions of Balistreri, see supra note 50.
403. For an overview of pre-DeShaney failure to train and related law, see supra notes 138-66 and
accompanying text.
404. 489 U.S. 378 (1989). Geraldine Harris' failure to train claim alleged the City of Canton failed
properly to train its police supervisors how to evaluate detainee's medical needs, to her detriment. Id.
at 381-82.
For more on City of Canton, see, e.g., Brown, supra note 36, at 645-57; Burke & Burton, Defining
the Contours of Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Monell Through City of Canton v. Harris,
18 STErsoN L. REv. 511, 539-46 (1989); Gerhardt, supra note 36, at 605-11.
405. See supra note 155 and accompanying text on the history of the Supreme Court's treatment
of inadequate police training cases.
406. 489 U.S. at 387-89.
407. Seeby
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had existed over the exact level of municipal culpability that was
requisite to failure to train liability by holding liability would exist
only when the failure to train amounted to "deliberate indifference"
to the rights of those the police encounter. 408 The Court contrasted
"deliberate indifference" against the mere gross negligence culpability standard applied by some pre-City of Canton courts. 40 9 Thus,
after City of Canton, battered spouses could recover in failure to
train suits, but only if they demonstrated the defendant municipalities were deliberately indifferent towards the constitutional rights
of the abused when they trained their police and this indifference
and the resulting lack of training caused 410 the police to violate the
abuseds' constitutional rights.
Victims of domestic violence lost little time in asserting their
newly recognized rights under City of Canton. In Dudosh v. City
of Allentown, 4 1 the district court reconsidered its grant of summary
judgment against the plaintiff administrator of the deceased battered
spouse's estate on a failure to train claim because of the new Supreme Court precedent. The court acknowledged that it originally
had imposed a greater burden of proof on the plaintiff than the
City of Canton Court had required, and allowed the plaintiff to
proceed to trial. 412 There, the administrator would have to establish
deliberate indifference and causation to ultimately prevail. Similarly,

408. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. The Court listed two examples of what might constitute
"deliberate indifference" in a failure to train the police case setting:

For example, city policy makers know to a moral certainty that their police officers will
be required to arrest fleeing felons. The city has armed its officers with firearms, in part to
accomplish this task. Thus, the need to train officers in the constitutional limitations on the
use of deadly force can be said to be "so obvious," that failure to do so could properly be
characterized as "deliberate indifference" to constitutional rights.

It could also be that the police, in exercising their discretion, so often violate constitutional
rights that the need for further training must have been plainly obvious to the city policy
makers, who, nevertheless, are "deliberately indifferent" to the need.
Id. at 390 n.10 (citation omitted).

409. Id. at 388 n.7. See, e.g., Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1495-96 (10th Cir. 1990).
410. For more on causation in the municipal liability context, see, e.g., City of Canton, 489 U.S.
at 385, 391-92; id. at 393, 394 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Sims v. Mulcahy,
902 F.2d 524, 541-42 (7th Cir. 1990); Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1499 (10th Cir. 1990);
Gerhardt, supra note 36, at 601-03; Kritchevsky, "Or Causes to Be Subjected". The Role of Causation
in Section 1983 Municipal Liability Analysis, 35 UCLA L. Rnv. 1187 (1988).
411. 722 F. Supp. 1233 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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in Coffman v. Wilson Police Department,413 the court, recognizing

that the failure to train the police cause of action may be appropriate
in a battered spouse setting, denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and deferred the deliberate indifference issue to a later date.

While other domestic violence failure to train cases may be scarce,
more can be anticipated from those victims who can satisfy City of
Canton's stringent "deliberate indifference" 414 culpability standard.

As was the case before DeShaney, after City of Canton the failure to train the police cause of action apparently has potential in
abused spouses' actions against the municipalities that employ and
train the nonresponsive, and non- or ill-trained, police.4 15

V. THE

FUTURE OF BATTERED SPOUSES' SECTION

1983

DAMAGE

ACTIONS

The future relationship of Section 1983 damage actions and the
battered spouse is somewhat uncertain. Much depends on how
413. 739 F. Supp. 257, 262-63 (E.D. Pa. 1990).

414. A number of non-battered spouse cases have actually applied City of Canton's "deliberate
indifference" standard. City of Canton itself helped define it in such a way that recovery in failure to
train suits apparently often will not be possible. 489 U.S. at 389. See, e.g., Schepp v. Fremont County,
900 F.2d 1448, 1455-56 (10th Cir. 1990); Lewis v. City of Irvine, 899 F.2d 451, 455 (6th Cir. 1990);
Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373, 381-82 (1st Cir. 1989); Dorman v. District of Columbia, 888 F.2d
159, 162-65 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Merritt v. County of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 771 & n.10 (9th Cir.
1989). Still, some litigants are successful at establishing deliberate indifference. E.g., Roman v. Jeffes,
904 F.2d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1990); Horton v. Flenory, 889 F.2d 454, 458-59 (3d Cir. 1989) (upheld $65,899
jury verdict partially based on liability for municipal policy that, with deliberate indifference to consequences, deferred law enforcement in private clubs to their proprietors); Stoneking v. Bradford Area
School Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725-26, 730-31 (3d Cir. 1989) (evidence sufficient to create material fact
issue whether policy of deliberate indifference to teacher misconduct existed which contributed to student's
sexual abuse by teacher), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 840 (1990); Robert G. v. Newburgh City School Dist.,
No. 89 Civ. 2978 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1990) (1990 WEsTLAw 3210, at 1-2) (sufficient evidence of deliberate
indifference to defeat motion to dismiss when substitute teacher sexually assaulted female student and
school had policy to hire substitute teacher who had lengthy criminal record); Simmons v. City of
Philadelphia, 728 F. Supp. 352, 355-56 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (evidence of lack of training of jailers concerning
how to handle intoxicated detainees supported finding of deliberate indifference). Perhaps it is noteworthy
that the Third Circuit, which formerly was so inhospitable to the failure to train cause of action, see
supra notes 150, 160-61 and accompanying text, now embraces it so enthusiastically.
"Deliberate indifference" should certainly be provable in at least some abused spouse cases. As
discussed above, special police training in the handling of domestic violence confrontations is needed
in many jurisdictions. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. And as in City of Canton's footnote
ten example, see supra note 408, city policy makers should know "to a moral certainty" that their police
officers will have to cope with an abundance of such cases. Thus, their need to train the officers how
to act may be "so obvious" that their failure to do so could constitute "deliberate indifference" to
battered spouses' constitutional rights.
415. SeebyOren,
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broadly the courts interpret DeShaney in the substantive due process
field and whether the Supreme Court, or lower courts, expand it to
cover the procedural due process and equal protection causes of
action as well. This section of this article will discuss the future
status of domestic violence victims' Section 1983 claims, including
how they ought to be treated and how they probably will be handled.
A.

Denial of Due Process

Battered spouses' post-DeShaney Section 1983 due process suits
against the police were most affected by DeShaney. The greatest
impact was on the substantive due process cause of action, but
DeShaney may prove equally influential in Roth procedural due
process cases.
1. "Special Relationship" Substantive Due Process Cases
4 16
DeShaney has proved to be an extremely controversial decision.
Debate has raged over whether the Seventh Circuit's federalist negative liberty approach to the fourteenth amendment 4 1 7 which Chief
Justice Rehnquist adopted in his DeShaney majority opinion 4 8 along
with the federaist doctrine against transforming every tort committed by a state official into a constitutional violation,1 9 is appropriate. While this article is not the forum for yet another extended
pro- or anti-negative rights litany, it must be acknowledged that the
negative rights stand has considerable appeal in the usual abused
spouse case setting. The due process clause itself is worded in the
negative. 420 A mere governmental failure to act, like that featured

416. Compare supra note 211 and accompanying text with supra note 212 and accompanying text.
417. See supra note 42 and accompanying text; see also Currie, supra note 42.
418. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195-97.
419. Id. at 202; see also Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 665 F. Supp. 381, 390-91 (E.D. Pa.),
reconsiderationdenied sub nom. Dudosh v. Warg, 668 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1987), vacated, 853 F.2d
917 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988). See supra notes 304-06 and accompanying
text.

420. See supra note 39; see also Currie, supra note 42, at 865.
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in most battered spouse cases, 421 simply does not call the clause into
play. 422 Those few cases which merit governmental responsibility for

its inaction will qualify for a substantive due process recovery because they will meet DeShaney's custody test.4 23 A broader sub-

stantive due process rule would risk causing ruinous federal
interference in the states' allocation of their increasingly scarce monetary and related resources, 424 as well as possibly bringing about a

"razor's edge" scenario. 425 Thus, the negative liberty doctrine result
426
in DeShaney can be supported against its host of critics.
The DeShaney Court's federalist font of tort law point is at least

as important as the negative liberty one. Much has been written,
pro and con, about the federalism doctrine. 427 At its best, it holds

421. The exception, of course, would be the various "special danger" cases discussed supra notes
232-49 and accompanying text and infra notes 431-41 and accompanying text. This distinction from pure
governmental nonfeasance cases could explain, see Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1226 (7th
Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., concurring), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989), see supra note 232, why the
special danger ones merit recovery, even after DeShaney, on a custody or related theory. See Note,
Snake Pits, supra note 42, at 813-14.
422. See Note, Snake Pits, supra note 42, at 812-13.
423. See id. at 819-20.
424. See, e.g., Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1223-24 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 812 F.2d 298,
304 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507, 512 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986); Ellsworth v. City of Racine, 774 F.2d 182, 186 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1047 (1986); cf. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 400 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
425. The Seventh Circuit feared putting every state welfare department, via substantive due process
law, "on the razor's edge, where if it terminates parental rights [to an abused child] it is exposed to
a section 1983 suit ... by the parent and if it fails to terminate those rights it is exposed to a section
1983 suit by the child .... " DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 304. Accord, DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203. It is
questionable how compelling the "razor's edge" argument would be if it were standing alone. See Oren,
supra note 22, at 717-21. Joined with the negative liberty and anti-font of tort law doctrines, however,
it effectively dictates the restrictive interpretation of due process law reached by the Court in DeShaney.
426. Contra, e.g., Gerhardt, supra note 167; Oren, supra note 22, at 686-92.
427. Compare, e.g., Durchslag, Federalism and ConstitutionalLiberties: Varying the Remedy to
Save the Right, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 723 (1979) (negative view of Supreme Court's version of federalism)
and Gerhardt, supra note 167, at 411-12 (same) and Weinberg, The New JudicialFederalism, 29 STAN.
L. REv. 1191 (1977) (same) and Wells & Eaton, Affirmative Duty And ConstitutionalTort, 16 U. MIcH.
J.L. REs. 1, 29-31 (1982) (same, argues federalism ought not to restrain the law of constitutional torts)
with Aldisert, JudicialExpansion of FederalJurisdiction:A FederalJudge's Thoughts on Section 1983,
Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAw & Soc. ORD. 557, 578-79 (favors federalism and other
methods to preserve integrity of state court system) and Brown, supra note 29, at 815-17, 820, 878-80
(favorable towards concept of federalism, although not towards way Supreme Court has attempted to
protect it) and McConnell, Book Review, 54 U. Cm. L. Ray. 1484 (1987) (positive view of Supreme
Court's view of federalism) and Nichol, supra note 306, at 1009-10 (favorable towards concept of fedDisseminated
by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991
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that federal fourteenth amendment actions ought not to displace
state law, tort and otherwise, in the disposition of what are really
state tort claims. 4 Certainly, the state's failure to protect many
abused spouses is actionable under state law. Thus the wisdom of
DeShaney becomes apparent: (1) most litigants correctly are left to
their state law remedies, (2) a select few are so much at the mercy
of the state that they are in DeShaney custody and can bring federal
substantive due process claims, and (3) federalism is protected.
Correctly or not, DeShaney has derailed almost all substantive
due process failure to protect cases brought by battered spouses and
others. The remaining issue is which cases should escape DeShaney
and still provide their plaintiffs a substantive due process Section
1983 right of action. DeShaney's custody test means that incarcerated prisoners and involuntarily committed mental patients still qualify for such relief. Who should fit its alternative "similar restraint
of personal liberty" inquiry? At the outset, clearly the spirit of
DeShaney mandates that its escape clause be narrowly interpreted.
Indeed, if so appealing a plaintiff as Joshua Deshaney did not qualify for federal substantive due process protection, it is difficult to
imagine that very many others would do so. And this is fitting. It
makes no sense to foster federalism by limiting federal court interference with state law concerns and then make broad, frequent
exceptions to the rule. The proper way to apply DeShaney is to
follow its lead and find few "similar restraint of personal liberty"
deviations in the difficult line-drawing exercise that DeShaney custody determination necessarily entails.
Turning to the actual cases, the first major class of "similar
restraint" alternatives are the abused foster child cases DeShaney
itself noted. The class of abused foster children ought to, and undoubtedly does, meet the custody test. As a rule, they are taken by
the state and placed in foster care with little to say about the matter.
eralism, although not towards way Supreme Court has attempted to protect it) and Smolla, Displacement,
supra note 68, at 886 (positive view of Supreme Court's view of federalism, suggests some alterations
in ParrattlHudsontest); see also, e.g., Brown, supra note 306, at 906-09 (predicts that federalism will
become increasingly important to the Supreme Court); Burnham, supra note 29, at 520-22; Whitman,
supra note 306.

428. E.g., Brown, supra note 29, at 820; see supra notes
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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If anyone besides an incarcerated inmate or involuntarily committed
mental patient meets the DeShaney custody requirement, it is the
foster child. 429 Public school students are distinguishable. While state
law may require that they attend school, that ought not to be enough
to grant custody status to them, or related persons who would assert
Section 1983 liability for a failure to protect. 430 Otherwise, DeShaney's custody requirement will be gradually eroded until multitudes of claimants are deemed to satisfy it.
The other major group who assert they suffered a "similar restraint of liberty" are the "special danger" case proponents. Here
the state agent acted far more actively than in DeShaney or the other
nonfeasance situations; here, the State affirmatively placed the plaintiffs in danger of falling into the proverbial snake pit and then failed
to protect them from it.431 Should this difference be enough to confer

custody status on "special danger" plaintiffs? In many cases the
answer is yes. As it does in the case of the incarcerated prisoner or
the involuntarily institutionalized mental patient, the state in a number of the special danger actions has "restrain[ed] the individual's
freedom to act on his own behalf, ' 432 and thus should be held responsible under substantive due process law for any harm that results. DeShaney itself may support this conclusion.433 There is at
least a difference in degree between the circumstances of public school
students or hospital patients and "special danger" plaintiffs, as the
State has more directly placed the latter in positions where they are
unable to take care of themselves as they normally would do when
unfettered.434

Thus, in Horton v. Flenory,435 the official municipal policy and
the individual police officer significantly contributed to the dece429. E.g., Artist M. v. Johnson, 726 F. Supp. 690, 699 (N.D. Ill. 1989)("[W]hen [the State] obtains
an order to remove a child from his or her home and takes that child into protective custody, it is
surely exercising affirmative State power over that child to the extent that it must assume responsibility
to provide for the child's basic needs."); see supra note 228 and accompanying text.
430. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
431. See Bowers v. Devito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
432. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200.
433. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
434. Cf. Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1226 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989), supra note 232. See supra note 421.
435. 889
(3rd Cir.Repository
1989).
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dent's death by setting the scene for this event and failing to forestall
it when there was still time to do so. This was the sort of restraint
of liberty the DeShaney Court must have intended to remain actionable under the fourteenth amendment in a Section 1983 suit.
Similarly, in Wood v. Ostrander,4 6 the police officer put the plaintiff
in peril when he left her at the side of a dangerous road very early
in the morning. She was isolated and far less able to defend herself
than she normally would have been. Like the child plaintiffs in White
v. Rochford,437 she accordingly should have been considered to be
in DeShaney custody.
In Cornelius v. Town of HighlandLake,438 state representatives
also took steps which left the plaintiff unable to fully take care of
herself. However, her case is less compelling than the situations in
Horton and Wood, as she was, after all, in the town hall at her
job site when she was attacked. Her liberty previously was "restrained" by her employer only to the extent that she was required
to be at the town hall in order to retain her position. Courts should
accordingly view her DeShaney custody status differently, as she falls
beyond the line custody determination requires drawing. 439
In any "special danger" case, the court should not automatically
assume that custody status is present. Instead, it should analyze the
436. 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 1II S. Ct. 341 (1990). This reading of the facts
takes the plaintiff's proof in its best light. See supra note 240.

437. See Wood, 879 F.2d at 592-93 (equates Wood and White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th
Cir. 1979)). But see id. at 603-05 & n.5 (Carroll, J., dissenting).
438. 880 F.2d 348 (llth Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1784 (1990).
439. See, e.g., de Jesus Benavides v. Santos, 883 F.2d 385, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1989) (jailers attacked

in correctional facility by inmates not in DeShaney custody while locked up in jail work site; unlike
prisoners, who clearly were in custody, jailers could quit their jobs whenever they pleased and thus their
liberty was not sufficiently restrained for them to be in custody); Washington v. District of Columbia,
802 F.2d 1478, 1481-82 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (same under pre-DeShaney special relationship law); Walker
v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507, 511-12 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986) (same). But see Swader v.
Commonwealth of Virginia, 743 F. Supp. 434, 436-44 (E.D. Va. 1990) (prison nurse and her daughter
resided on prison premises pursuant to State rule requiring that employees do so, daughter raped and

murdered by unsupervised inmate, court held she was in DeShaney custody).
The result in Swader is as objectionable as that in Cornelius - again, a prison worker and her

family ought not to be considered to be in DeShaney custody simply because they live on prison property

as a condition of the worker's employment. Like the jailers in de Jesws Benavides, if the prison nurse
in Swader did not want to dwell on the prison grounds she was free to work, and live, elsewhere. Her
liberty was not sufficiently restrained by the State for her, and her daughter, to merit DeShaney custody
status.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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relevant facts and ascertain whether the State caused sufficient restraint of the plaintiff's personal liberty to justify a custody finding. 40° It certainly should not so find when a custody claim is as
41
dubious as that in Cornelius.
The foster child, "special danger," and related exceptions to
DeShaney's general bar of substantive due process claims for governmental failures to protect those in danger from third parties are
important to battered spouses because they sometimes may fit within
them.44 But the domestic violence victim must remember the federalism-based narrowness of the DeShaney custody exception. Courts
should not find "similar restraints of personal liberty" easily, as to
do so will be to convert federal courts back into the surrogate state
tort fora from which DeShaney set out to transform them. 443 Thus,
most abused spouses will need to turn elsewhere for Section 1983
damage relief.
2.

Board of Regents v. Roth Procedural Due Process Cases

The battered spouses who are barred by DeShaney from substantive due process Section 1983 damage relief from the inactive
police may turn to procedural due process law for assistance. If the
spouses were the holders of valid state orders of protection the police
refused to enforce without first offering them procedural due process
in the form of predeprivation notice and a hearing on the refusal,

440. Thus, it is doubtful that the deceased battered spouse in Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 722
F. Supp. 1233 (E.D. Pa. 1989), see supra note 217 and accompanying text, qualified for custody status.
Kathleen Dudosh voluntarily led police officers to her door with the intention that they evict her former
cohabitant from her apartment. The officers did not force her to accompany them. Their actions ought
not to be considered sufficiently restrictive of Ms. Dudosh's liberty to render her condition custodial.
See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
441. Custody issues also could arise in the Byrd v. Brishke police misconduct situation and would
certainly warrant a finding of custody because of the governmental restraint of victimized persons'
freedom to care for themselves present there. See supra note 251.
442. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
443. Courts should reject the premise of Ward v. City of San Jose, see supra note 252, and arguably
at least some of that of Swader v. Commonwealth of Virginia, see supra note 252, that an independent
substantive due process cause of action is available to those endangered by governmental officials and
subsequently injured. The most that can be said foi such a claim is that in those cases where governmentally-caused danger leads to harm, a "special danger" DeShaney custody claim should be entertained
by the court and, if appropriate, be upheld. The spirit of DeShaney and federalism certainly would not
support an independent substantive due process right to redress such an injury.
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they may have a viable procedural due process damage claim. Various cases have recognized the cause of action in both theory and
application, and may continue to do so. However, those courts which
honor the spirit of DeShaney will disavow such litigation.
DeShaney spoke out in favor of federalism and not converting
the fourteenth amendment into a font of tort law. Doe v. Milwaukee
4" travelled in its footsteps in the procedural due
County (Doe I1)
process theatre when it adopted the approach of Archie v. City of
Racine445 and concluded that Board of Regents v. Roth claims have
no place in battered spouse police nonfeasance cases. Not only does
allowing such claims go against well-established doctrine which holds
that a simple violation of state law does not violate the federal
Constitution, it also furthers the expansion of the fourteenth amendment and the preemption of state law remedies. Doing so is just as
inappropriate in the procedural due process arena as in the substantive - as was true there, it would improperly "transform [the]
tort committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation. ' 446
Permitting such claims would merely encourage litigants to dress up
their state law tort claims in procedural due process language as
they masquerade behind a federal constitutional tort facade. Despite
the havoc arguably wrecked in this area by the Court's recent Zinermon v. Burch447 decision, Doe II properly resolved the procedural
due process issues raised in battered spouses' Roth suits when it
applied the time-honored federalist precedents and theory to them.
Subsequent courts ought to follow its lead.
Those battered spouses endeavoring to assert Roth claims may
respond to this approach by noting that traditional Roth procedural
due process analysis holds that once the government offers people
a benefit which is sufficiently definite and restrictive of governmental
discretion to constitute an entitlement they cannot later be deprived
of it without first being accorded procedural due process. 44 This
444.
445.
446.
447.

903 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1990).
847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989).
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202.
110 S. Ct. 975 (1990).

448. See, e.g., Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 942 (1986); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
& Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9 (1979); Goss v. Lopez,'419

U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
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should be true, they would argue, even though the deprivation consists of governmental nonfeasance in the face of danger. 449 DeShaney's holding that the state has no duty to protect its citizens
against attack by other private citizens, such as those by abusive
spouses against abused ones, might be inapplicable in such an inaction case, they would contend, because there is a considerable
difference between saying that there is no duty to protect at all and
that once the State has assumed such a duty by creating an entitlement it cannot unilaterally abandon it without first offering the
protected persons procedural due process. When an entitlement to
protection takes effect according to a state order of protection statute,45 0 the assertion would be, it should have to be either honored
or else removed pursuant to procedural due process dictates regardless of what DeShaney might say about the person for whom
no entitlement ever existed.
This line of reasoning would not preclude a court from applying
the DeShaney rationale to procedural due process governmental inaction cases. The concept of federalism would not distinguish between nonfeasance actions depending on whether or not an
entitlement was involved - state law adjudication should control
in either situation because the due process clause does not impose
an affirmative duty for the government to protect 'individuals from
third parties whether they had entitlements or not. 45 ' Battered spouses
ought not to obtain procedural due process relief through circuitous
and syllogistic reasoning. 4 2 So long as the police do not discriminate
improperly when they decide not to enforce specific orders of protection, the fourteenth amendment and Section 1983 ought never to
be called into action.
Notwithstanding the persuasive logic of the Seventh Circuit in
Doe H and Archie, some courts will entertain the battered spouse's
449. See, e.g., Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d at 800; Comment, Actionable Inaction, supra note

35, at 1066-67; Note, supra note 11, at 499 n.98.
450. Or perhaps a judicial order, see Coffman, 739 F. Supp. at 260-66; see supra notes 308-17
and accompanying text.
451. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195-96.

452. See Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1216 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,

300 and accompanying
text.
465 U.S. 1049
(1984);Research
supra note
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Roth claim. When they do so, they need to consider a variety of
issues. First, the courts must determine whether the state right of
protection statute in question creates a benefit which qualifies for
Roth entitlement status. When doing so, they should construe the
statutory language carefully and recall that not every state statute
creates a Roth entitlement-possibly very few state order of protection statutes will bestow entitlement status. The spirit of DeShaney would require no less. If a judicial order is sufficiently definite
and restrictive of governmental discretion that it would create an
entitlement if it were a statute, it should qualify as a Roth entitlement as well.
If the court considering domestic violence victims' Roth claims
against the police decides that the state order of protection statute
in question is one of the few to create an entitlement to procedural
due process, it next must ascertain to what process they were entitled. Mathews v. Eldridge453 apparently would dictate predeprivation notice and a hearing in such a case unless the Parratt/Hudson
test restricted battered spouses to a postdeprivation state law damage
action as the only process they were due. A court applying Parratt
and Hudson should remember the desire to minimize federal court
intervention in what were really state tort claims that underlay them,454
and accordingly apply them broadly. Zinermon may have cut back
on Parratt and Hudson in some settings, but nowhere did it set
aside their underlying rationale. Thus, abused spouses who were
deprived of their entitlements to protection should not automatically
be led around the Parratt/Hudsonhurdle. Instead, they should be
forced to prove why they merit exemption from it. Often, their
deprivation will have been perpetrated by a low-ranking police officer who acted randomly and without the approval of superiors.
If this were the case, Parrattand Hudson would mandate leaving
them with a state court tort claim as their only process unless no
adequate state remedy were available. Most jurisdictions provide such
an "adequate remedy," especially when one considers the term's
broad definition under Parrattand its progeny.4 5 Even under Zi453. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

454. See supra note 327 and accompanying text.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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nermon, only when the deprivation truly was not random or unauthorized, such as when it was pursuant to an established state
procedure, ought the abused spouse to be able to proceed on in the
procedural due process analysis. If courts apply Parrattand Hudson
nargowly, as DeShaney would require, relatively few battered spouses
will avoid them.
It is entirely appropriate that those few domestic violence victims
who progress to the procedural due process remedial stage recover
compensatory, and in the right case even punitive, damages. A police
department that has something akin to an established procedure not
to accord due process to battered spouses clearly violates procedural
due process law, if not equal protection law as well. Damages and
other Section 1983 relief may properly be awarded to its victims by
a court that first strictly applies the law of cause in fact and proximate causation. Any other spouse who reaches this point is due
similar treatment.
In summary, procedural due process Roth entitlement analysis
should not be available to battered spouses at all under DeShaney
and the principles of federalism. Courts that disagree still should
rarely grant relief in such cases due to the requisite strict construction
of order of protection statutes in entitlement analysis and the impact
of Parrattand Hudson on those cases that survive that far. Thus,
while procedural due process law may offer a viable due process
action for at least some domestic violence victims even after DeShaney, very few should benefit from it.
B. Denial of Equal Protection
Abused spouses' Section 1983 denial of equal protection damage
suits against the police were far less directly affected by DeShaney.
The question that must be resolved is whether the spirit of DeShaney
should inhibit such claims. The answer is probably not.
As University of Chicago Professor Cass Sunstein persuasively
argued, 4 6 denial of equal protection cases ought to be viewed dif456. See supra note 399.
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ferently from substantive or procedural due process ones. Due process law protects against the State interfering with a person's
freedom, 45 7 and in the battered spouse case context asks whether the
State normally has a duty to protect a person against third party
attackers. Equal protection law, on the other hand, requires that
when the State acts, or chooses not to act, it treat all similarly
situated people alike. A governmental choice not to protect anyone
ought to be viewed far differently than a decision to protect some
but not others. Depending on what motivated this latter choice, it
could and ought to be unlawful. The government simply cannot be
permitted to discriminate improperly, and if it does so in the domestic violence case setting it should be held accountable according
to standard equal protection law principles. 45 8 Thus, DeShaney, a
substantive due process decision, should play no direct role in denial
of equal protection disputes.
But even if it were appropriate to mingle due process and equal
protection precedents, DeShaney ought not to affect the disposition
of equal protection cases. DeShaney itself acknowledged that if the
State selectively denies otherwise available protection services from
certain disfavored minorities, it is liable for a denial of equal protection. The Seventh Circuit precedents which preceded DeShaney
agreed that an unsuitably discriminatory denial of such services would
violate equal protection. Neither of these lines of authority felt that
the concerns of federalism overcome the antidiscrimination tenets
of equal protection law. And nothing in McKee v. City of Rockwall 4 9
went against this conclusion. McKee completely supports the retention of pre-DeShaney equal protection law such that any governmental exercise of discretion not to act is actionable if founded on
improper discriminatory motives. Thus, the problem in the battered
spouse case is not establishing that state-sponsored inappropriate
discrimination would transgress equal protection, but rather proving
that specific police classifications of domestic violence cases and

457. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 194-96.
458. Notwithstanding the post-Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), equal protection cases
discussed supra note 399, there really should be a difference in the application of equal protection and
due process principles.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
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their subsequent response to them are themselves unsuitably discriminatory.
Police classifications that are facially based on a gender foundation must be subjected to heightened scrutiny under the intermediate standard of equal protection analysis. Those not so grounded
need merely be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. When
the police respond to domestic violence cases in a manner openly
attributable to the sex of those calling for assistance, their classification is facially gender-based. The problem in most cases is ascertaining whether the police response is, in fact, founded on the
gender of the victim. If it is not manifestly so based, the reviewing
court must apply the Personnel Administrator v. Feeney46° test to
see if a discriminatory purpose underlay the classification and a
discriminatory effect resulted. It will only be deemed gender-based
if it meets this standard. Many battered spouses' equal protection
suits collapse at this point, as they cannot prove the police failed
to help them because of a classification grounded on gender and a
non-gender-based classification can withstand the rational basis test.
One way an abused spouse could get around this dilemma would
be to establish that a domestic violence victim classification is actually per se gender-based because almost all such victims are
women.4 61 If courts so deemed this classification, all battered spouse
equal protection cases, except presumably for those with men as
victims, would qualify for heightened scrutiny and have a far greater
chance for ultimate success. But should the domestic violence situation classification be so regarded? Some have argued loudly that
it ought to be, 462 and their claim is at least somewhat compelling.
The overwhelming majority of battered spouses are women, and the
police have to be aware of this fact and use this awareness in planning their actions when they decide to respond to abused spouses'
calls for aid in a different way than they treat those from other
crime victims.463 However, there are some problems with this ap-

460. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).

461. See supra note 5.
462. See supra note 134.
463. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 4, at 723.
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proach. Because not all domestic violence victims are female, it is
difficult to argue that a police classification of domestic violence
cases is purely gender-related. After all, the Supreme Court has held
classifications were not facially gender-based even though they involved a uniquely female condition, pregnancy. 464 Thus, although
the police's domestic violence case categorization of women's battered spouse complaints probably ought to be considered genderbased, at least some courts will continue to join Hynson v. City of
466
Chester Legal Department,461 Watson v. City of Kansas City,
McKee,467 and related decisions which held such classifications were
facially neutral.
Assuming the domestic violence categorization is facially neutral,
the female battered spouse with an equal protection complaint has
a potentially difficult battle ahead of her. Various recent decisions,
particularly the majority opinion in McKee and the district court
holding in Howell v. City of Catoosa,468 have shown how much
evidence of the police's discriminatory purpose and effect a battered
wife must produce to overcome the Feeney test. The police undoubtedly will attempt to undercut any evidence of discriminatory
purpose that the abused spouse presents by articulating a benign
rationale for the domestic violence classification. They may be successful in doing so despite the basic unworthiness of most of the
grounds they could posit.469 Still, in the appropriate case, it should
be possible for the domestic violence victim to prove, pursuant to
Feeney, that the police employed a discriminatory facially neutral
classification that was, in fact, gender-derived. It most likely would
be overturned in any court's intermediate scrutiny equal protection
analysis. 470
464. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974). See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125, 135-36 (1976); Toomey v. Clark, 876 F.2d 1433, 1437 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Under equal protection

cases, [pregnancy] classifications are not gender based."). But see Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 462 U.S. 669, 684 (for statutory Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982), purposes,

"discrimination based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex.").
465. 864 F.2d 1026 (3rd Cir. 1988).
466. 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988).

467. 877 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 727 (1990).
468. 729 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D. Okla 1990); see supra note 379.

469. See supra note 130.
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In conclusion, a Section 1983 denial of equal protection damage
action may well be the post-DeShaney battered spouse's most profitable Section 1983 remedy. Female spouses will be best off if they
can establish a facially gender-based police classification. Failing that,
they should generate compelling evidence of discriminatory police
purpose and effect by a facially neutral classification. In either case,
once the proper showing is made the classification will be evaluated
under the heightened standard of review, with the litigant's ultimate
success reasonably certain. If neither of these scenarios applies, or
the abused spouse is male, the police classification would not be
gender-based and would stand if a rational basis supported it. This
is an appropriate result, since the government should not discriminate in the way it provides protective services, even after DeShaney.
C. Failure to Adequately Train the Police
The failure to train the police municipal liability theory seems
to offer real hope for redress against a municipality for the domestic
violence victim whom the police did not assist. When a deliberately
indifferent municipality fails to train its officers properly for domestic violence situations and this lack of training causes them not
to help a battered spouse in violation of due process or equal protection law, the municipality is liable for its inaction. DeShaney
indirectly affected the failure to train cause of action to the extent
it reduced the number of police actions that can constitute the underlying constitutional violations which are actionable under Section
1983 in municipal failure to train cases.
Many domestic violence victims may not profit from the failure
to train cause of action because after DeShaney they will not be
able to prove an underlying constitutional violation. Still, as Coffman v. Wilson Police Department471 and Dudosh v. City of
Allentown472 have recognized, the spouse who can meet City of Can-

only utilize the rational basis test of whether his right to equal protection had been denied him. Thus,
he only would have a relatively small likelihood of success unless the police could articulate no valid
reason for their classification. See supra note 131.
471. 739 F. Supp. 257, 262-63 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
472. 722by
F. The
Supp.Research
1233, 1236
(E.D. Pa. @
1989).
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ton v. Harris's473 stringent deliberate indifference standard and get
around its causation roadblock has a good shot at an eventual recovery from the municipality whose deliberate indifference to the
training of its police led to post-DeShaney unconstitutional police
inaction which produced the spouse's injuries.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Spouse abuse is a serious national and international problem.

Police unwillingness to help its victims is a major aspect of the
predicament. One of the best ways to encourage police action may
be to hold them liable for damages when they fail to perform their
duty.
Many states impose liability in police inaction spouse abuse cases,
and this is the preferred means of redress for the battered spouse
with a claim against the police. But some want a federal law damage
remedy, and would turn to Section 1983 for assistance. Since
DeShaney, few domestic violence victims qualify for a Section 1983
substantive due process recovery. Under a federalist system, this is
an appropriate result. While some courts currently will permit a few
abused spouses to recover under federal procedural due process law,
they should recognize that they do so against the spirit of DeShaney.
Battered spouses ought to be able to recover for properly documented denials of equal protection; such governmental behavior
should be actionable even in a federalist judicial system.
Under DeShaney and other authorities, when the abused can prove
that the police violated their federal constitutional rights by failing
to protect them they can recover from the municipality employing
the police for a failure to train if they can demonstrate that (1) the
municipality exhibited deliberate indifference to their rights, and (2)
that the resulting failure to train caused the police not to help them.
Thus, after DeShaney Section 1983 should provide limited damage relief to domestic violence victims with claims against the unresponsive police. Exactly how much will actually prove to be
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/2
473. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
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available in a particular case may depend on how broadly or narrowly the reviewing court regards DeShaney and the principles of
federalism that governed it. Meanwhile, the victims ought to vigorously pursue their state law remedies.
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